Does tenure of business premises influence UK SMEs’ ability to benefit from energy efficient technologies? by Emblen-Perry, Kay
 Coventry University
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY









Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of this thesis for personal non-commercial research or study
            • This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission from the copyright holder(s)
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.






Does tenure of business 
premises influence UK SMEs’ 





















Does tenure of business 
premises influence UK SMEs’ 







A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the University’s requirements for 




The UK’s historically low cost of energy has encouraged a culture that considers energy 
to be in limitless supply and excessive levels of consumption acceptable. Now that 
supplies are becoming restricted and costs rising, it is slowly becoming recognised that 
this energy culture has created a legacy stock of buildings with poor building fabric, 
limited energy efficiency equipment and even lower levels of energy awareness.  
Cost effective technologies are readily available but are not being adopted by UK SMEs in 
non-domestic buildings, as rational economic theory would expect. A gap exists between 
availability of technically feasible, cost effective energy improvements and what is 
implemented. Policy-makers attribute this to inaccessibility of information and investment 
and design policies accordingly. However, as escalation of demand continues an 
alternative driver of this paradox must exist. This research hypothesises that this driver is 
the ownership structures of non-domestic buildings. 
To explore this hypothesis a new framework for energy research is adopted; the 
segmentation of non-domestic buildings based on ownership and the purchase of energy. 
A survey of members of these segments is undertaken to test this hypothesis.  
This research identifies an energy-efficiency gap caused by building ownership and finds 
that tenure of business premises prevents the adoption of energy conservation 
opportunities; 64% of research participants encounter barriers to energy efficiency from 
building ownership; 50% have relationships with owners/tenants that prevent energy 
improvements being implemented. When this is increased pro rata to reflect the UK 
population of 4.99 million SMEs it emerges that almost 2.5 million businesses are unable 
to benefit from financial savings available from energy improvements and around 0.7 
million occupy premises in which the owner chooses to have no involvement in energy 
management. Non-domestic building owners participating in this research consider that 
energy costs are not a significant issue for their tenants.  
This thesis proposes that an alternative approach to UK energy policy based on 
regulation and provision of grant funding for energy efficiency improvements could 
improve the likelihood of SMEs adopting energy efficiency and conservation activities. 
75% of research participants highlight legislation as their key driver for change with 70% 
responding positively to the provision of grant funding for energy improvements. This 
knowledge of energy behaviours is used to propose the Carbon Allowance Scheme, a 
simple form of energy rationing based on non-tradable energy quotas, as an alternative 
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The difference between what is considered important and what 
energy actions are undertaken  
Building 
Regulations  
Legislation that relates to the standards of premises or construction 
and, depending on the type of premises and whether any building 










A mandatory scheme that aims to improve the energy efficiency of 
large public and private sector organisations. It incorporates a range 
of reputational, financial and behavioural drivers which are expected 
to promote reductions in energy consumption and deliver 





Strategies that are planned to reduce carbon emission to deliver UK 
carbon reduction targets 
Climate 
Change Levy 
A tax on the unit cost of energy supplied to non-domestic consumers 
including industry, commerce, agriculture and local administration to 




A declaration of the energy performance of large buildings. They are 
mandatory for public and commercial buildings over 5000m2 that are 
frequently visited by the public. The purpose is to raise public 
awareness of energy use and to inform visitors to public buildings 





A cap and trade scheme that caps the total emissions allowed from 
industrial installations covered by the scheme. Allowances are 
allocated to installations at their capped level. A trading system is in 
place to support the sale of unused allowances. Installations may buy 
additional allowances to increase their emsiitions.  
Energy 
conservation 
Reducing the amount of energy used through economy and the 
elimination of energy that is wasted 
Energy 
efficiency 
A way to obtain the same service from less energy by adopting, 
improving, adapting equipment or behaviour; a way of managing or 






A gap exists between availability of technically feasible, cost effective 
energy improvements and what is implemented 
Energy 
inefficiency 






A declaration of the expected energy performance of a property 
based on a set of standardised measures and performance criteria. It 
gives a theoretical efficiency rating from A (most efficient) to G (least 
efficient). Their purpose is to help owners and tenants make their 
building more energy efficient and allow potential buyers and tenants 
to compare the energy performance of different buildings. 
Energy Policy The processes and procedures the UK Government has established 
to manage the consumption and conservation of energy 
Energy Rating A categorisation of the energy performance of a building based on a 
set of standardised consumption criteria 
Feed In Tariff 
(FiT) 
A compensation payment made for the small scale generation and 
supply of renewable energy 




A Government energy-saving initiative that provides up-front funding 
for domestic energy improvements; the funding is paid back through 
the consumers’ energy bill 
Investor/user 
dilemma 
Incentives to invest in energy efficiency are diluted for owners and 
tenants; neither perceive themselves as benefitting from the financial 
savings available; it is perceived that the tenant will benefit from the 
owners’ investment and vice versa  
Landlord-
Tenant Divide 
The adversarial relationship between landlords and tenants; the split 
incentives deriving from commercial leases whereby neither the 
owner nor tenant will invest in energy improvements as the other 




A single building sub-divided to provide business premises for two or 
more tenants  
Non-domestic 
building 
A building utilised as business premises 
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Owner The individual or group that owns the non-domestic building 
Polluter Pays 
Principle  
The practice that requires those who produce pollution to bear the 





Individuals and organisations make decisions and take actions based 




The Renewable Heat Incentive financial support scheme is designed 






This thesis uses the classification of SMEs set by the European 
Commission's Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry 
(2005); small and medium commercial organisations with less than 
250 employees and a turnover of no more than €50 million 
Smart meters Smart metres provide real-time information on energy consumption 
to help energy users understand and control use, optimise energy 
spend and improve energy management 
Split incentives A situation or outcome in which the benefits from energy 
improvement actions are divided between the owner and tenant so 
that the benefit for each party is reduced thus providing an 
inadequate business case to invest 
Tenant An individual or group renting or leasing a property from the owner 
Value-action 
gap 
The gap that exists between the availability of cost effective energy 
improvements and what is implemented 
Zero carbon 
buildings 
Buildings that avoid or mitigate all regulated emissions using a 
combination of on-site low carbon technologies (e.g. solar panels) 
on-site energy efficiency measures (e.g. insulation), and off-site 









CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
Today the central role energy plays in the emission of carbon is widely accepted by the 
UK Government, politicians and the public with, according to the Committee on Climate 
Change (2012), energy concerns high on political but few business agendas. Most 
businesses continue to work within historically developed economic infrastructures that 
have built up around the availability of low cost energy and do not consider energy 
concerns a business threat.  
Challenging government energy policies and targets have been established to counter 
this: Zero Carbon Buildings by 2019; 80% carbon emission reduction over 1990 levels by 
2050 with at least 34% by 2020 and 14 million homes to be insulated by 2020. The 
Carbon Trust (2013a) and Kennedy and Gault (2013) indicate that carbon emissions 
reductions of 3% per annum are required to achieve this. The current underlying rate of 
emissions reduction is less than 1.5%. Gault and Thompson (2014) attribute only 0.4% of 
this to energy conservation measures. Bateman (2011) equates this 3% per annum 
reduction rate to retrofitting a city the size of Cambridge each week until 2020 just to meet 
2020 targets.  
However, these targets and the ability of energy policies to deliver them are markedly 
disconnected. Energy policies are primarily focused on both the exploitation of new 
sources of energy, including the generation of lower carbon electricity and the adoption of 
voluntary conservation actions by large intensive energy users and owners of domestic 
properties.  
Although there has been a downward trend in carbon emissions since 1990 due to 
utilisation of lower carbon fuels for electricity generation, this has not comprised year-on-
year reductions. For example, Kennedy and Gault (2013) calculate a 7% fall in emissions 
between 2010 and 2011 was followed by a 4.4% rise between 2011 and 2012. The 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (2014a) attributes this rise to increased use of 
high carbon fuel to generate electricity in response to falling coal prices.  
Despite this trend of falling carbon emissions there has been a concurrent upward trend in 
the per capita consumption of energy. The Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(2013a) indicates demand is now 1.3% higher than in 1990 and 6% greater than 1970 
with 2.1% rise in power consumption between 2011 and 2012 alone. The number of 
buildings, appliances and gadgets requiring this lower carbon fuel has outweighed 
improvements in efficiency that may otherwise have reduced overall energy consumption.  
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Attempts to reduce carbon emissions through conventional approaches of encouraging 
voluntary energy conservation, generation of low carbon energy, implementation of taxes 
and financial and non-financial incentives have failed to deliver climate change 
requirements. This is explored further in the Literature Review in Chapter 2. de Groot, 
Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999), Janda (2009a), Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh 
(2007) and Warde (2010) agree that energy efficiency improvements have not been 
adopted as expected in spite of extensive information campaigns and financial and 
motivational incentives.  
To date, the expansion of low carbon energy supplies has received far greater attention 
within UK energy policy than regulatory policies and incentives that would encourage the 
adoption of energy efficiency and conservation actions. Where implemented, energy 
regulations and incentives have focused on large commercial energy users, domestic 
properties and new non-domestic buildings. This has left a sector of 4.99 million small 
businesses operating within 1.8 million existing non-domestic buildings largely without 
incentives to become energy efficient or adopt energy conservation. The Carbon Trust 
(2013b) has determined that this sector is responsible for 20% of all UK carbon 
emissions. Janda (2008), Kelly (2010) and the Carbon Trust (2013a) consider if the 
energy efficiency of this building stock is not improved neither the 2020 nor the 2050 
targets will be met 
Small and medium enterprises are significant contributors to the UK economy. The 
Federation of Small Businesses (2014) estimate they comprise 99.9% of all UK private 
businesses by number and employ 60% of the total private sector labour force. Energy 
savings reduce overheads and could improve their competitiveness with long-term capital 
investment. Hereafter small and medium enterprises will be referred to by the acronym 
SMEs. 
Given the financial benefits offered, rational economic theory would expect these energy 
opportunities to be swiftly adopted. However, this has not occurred. DeCanio (1993), de 
Groot, Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999), Janda (2008) and Warde (2010) recognise that there 
is now a gap between what energy efficiency improvements are technically feasible and 
cost effective and what has actually been achieved. DeCanio (1993) describes this as the 
“energy-efficiency paradox”. Energy opportunities have been proven technically viable, 
financially rational and retrofit feasible therefore another factor must be involved to 
influence what, at face value, appears to be a simple carbon and cost saving opportunity. 
This research hypothesises that this factor is building ownership.  
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Following an exploration of the research aims and objectives established to test this 
hypothesis; the background to the research is described. This chapter also provides the 
rationale for focusing on UK non-domestic energy efficiency and conservation in Section 
1.4, including reasons for selecting non-domestic buildings, SMEs and building ownership 
as the evidence base for this research. This is then set against the backdrop of current 
UK Energy Policies in Section 1.5, which describes the energy challenge currently faced 
and provides the regulatory and incentive framework within which commercial energy 
management currently operates. Finally the structure of this thesis is described in Section 
1.6. 
 
1.2 Research aims and objectives 
The key aim of the thesis is to identify how SMEs can be encouraged to maximise the 
financial benefits offered by energy efficiency and conservation, which in turn increases 
their contribution to national carbon reduction targets. A series of objectives are 
established to deliver this and seek to establish:   
i. The extent to which building ownership influences the ability and willingness of 
both non-domestic building owners and tenants to adopt energy efficiency and 
conservation opportunities 
ii. The factors that motivate UK SMEs to adopt energy efficiency and conservation 
behaviour 
iii. The influence of building ownership on energy conservation behaviour and 
consequent challenges faced by Government energy policies from this  
iv. The opportunities for an alternative approach to energy policy in order to improve 
rates of energy efficiency and conservation within SMEs 
 
1.3 Scope of research  
The scope of this research has been designed to support delivery of the aims and 
objectives described above. Primary research targets comprise existing non-domestic 
buildings within the UK, their owners and tenants. Specific definitions of building owners 
and tenants are adopted for this research; building owners are either owner-occupiers, 
owners of an individual leased/rented building or commercial landlords with multiple 
properties. Tenants are small and medium sized organisations from all commercial 




To create a framework for this research, a new segmentation of the SME sector has been 
adopted. This has been designed to reflect the hypothesis adopted and utilises a 
segmentation based on the ownership of non-domestic buildings and the purchase of 
energy. The model is described in detail in Chapter 4.  
The extent to which building ownership, particularly within the non-domestic building 
sector, has been included within energy research is explored in Chapter 2. This assesses 
the role of ownership within energy research and considers how the characteristics of 
ownership, including the traditionally adversarial relationship between owner and tenant, 
are viewed.  
Research participants owning and occupying existing non-domestic properties are 
specifically sought. New buildings are excluded as they have been built under the energy 
efficiency controls of Building Regulations and therefore considered to have acquired a 
minimum standard of energy efficiency and conservation. 
 
1.4 Rationale for this research 
As described above the key elements of this thesis are non-domestic buildings, building 
ownership and SMEs. The rationale for focusing on these is explored in turn in more 
detail below. 
 
1.4.1  Rationale for focusing on existing non-domestic buildings 
Greenwise (2012) considers the non-domestic building sector is one of the least 
successful in terms of energy efficiency and conservation in the UK. To date Government 
Energy Policy has focused on the encouragement of voluntary good practice to reduce 
carbon emissions rather than reduce energy consumption. Taxes and carbon-trading 
schemes attempt to deliver this from large carbon emitters, whilst emissions from 
domestic buildings are tackled through recently introduced financial incentives 
programmes. This has left an area of opportunity between the two consisting of 4.99 
million UK SMEs occupying 1.8 million non-domestic buildings1  of which 72% of the 
buildings are leased or rented. Kennedy and Gault (2013) calculate that 18% of these 
currently have an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) rating of “F” or “G” and only 8% 
are rated “A” or “B”. From 2018 only buildings rated ‘E’ or above can be legally rented or 
                                                          
1
 Multi-occupancy buildings account for the difference between the number organisations and 
number of buildings. 
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sold and therefore only 12% of non-domestic buildings are deemed acceptable for 
continued use. An “E” rating therefore appears to represent the threshold at which a 
building is considered to have acceptable energy efficiency.  
However, there is a concern over the logic of the energy rating thresholds applied. The 
Committee on Climate Change (2012) indicates that all but 12% of the 118,000 buildings 
obtaining a Display Energy Certificate (DEC) in 2011 were given an “E” rating or above. 
This implies that 88% of buildings are considered to be energy efficient. However, 33% of 
carbon emissions were from buildings with a “C” rating or higher. Energy policy does not 
address emissions from the “A” to “D” rated buildings, which casts doubt on the ability of 
current energy policies to meet carbon emissions reductions targets.  
The desire for “zero carbon” non-domestic buildings has driven changes to Building 
Regulations, consequently some energy efficiency improvements to new buildings and 
larger properties (over 1000m2) undergoing alterations are achieved. However, Building 
Regulations affect only 2% of the present commercial building stock. If carbon reduction 
targets are to be achieved energy savings must also come from the remaining smaller 
existing commercial organisations, which remain largely energy inefficient. Aldridge 
(2012) identifies that cost savings generated from energy consumption reduction in non-
domestic building far outweigh those from any domestic building. Despite this, retrofit of 
smaller non-domestic buildings remains a voluntary activity.  
For non-domestic building occupants, particularly where they are tenants, carbon 
emission reduction remains remote from day to day business activity. By focusing on the 
tangible aspects of energy that resonate most closely with them, rather than simply 
extending domestic energy incentives to them, opportunities can be targeted more 
effectively and the greatest returns on investment achieved. The attitudes and motivations 
of building owners and users are the key to this and is the discussed in more detail below.  
 
1.4.2  Rationale for focusing on building ownership 
The evolution in non-domestic property ownership over the last 150 years has created a 
complex pattern of building ownership and tenancies. This complexity, identified by Dixon 
(2009) has left a legacy of unsupportive, non-collaborative relationships between 
landlords and tenants that significantly influence the ability and willingness of building 
owners and users to invest time and money in energy efficient improvements. It dilutes 
incentives to make improvements to energy efficiency as they, and the benefits produced, 
are split between the building owner and tenant. Kennett (2012) considers that incentive 
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schemes have proved difficult to implement because of the differing impacts on each side 
of the relationship.  
Any intervention to improve energy efficiency or conservation in an occupied building 
carries a level of investment risk. Building owners rarely take risks consequently this 
attitude results in energy inertia. This thesis aims to propose tools to rectify this.  
The majority of energy research conducted to date focuses on domestic buildings and 
energy intensive commercial sectors and, according to de Groot, Verhoef and Nijkamp 
(1999), Janda (2008) and Schleich and Gruber (2008), sees the building type as the 
driver of carbon emissions. These approaches mirror the structure of, and rationale for, 
energy policies that have excluded organisations below the intensive energy user 
threshold within the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) energy efficiency scheme. 
This is described in more detail in Chapter 3.  
However, in spite of 30 years of detailed energy policy and well-documented financial 
benefits achievable, energy efficiency remains remote from business strategy. 2020 and 
2050 carbon reduction targets are unlikely to be achieved without a change in policy 
approach. This thesis proposes this alternative approach. 
 
1.4.3  Rationale for focusing on SMEs 
To date Energy Policy for non-domestic consumers has been differentiated on energy 
consumption and carbon emissions. This has targeted energy consumers with information 
to encourage voluntary good practice and large carbon emitters with a series of regulatory 
tools such as the CRC Scheme, EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), and Climate 
Change Levy. de Groot, Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999) believe that commercial energy 
policies are based on the assumption that energy efficiency and conservation 
improvements will filter down to SMEs driven by market forces, supply chains or green 
consumerism. However, this has not occurred. SMEs continue to be significant energy 
consumers and carbon emitters. Individually they consume relatively small amounts of 
energy but when combined it becomes a significant proportion of overall business energy 
consumption. The Carbon Trust (2013b) has estimated that together they emit 
approximately 110 MtCO2 per annum, which represented 20% of the UK total emissions 
in 2012.  
Waters Wye Associates (2010) believe that within large organisations the cost of energy, 
which represents a significant proportion of their overheads, offers a significant internal 
pressure to invest in reducing energy consumption. In addition the financial disincentives 
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of EU ETS and CRC Schemes have increased financial business risks and therefore 
pressure to reduce energy consumption.  
However, de Jong (2013) considers the incentives to reduce energy consumption for 
owners and occupiers of non-domestic buildings below the threshold applied by the CRC 
Scheme have traditionally been weak. Energy costs for SMEs remain a low business 
overhead, which has discouraged them from considering opportunities to reduce energy 
consumption as a business priority, despite the cost benefits from doing so. Financial and 
non-financial incentives for energy conservation within this sector remain an extension of 
domestic energy policies so do not address the specific needs of non-domestic building 
owners and tenants. The framework proposed attempts to change this. 
 
1.5 The current energy challenge 
Warde (2010) considers that the historically low cost of energy has encouraged an energy 
culture that considers energy to be in limitless supply and excessive levels of 
consumption acceptable. Now that energy is becoming restricted and costs rising, it is 
slowly becoming recognised that this energy culture has created a legacy stock of 
buildings with poor building fabric, limited energy efficient equipment and even lower 
levels of energy awareness.  
McAllister, Quartermain and McWilliams (2009) identify that only 1-2% of existing energy 
inefficient buildings is replaced each year. Kelly (2010) estimates that in 2050, the 
deadline to deliver 80% reductions in CO2 emissions over 1990 levels, 70% of the 
buildings stock will have been built before 2005 to energy inefficient standards. Kennedy 
and Gault (2013) have estimated that 80% of the carbon identified as eligible to contribute 
to emissions targets is already locked-in by the existing infrastructure. To prevent 100% of 
emissions becoming locked-in all existing high carbon buildings will need to be updated to 
energy efficient standards or scrapped before the end of their useful life and all new 
buildings will need to be designed, built and operated to zero carbon standards. Unless 
these existing buildings’ energy efficiency is improved there is little chance that emissions 
targets can be met. 
Warde (2010) considers that UK Energy Policy has introduced numerous initiatives to 
encourage a change in energy behaviour in addition to legislation and taxes imposed to 
manage intensive energy users’ emissions. However, UK Energy Policy has developed 
separately from other public policies and has been introduced in a piecemeal fashion. 
Janda (2009a) and Kelly (2010) consider this has resulted in a regulatory framework that 
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is complex, confusing and remote from day to day business activities. In fact the last 
survey undertaken by NetRegs (2009) found only 23% of SMEs could name a piece of 
applicable energy legislation unprompted. The Environmental Audit Committee (2011) 
considers that this complexity is widely recognised by businesses and has reduced the 
effectiveness of Energy Policies in raising awareness and securing behavioural change. 
UK Energy Policy has been constructed on the basis that organisations will treat energy 
efficiency and conservation as a rational economic business decision. This premise has, 
however, proved flawed. Firms will only become engaged in energy efficiency actions and 
behaviours if there is sufficient incentive to do so. With existing policies and initiatives this 
is proving difficult as energy is rarely considered a significant business cost and has 
resulted in energy inertia. Bright (2010) and Delay (2013) have estimated that energy 
represents only 1-2% of overheads for most organisations which is insufficient to drive 
behavioural change on its own. To achieve the required business re-prioritisation of 
energy conservation, the benefits of change must outweigh the costs of intervention. 
These costs are not simply financial but may include disturbance, time and knowledge.  
Within organisations there are numerous points of friction that prevent the adoption of 
economically viable and retrofit feasible energy efficient behaviours and actions. 
Behavioural barriers, such as the need to comply with internal hierarchical decision-
making structures, or financial barriers, such as energy efficiency having to compete for 
resources with other economically rational alternative investment opportunities, are 
significant disincentives that effectively block contributions to energy reduction targets. 
These barriers to the adoption of energy efficiency and conservation technology and 
behaviours are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
For SMEs the investment decisions may appear less bureaucratic. However, the financial 
aspects of energy investment may be more significant for them as energy efficiency 
investment decisions must be balanced against investment for business growth. Although 
the decision to make energy savings can contribute directly to an organisation’s profits it 
is not always clear how to conserve energy or access efficiency opportunities. As with 
larger organisations the attitudes of some SME owners and managers to energy 
efficiency and conservation will also be of major significance in whether energy reduction 
actions are taken. This is explored further in Chapter 5. 
Energy efficiency and conservation still appears irrelevant to many SMEs. The provision 
of energy efficiency information has been increasing for the last 30 years but has not 
resulted in significant improvement nor has it reduced absolute levels of energy 
consumption. Janda (2011) considers that further education is unlikely to be more 
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successful. Kennedy and Gault (2013) consider the Government’s drive to secure energy 
supply improvements is unlikely to change this lack of engagement. The incentivisation 
and promotion of new sources of fuel, such as shale gas and lower carbon electricity are 
overshadowing the fact the not using energy is the most cost effective way of cutting 
carbon emissions and a significant financial opportunity for commercial organisations. 
This thesis pursues this conservation approach. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is comprised of nine chapters as detailed in the table of contents. Each relates 
to an aspect of the research process followed, which is explained fully in the research 
methodology in Chapter 4. 
The review of literature contained in Chapter 2 and the critique of UK energy policy in 
Chapter 3 provide the context for this research. The Literature Review explores current 
academic and business attitudes towards non-domestic buildings’ energy consumption. 
Gaps in knowledge of, and research into, the impact of building ownership on the current 
landscape of energy inertia are highlighted where appropriate. Impacts on the ability and 
willingness of owners and tenants to adopt energy efficiency opportunities to conserve 
energy are also considered. The scale and impact of this energy inertia are then explored 
further in the analysis of primary research data in Chapter 5 and the proposed alternative 
approach to energy policy in Chapter 6.   
The analysis of data has two components. Firstly, an analysis of qualitative and 
quantitative information provided by research participants is undertaken in Chapter 5 
utilising a framework based on segmentation of non-domestic business premises 
according to their tenure and purchase of energy. Secondly a discussion of contributions 
to the research made by the low overall rates of participation, a specifically low rate of 
response to the surveys issued is included in Chapter 6.  
The analysis of participants’ evidence establishes the extent to which building ownership 
influences the ability and willingness of non-domestic building owners and tenants to 
adopt energy efficiency and conservation opportunities. It also identifies and explores the 
factors that will motivate tenants and owners of their business premises to implement 
energy improvements and conservation behaviour. The scale and impact of energy inertia 
is also considered in relation to these motivating factors. Findings from this data analysis 
are then used to propose an alternative approach to energy policy in Chapter 7 and to test 
its implementation through the sensitivity analysis undertaken in Chapter 8. A Scenario-
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Planning Model has been designed to integrate the ownership segmentation framework 
and features of the proposed alternative energy policy to explore opportunities to optimise 
energy efficiency across the SME sector. It establishes prioritisation for investment in 
energy efficiency measures by optimising the rates of return on grant funding within the 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
Agencies aiming to improve rates of energy conservation have, until recently largely 
followed the traditional technological approach to energy efficiency i.e. the ways to obtain 
the same service from less energy by adopting, improving or adapting equipment. This 
has seen energy choices as rational economic decision making, the same approach taken 
by energy policy makers. However, widespread research consensus has now developed 
recognising that slow adoption rates of cost effective energy efficiency and conservation 
opportunities has fallen short of climate change requirements and will not deliver carbon 
reduction targets. This has led researchers to broaden the scope of energy research in an 
attempt to explain this slow progress.  
This review of energy literature goes beyond conventional technological research and 
explores whether a greater diversity of research approaches has contributed behavioural 
aspects of energy use and considered the impact of barriers to change in an attempt to 
understand the drivers of energy consumption. Since rational decision-making is clearly 
not delivering energy efficiency as would be expected by economic theories alternative 
explanations may be sought.  
Overall the papers cited here highlight the diversity of approaches to energy research 
undertaken by both academic and business researchers. These include technical, socio-
technical, behavioural, economic and legal approaches to energy consumption and 
efficiency and are considered within both domestic and non-domestic buildings. Although 
this thesis focuses on non-domestic buildings energy literature on domestic buildings has 
been included, as non-domestic building research has proven scarce.  
Technical perspectives on energy consumption including papers by Schleich and Gruber 
(2008) and Smid and Neiboer (2008) and Peacock et al. (2008) consider that users’ 
energy consumption is determined by the energy efficiency of the equipment installed. 
Behavioural approaches taken by Brohmann et al. (2009), Fawcett (2010), Stephenson et 
al. (2010), Weber (1997), Janda (2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2011) and Janda and Killip (2010) 
consider energy consumption is determined by the users beliefs and relationships. Janda 
(2014) and Axon et al. (2012) combine these two approaches to consider energy 
improvement from a socio-technical perspective. The economic approaches to energy 
research taken by Grubb, Haney and Wilde (2009), Gillingham, Newall and Palmer (2009) 
and McAllister, Quartermaine and McWilliams (2009) hypothesise that users respond to 
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economic stimuli whereas legal approaches shown by Bright (2010) and Hinnells et al. 
(2008) focus on taking a legal strategy for becoming energy efficient.  
Behaviour is recognised as a key driver of energy consumption although opinions as to its 
importance vary. Biggart and Lutzenhiser (2007) consider energy inefficiency the result of 
overconsumption whereas Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2009) consider that behaviour 
will determine the energy-attitude behaviour gap. Weber (1997) and Brohmann et al. 
(2009) take a more general view that people do not consume energy, they consume the 
service it provides.  
Split incentives of energy improvement are widely recognised within energy research 
reviewed here. The UK Green Building Council (2011) consider that this split of 
responsibility between tenants and landlords impacts the adoption rates of energy 
efficiency improvements in both investment and behaviour, effectively providing a barrier 
to change. Researchers consider that ownership dilutes incentives for both domestic and 
non-domestic building owners to adopt energy efficiency improvements. This is termed by 
Schleich and Gruber as the ‘investor/user dilemma’ (2008: 454). Building ownership has 
not proved to be a key topic for energy research. It is however, considered an important 
determinant of energy conservation. This thesis takes and builds on this finding. 
Research papers reviewed here illustrate the cross section of energy research topics and 
approaches taken by both academic and professional researchers. A number of key 
themes have emerged, some of which are points of consensus between researchers, and 
some show differences of opinion and some highlight gaps in research. These gaps 
indicate a paucity of information within the extensively investigated energy landscape and 
therefore represent an opportunity for further research into energy efficiency. Key themes 
are explored in turn. Firstly, the approaches taken to research are considered; secondly 
the role of behaviour within energy research is examined; thirdly the authors’ perceptions 
of building ownership is explored; fourthly explanations for poor adoption rates of energy 
efficiency are considered; fifthly proposed opportunities for the improvement of energy 
efficiency are critiqued and finally research gaps are identified that support or challenge 
the hypothesis tested by this thesis. 
 
2.2 Approaches to energy research 
To provide a structure for this review of approaches taken to research, findings are 
grouped into topics that illustrate the main research strategies that have emerged. 
Technological, behavioural, financial and legal approaches are defined and where 
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appropriate the research focus on building use (non-domestic or residential) and building 
status (new or existing) is included. 
The traditional approach to energy efficiency research has been to focus on technologies 
involved. Grubb, Haney and Wilde (2009) look to UK business sectors to identify potential 
energy improvements and attempt to understand how technology can be embedded into 
policy making to drive demand for energy efficient goods and services. Existing properties 
are chosen as their potential for improving non-domestic energy efficiency is considerable 
and largely unexploited. 
Schleich and Gruber (2008) also present a technological approach by examining the 
extent to which energy efficient products, materials and behaviours are implemented in 
non-domestic buildings in Germany occupied by small commercial and service 
organisations. In a similar technological approach, Clarke et al. (2008) focus on the 
potential for technology to deliver energy conservation in the UK. However, this research 
adopts a wider scope than Schleich and Gruber (2008) and evaluates the technological 
potential for energy efficiency in domestic and non-domestic buildings.  
Although focusing on technological aspects of energy efficiency and conservation Smid 
and Neiboer (2008) limit their research to evaluate energy conservation opportunities 
within residential properties owned by three Dutch housing associations. The researchers 
hypothesise that property asset values will increase in response to landlords’ energy 
efficiency successes and so focus on the development of energy efficiency and 
conservation within asset management strategies.  
Both Kelly (2010) and Warde (2010) incorporate an historical view of energy efficiency in 
the UK into their technology led research. Kelly (2010) hypothesises that future energy 
use will be determined by technological improvements achieved in today’s building stock. 
Warde (2010) considers how technology impacts energy consumption and how its’ 
influences can be used to structure incentives for change. The research tests the 
hypothesis that historically significant patterns of technology development have not led to 
consumption reduction. For example, Somerville (1987) cites the case of Fair Isle. A wind 
turbine was installed to provide renewable electricity in place of the long established 
diesel generator. The new source provided a constant supply of energy in place of the 
twice-daily supply at one tenth of the cost. Consequently the demand rose markedly and 




Peacock et al. (2008) follow the traditional technology based approach in their energy 
research into UK commercial buildings, although unlike Kelly (2010) and Smid and 
Neiboer (2008) they focus on non-domestic buildings. The authors use previous energy 
research literature to segment non-domestic premises by building type such as schools 
and hotels, each of which is given an idealised energy profile. By segmenting the existing 
building stock, Peacock et al. (2008) propose the opportunity for bespoke technology 
solutions.  
In an alternative methodology a number of authors including Brohmann et al. (2009), 
Fawcett (2010), Janda (2008) and Weber (1997) take a behavioural approach to energy 
research. In a review of diffusion of energy efficient activities within domestic properties in 
Germany, Brohmann et al. (2009) focus on attitudes and preferences of consumers 
towards energy. The research defines two factors that affect the German residential 
energy market: supply side measures, for example the availability of energy efficiency 
technology; and socio-political factors such as eco-labelling. Brohmann et al. (2009) 
hypothesise that these factors determine the individual choices of consumers when 
making energy decisions.  
Fawcett (2010) researches energy attitudes and behaviours in small commercial and 
public sector organisations falling outside the existing UK Government interventions. This 
survey of 400 UK SMEs on behalf of the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
generates a statistical picture of the SME sector and identifes cost saving opportunities 
accessible to them. In a similar approach Johnson Controls (2013) surveyed 850 building 
managers for the Institute for Building Efficiency to capture energy priorities, behaviours, 
challenges and engagement with energy improvements. Both Fawcett (2010) and 
Johnson Controls (2013) compile similar pictures of the energy behaviours of UK SMEs 
that could be used identify cost-effective energy savings.  
In an alternative ‘performance based approach’ Janda (2008, 2009b, 2011) and Janda 
and Killip (2010) hypothesise that energy use in UK commercial buildings is a social 
problem not a technical one; people, either individually or in groups, are responsible for all 
energy use. In Buildings Don’t Use Energy: People Do Janda (2011) recognises that 
building users and not just designers have the ability to reduce energy consumption. 
Organisational characteristics define a culture that favours or discourages the adoption of 
energy efficiency. Technology or the building itself may influence energy consumption but 
ultimately the key driver is the choice to use energy or not, a fundamental belief that this 
thesis supports.  
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However, Janda (2011) researches firms engaged in voluntary accreditation schemes, all 
of which have robust energy management, which suggests research findings may be 
prejudiced. They represent a group of ‘early adopters’ who will be keenest implement 
energy efficiency opportunities. As Janda (2011) gathers data through participants’ web 
sites the information will have been filtered for public declaration and does not consider 
drivers for energy efficiency or barriers affecting its adoption. 
de Groot, Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999) adopt a behavioural approach surveying Dutch 
firms’ attitudes to energy use and internal decision making to establish levels of adoption 
of energy efficiency opportunities. The research hypothesises that attitudes towards the 
Government preferred voluntary agreements and market mechanisms determines 
acceptance of energy conservation activities.  
Like de Groot, Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999), Revell, Stokes and Chen (2010) also focused 
on commercial organisations’ energy behaviours. This research surveyed UK SMEs 
leasing workspaces in London, a segment that other agencies have excluded. The survey 
is combined with a review of previous research to understand responses of SME owner-
managers to energy policy and media attention. Despite encountering geographical and 
ownership restrictions it does offer a new approach to energy research, one that connects 
organisational ownership to the drivers of energy consumption. This thesis extends this 
approach to hypothesise that building ownership is the key driver of energy behaviours 
and consumption. 
Schmidt and Fonseca (2007) also adopt a behavioural approach to energy, hypothesising 
that solutions to poor uptake of energy efficient technology and behaviour in the EU can 
only be identified by understanding changing patterns of domestic energy consumption 
and social aspects of energy use. The researchers review social aspects of energy within 
previous literature to identify solutions to the poor uptake of energy efficiency technology 
and behaviour. Whilst this research focuses on residential properties the findings will be 
considered in framing opportunities for SMEs to develop energy efficient behaviour in this 
thesis. 
Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh (2007) challenge the traditional technological 
approach to energy research by gathering data on individuals’ responses to climate 
change through a survey of energy use within the UK residential sector. This identifies 
barriers to energy efficiency such as distrust of information sources, lack of action by 
businesses and lack of political action prevent residential consumers developing a greater 
engagement in energy conservation. Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh (2007) 
consider that a radical change in individuals’ and groups’ behaviour is required to 
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overcome them. Although the research focuses on the residential sector their findings 
support those of other research into non-domestic building sectors.   
In a similar challenge to the technological perspective on energy research Biggart and 
Lutzenhiser (2007) use elements of sociology to examine energy inefficiency within US 
non-domestic properties. The research hypothesises that users’ behaviour causes energy 
inefficiency. However, findings indicate that energy users do not change their behaviour, 
as rational economic theory would expect. Consequently this approach to energy 
efficiency and conservation is unlikely to reduce energy overconsumption. 
Axon et al. (2012) combine these sociological and technological approaches to consider 
the effectiveness of technological solutions to energy inefficiency within the context of UK 
commercial building use. The research focuses on multi-tenanted properties to 
understand the impact of buildings and ‘organisational communities’ (2012:461).  
Janda (2014) extends this socio-technical approach to consider the relationship between 
the stakeholders of UK commercial premises and the physical space they occupy. The 
research views poor energy performance within buildings as a ‘people problem’ whereby 
demands of stakeholders, investors, developers, facilities mangers as well as landlords 
and occupiers combine to create social and institutional barriers to energy transformation 
(2014:49).  
Weber (1997) sees energy as power consumed for the services it provides; and 
consequently focuses on decisions and actions that influence energy consumption rather 
than its technical aspects. Despite this research hypothesis Weber (1997) finds it is not 
possible to identify true reasons behind the well-recognised lack of energy conservation 
actions in the EU because they are invisible. This thesis does not support this view and 
aims to establish motivations for not taking up economically rational energy behaviours 
and activities. 
Stephenson et al. (2010) review previously identified drivers of energy use for their 
behavioural research into the adoption of energy management in New Zealand. They 
term this the ‘energy cultures’ approach (2010:121). The research categorises individuals’ 
and groups’ responses to external influences such as access to low cost funding for new 
technologies, creating a model that recognises the complexity of energy attitudes on 
energy users’ behaviour.  
A number of researchers including Grubb, Haney and Wilde (2009) and Gillingham, 
Newell and Palmer (2009) take an alternative approach and consider energy efficiency in 
the US from an economic perspective. Grubb, Haney and Wilde (2009) see improving 
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energy efficiency of existing materials and behaviours as the quickest and cheapest route 
to lowering environmentally damaging energy consumption. This is considered from a 
financial viewpoint in an attempt to understand why energy users do not adopt optimum 
levels of energy efficiency if energy and product markets are working correctly as policy 
makers and energy analysts claim.  
McAlllister, Quartermaine and McWilliams (2009) recognise it has been more usual for 
energy research to be conducted into new buildings as energy efficient technologies are 
easier and cheaper to integrate during construction. The authors highlight that only 2% of 
the UK commercial building stock comprises new buildings and so, if Government targets 
are to be met, the remaining 98% of existing buildings must deliver significant retrofit CO2 
reductions. This will only happen if there are cost benefits from doing so. 
McAlllister, Quartermaine and McWilliams (2009) focused on buildings owned by 
commercial investors such as offices, supermarkets, warehouses and light industrial 
buildings as the Investment Property Forum commissioned their research. In a similar 
approach to Janda (2011), they segment the investment building stock according to 
building type to review opportunities to increase energy efficiency above market 
standards. Seven office types and one segment each for retail and industrial premises are 
used allowing the researchers to take a more detailed view of a property’s potential than 
the three ownership categories put forward by Janda. This thesis uses a similar 
framework although segmentation by ownership criteria rather than building type will be 
used to generate bespoke solutions for energy efficiency.  
In an annual survey of energy trends RWE Npower (2013) take an economic perspective 
of energy issues that represent a major business risk for UK commercial energy users. 
Although there is an obvious bias in this research as an energy supplier conducted it, the 
survey identifies attitudes towards energy and trends in commercial energy management. 
The findings show that only 20% of SMEs consider energy consumption reduction as an 
important issue for their business. 
Both Bright (2010) and Hinnells et al. (2008) offer an alternative legal perspective to 
explore energy opportunities available for UK tenanted commercial properties. Bright 
(2010) tests the hypothesis that tenancy arrangements determine the ability of building 
owners and users to conserve energy and adopt energy reduction incentives and 
evaluates the likelihood of these opportunities meeting the CRC scheme’s aims of carbon 
emissions reduction and improving collaboration between landlords and tenants.  
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Hinnells et al. (2008) consider the legal aspects of the relationship between owners and 
occupiers as the core barrier to improving the adoption rates of energy efficiency 
behaviour in non-domestic buildings and hypothesise that the impact of commercial 
leases prevents energy saving within buildings. The research finds the short-term nature 
of a tenant’s interest in their premises gives little incentive to invest in energy efficient 
equipment and in multi-let buildings landlords have no incentive to reduce energy usage 
in common areas, which are generally covered by the service charge. Specific aspects of 
leases also frequently block energy improvements. For example, they find dilapidations 
clauses that require tenants to reinstate their premises at the lease end discourage them 
from upgrading. Hinnells et al. (2008) also consider standard ‘right to entry’ lease clauses 
are unlikely to give the building owners access to tenants’ premises to make changes. 
In response to members’ widely held view that energy policies for commercial buildings 
are confused and overly complex, the UK Green Building Council (2011) reviews factors 
that encourage building owners and leaseholders to improve their energy efficiency. The 
research uses existing buildings to evaluate the impact of agreed lease terms on the 
retrofit of energy conservation measures and recommends mandatory application of a 
landlord DEC to establish energy performance requirements within leases. 
Like Kelly (2010) and Warde (2010), Roodhouse (2007) takes an historical approach to 
consider the possible solutions to energy inefficiency and challenges the ability of current 
UK policy to drive future change. Roodhouse (2007) hypothesises that energy rationing is 
the only way forward to deliver Government carbon reduction targets. 
This review of energy literature has identified a number of similarities and differences 
between the research approaches implemented. These support the role of behaviour and 
perceptions of building ownership that are considered in more detail below.  
 
2.3 The role of energy behaviour within energy literature 
For a small number of researchers the key driver of energy conservation is the attitude 
and behaviour of energy users, i.e. the choice of individuals, groups and firms to use 
energy or not. Although this has been a component of energy literature in the last 20 
years, this thesis has identified that behavioural research into energy consumption still 
appears to be in its infancy. To date most of this research has simply described attitudes 
and behaviours of energy users. Few authors extend the understanding gained from this 
into considering ways to improve the adoption rates of energy efficiency. This thesis aims 
to widen this research into a greater understanding of energy behaviours related to 
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building ownership and to use these to develop bespoke solutions to reduce energy 
consumption. 
The research conducted by Johnson Controls (2013) for the Institute for Building 
Efficiency collected data on the importance placed on energy by European commercial 
organisations. This survey found that 58% of SMEs considered energy efficiency 
important to their business, a significantly higher figure than established by RWE Npower 
(2013) in a survey of 500 SMEs. Despite increases in the media’s focus on energy and 
Government generated publicity, this represents only 3% increase over 2010 but a drop 
on the 2011 and 2012 survey figures published in the 2013 report. Respondents cite cost 
savings, energy security and the expectation of future Government policies as factors that 
may encourage them to consume less energy.  
Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2009) take a more negative view of the role of behaviour 
within energy use. The research recognises the importance of the energy ‘attitude-
behaviour gap’ in the adoption of energy efficiency, i.e. difference between what is 
considered important and what energy actions are undertaken (2009:312). Ockwell, 
Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2009) find UK individuals’ and firms’ attitudes create negative 
responses to ‘participatory’ approaches to energy conservation. These include avoidance 
of regulations, superficial action or rebound effects of energy efficiency. The rebound 
effect comes from the increased efficiency of goods causing operating costs to fall, which 
in turn stimulates consumption. Herring and Roy (2007) cite the example of electric light. 
Since 1960 the efficiency of electric light has doubled but per capita consumption has 
increased over 400%. 
DeCanio (1993) adopts an alternative approach to determining energy use with an 
investigation into impacts of energy consumers’ behaviour on energy consumption at the 
level of US commercial organisations. The research hypothesises that these behaviours 
are a barrier to energy efficiency, particularly the behaviour of a firm in response to its 
rules and procedures. DeCanio (1993) concludes that commercial organisations’ rules 
and procedures will be conditioned by the need for profitability. This, along with rational 
business decisions, can explain why profitable energy investments are often avoided. The 
research identifies that management compensation, status, reputation, tenure and the 
‘principal-agent problem’ all influence energy decision-making. DeCanio defines the 
principal-agent problem as a conflict of interest between stakeholders within the 
organisation, which frequently leads to a state of organisational energy inertia (1993: 
908). In a multisite organisation these will be compounded by relationships between sites 
and central management. Subsequent research by Brohmann et al. (2009), Fleiter, 
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Worrell and Eichammer (2011), Weber (1997) and Janda (2008) has incorporated these 
determinants of energy inefficiency. However, no solutions to reduce energy consumption 
have yet been proposed.  
Articles by Janda (2009a, 2009b, 2011, 2014) and Janda and Killip (2010) reviewed here 
argue that complexities of people’s energy behaviours are not rational or predictable so 
the simple presence or absence of information that will not determine consumption. In 
addition, building users tend to treat their building as a fixed object rather than an 
adaptable system so there is little or no recognition of their ability to make changes.  
Brohmann et al. (2009) take a similar approach and recognise the importance of users’ 
choice in energy decision-making. 
Fleiter, Worrell and Eichammer (2011) also challenge the view of energy users as rational 
decision makers. Rather they find energy behaviour of firms is controlled by the success 
of the energy market, which in turn is determined by internal barriers and failures and the 
behaviour of external decision makers. Consequently firms operate ‘satisficing’ rather 
than rational ‘optimising’ behaviour, which achieves an adequate result rather than the 
best available performance, with decisions made on rules of thumb rather than rational 
economic assessments. The traditional economic view of firms as rational decision 
makers is considered flawed as it expects investment to be made if cost effective. This 
excludes the complex corporate context and so overestimates the level of investment 
made by organisations in energy efficiency. Lack of knowledge, risk management 
strategies and the availability of financial resources all contribute to this. 
In a similar challenge to rational energy decision-making Biggart and Lutzenhiser (2007) 
see behaviour as a key conflict in energy use. Non-domestic buildings represent major 
social investments but users do not approach them as such. Energy cost savings from 
reduced energy consumption and efficiency investment is not exploited as would be 
expected. Fleiter, Worrell and Eichammer (2011) and Biggart and Lutzenhiser (2007) 
consider traditional research that treats economic assumptions such as demand and 
supply as rational decision-making has failed to deliver energy improvements. Focusing 
on an economic approach that excludes human dimensions of energy use excludes 
choice and ability that can change if price does not wholly or partly change behaviour.  
In order to take a more detailed investigation into constraints on energy behaviours than 
Biggart and Lutzenhiser (2007), Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh (2007) 
distinguish between ‘personal’ and ‘social’ barriers to UK energy efficiency. This allows 
the authors to consider their impacts on individuals’ and groups’ behaviours from either an 
internal or external perspective. 
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Stephenson et al. (2010) take an alternative approach to understanding energy users’ 
behaviours. They consider a combination of three features of energy use determine the 
energy attitudes of individuals; technologies, users’ activities and users’ aspirations. The 
integration of these behavioural factors overcomes the researchers’ concern that the 
heterogeneity of users, the scale of their energy use and the external context are 
excluded from previous research.  
Brohmann et al. (2009) support the generally held research view of the role of people 
within energy management; people do not actively consume energy, rather they use the 
services it provides. As Stephenson et al. (2010), the researchers consider the external 
environment within which consumers operate influences energy consumption and 
behaviour. Together these influences create tenant users who act as barriers to their own 
energy efficiency. Brohmann et al. (2009) consider the key external influence is that of a 
landlord on a tenant. This is recognised by a number of researchers including Bright 
(2010), DeCanio (1993), Fawcett (2010) and Schleich and Gruber (2008) and termed the 
‘Landlord-Tenant Divide’ by the Carbon Trust (2013a). This has resulted in tenants 
frequently having little responsibility for or involvement in energy decisions. This 
relationship is considered further in the following section. 
The research described above views energy behaviour from the energy users’ 
perspective. Fawcett (2010), however, considers non-domestic building owners’ and 
tenants’ behaviour from an external perspective by investigating the role of firms’ 
customers as a driver of change. From a survey of UK SMEs Fawcett (2010) identifies 
that very few organisations consider their customers’ requirements to be drivers for 
energy efficiency. This suggests that supply chain policies are not sufficiently widespread 
to force behavioural change.  
This review of energy literature finds a limited acceptance of behaviour as the key driver 
of energy consumption. Researchers’ views on the importance of behaviour range from 
the perception of Biggart and Lutzenhiser (2007) that energy inefficiency results from 
users’ overconsumption to the complexities of users’ energy attitudes and behaviours that 
determine participatory approaches identified by Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2009). 
 
2.4 The authors’ perceptions of building ownership within energy research 
Within the energy literature reviewed here only a small number of the articles have 
considered the implications of building ownership on energy consumption. For these 
researchers the characteristics of building ownership are considered to dilute the 
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incentives of both tenants and building owners to introduce energy efficient behaviours 
and actions. The ways in which characteristics of ownership, including the traditionally 
adversarial relationship between owner and tenant, are used within energy research are 
explored further here. 
Bright (2010) and Hinnells et al. (2008) highlight the influential role relationships between 
building owners and tenants play in the adoption of energy efficiency. Neither research 
clarifies their definition of building ownership. As Schmidt and Fonseca (2007), both Bright 
(2010) and Hinnells et al. (2008) conclude that building ownership is an important variable 
in energy behaviour as it has an effect on landlords’ and tenants’ freedom to invest in 
energy efficiency. This is considered further in the primary research undertaken for this 
thesis.  
Bright (2010) considers that this is due to a number of tenancy and energy arrangements 
that determine whether tenants are in charge of their energy supply or consumption 
levels. This thesis follows this principle although from a behavioural perspective rather 
than a legal one.  
 
2.4.1 The Landlord-Tenant Divide 
The Landlord-Tenant Divide is recognised as a long-standing feature of the commercial 
property sector. Bright (2010) identifies two elements to this: firstly the adversarial 
relationship between landlords and tenants and secondly the split incentives of 
commercial leases. The structure of the lease will influence ability and/or willingness to 
invest in energy efficiency and receipt of benefits from doing so. This research found that 
a change to lease terms may be the only way to overcome barriers to energy efficiency 
created by leasehold contracts.  
Hinnells et al. (2008) also consider that lack of building energy saving is a function of the 
impact of commercial leases, particularly the relationship between the landlord and tenant 
driven by them. The research finds these lease structures do not encourage voluntary 
environmental efficiency in buildings as lease terms such as ‘damage and destruction 
clauses’ which impose the obligation to repair damage on tenants or ‘dilapidations’ 
clauses in which the building must be returned to its original condition at the end of the 
tenancy are a core barrier to change. This is explored further in the next section. 
RWE Npower (2013) highlights the role played by building owners and tenants within 
energy management; 46% of SMEs surveyed rent their premises. The survey finds more 
than one third of their landlords had not improved building energy efficiency in the 
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2012/2013-survey period. No causes are identified. The report uses the terms ‘rent’ and 
‘own’ to define non-domestic property ownership styles. It is assumed that those who own 
their premises are responsible for energy improvements and those that rent are not.  
Research by Schleich and Gruber (2008) differentiates between ownership structures 
using ‘private’, ‘public’, ‘quasi-public’ (not for profit) categories of ownership. These are 
considered in relation to barriers to the adoption of energy efficiency. Schleich and Gruber 
(2008) find that tenants’ opportunities to reduce energy consumption are affected by the 
investor/user dilemma. The research hypothesises that the investor/user dilemma is less 
severe in smaller commercial organisations occupying rented premises than in domestic 
properties as the rental periods are longer. This gives owners and tenants less incentive 
to withhold energy efficiency. It is at odds with the general research view that sees the 
investor/user dilemma as significant for all rental properties. The researchers’ view may 
be influenced by legal conditions of German non-domestic rental contracts. The 
experiences of UK SMEs are followed up in this thesis.  
Within the commercial research undertaken, McAlllister, Quartermaine and McWilliams 
(2009) find that the widely recognised, traditionally adversarial relationship between 
landlord and tenant exists within all buildings operated as commercial investments. This 
not only reduces their attraction to investors but also prevents a landlord from directly 
benefitting from energy efficiency improvements. The researchers consider that few 
voluntary investments are likely to be made. This view may be biased to meet the 
interests of the Investment Property Forum that commissioned the research. 
Brohmann et al. (2009) take the opposite view and consider that tenants lose out within 
the investor/user dilemma. They find the key impact of building ownership is believed to 
be the influence of a landlord who has no interest in energy saving investments. The 
research concludes tenants have little responsibility for, or involvement in, energy 
decisions that ultimately limit energy conservation measures both chosen and able to be 
adopted where this relationship exists. No definition of ownership is provided, rather it is 
considered as one of a number of characteristics that describe the household: age, size, 
ownership and education. This thesis takes an alternative view and considers that the 
energy characteristics of an SME stem from the ownership of its business premises.  
Fawcett (2010) supports the views of Brohmann et al. (2009) finding that tenants are 
unlikely to have investigated or undertaken actions to save energy in properties where the 
landlord (defined as those managing commercial premises and distinct from the building’s 
owner) pays the energy bill. Landlords are frequently unsupportive of energy efficiency 
investments, which severely impact the ability of tenants to make changes. Fawcett 
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(2010) finds that most survey respondents consider building owners responsible for 
making energy improvements. 
Fleiter, Worrell and Eichammer (2011) take a wider view of the split of incentives than is 
taken by Fawcett (2010). They extend it to include the divide between different market 
players or between business sectors, firms and individuals as well as between landlord 
and tenant. No definition of these stakeholders is given. 
Axon et al. (2012) consider that the primary driver of split incentives is the inability to 
value the savings available from any intervention proposed. This stems from the lack of 
awareness of energy and pay back times compared to the duration of the lease. The 
authors are, however, one of the few groups that provide a definition of the ownership 
structures considered within their research. They define tenanted properties as “divergent 
communities that share specific buildings” and “organisational communities represented 
by multi-site landlords and tenant companies” (Axon et al.: 2012: 2).  
The UK Green Building Council (2011) recognises that a complex relationship between 
tenants and landlords proves a major barrier to investing in energy efficiency. In rented 
buildings the split of responsibility between tenants and landlords influences adoption 
rates of energy improvements in both investment and behaviour. In turn the lack of data to 
demonstrate this split of responsibility prevents agreement to a fair division of costs and 
benefits. Together they combine to prevent the adoption of energy efficiency behaviour 
and technology. The research distinguishes between owners and occupiers and between 
owners, landlords and tenants. The owner is considered to have little to do with the 
practical running of the building and no influence over energy; the landlord is considered 
to have stronger influence over energy but does not control the tenants’ use; the tenants 
are seen as having no control over building design or shared services provided by the 
landlord, whilst the single owner-occupier is fully responsible for their premises. Research 
undertaken by the Green Building Council includes some consideration of ownership 
influencing energy use within business premises.  
From the research reviewed above it can be seen that whilst few authors have made the 
ownership of buildings the main focus of their energy research, a number of them do 
consider it an important determinant of energy consumption. Few however, give a 
definition of the ownership structures considered. The researchers agree that the 
traditional adversarial relationship between landlords and tenants is, and will continue to 
be, a major barrier to driving energy efficiency within rented buildings. The Landlord-
Tenant Divide and its consequent split of incentives make it insufficiently attractive to both 
the landlord and tenant to invest in energy efficiency.  
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2.5 Explanation for the poor adoption rates of energy efficiency 
The research papers examined here all recognise that there has been a lower take up of 
energy efficient behaviours and actions than would be expected since cost effective 
opportunities to reduce consumption are readily available. This is termed the “energy-
efficiency paradox” by DeCanio (1993), the attitude-behaviour gap by Lorenzoni, 
Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh (2007:447) and the “value-action gap” by Revell, Stokes 
and Chen (2010: 273). In response Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh (2007) and 
Revell, Stokes and Chen (2010) propose a number of reasons for this. Whilst all agree 
the problem is significant many different causal theories emerge. These are examined in 
more detail below.  
A large pool of cost-effective and available technologies is readily available. However, to 
benefit from them the series of barriers preventing their adoption need to be overcome. 
These have been categorised by the Carbon Trust (2013c) as cost barriers, 
organisational inconsistencies and market failures. The Carbon Trust (2013c) finds that 
current energy efficiency policies fail to adequately exploit customer, employee and 
investor pressures for lower carbon lifestyles, workplaces and investments that could help 
overcome these organisational and behavioural barriers. The research concludes energy 
inefficiency will continue, as enforcement of existing policies is patchy and principally 
concentrated on large intensive energy users and larger buildings. There is lack of 
resource to enforce policies, which makes it difficult and costly to monitor SMEs 
compliance.  
Fleiter, Worrell and Eichammer (2011) attribute the failure to widely adopt energy efficient 
products and behaviours to the ineffectiveness of Government policies. The research 
finds that most models used to develop energy policies have failed to adequately consider 
the hurdles that determine the likelihood of adoption of energy efficient technology and 
behaviour. Heterogeneity of firms and differences in their barriers are too complex to be 
handled adequately by current energy strategies. Policies aiming to address the 
excessive energy consumption by commercial and domestic premises fail to recognise 
this complexity consequently they have failed to deliver their energy saving targets. 
From their survey of US domestic energy users Attari et al. (2010) support this 
explanation that poor rates of energy efficiency are due to policy failures. The research 
finds the main reason policies and incentives promoting energy efficiency fail is the policy 
makers’ lack of understanding of energy decision making. The researchers consider the 
paucity of data to evaluate the impact of policies; the inaccessibility of information and the 
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fact that sources of information are considered untrustworthy have all contributed to this. 
Policies consequently remain remote from the households surveyed.  
Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2009) and Roodhouse (2007) suggest that the poor 
adoption rate of energy conservation measures is due to the inappropriate use of policies 
to drive change. Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2009) conclude that policies 
implemented to encourage voluntary action have not worked. Similarly Roodhouse (2007) 
argues that carbon taxes have proved to be ineffective and inequitable, and that 
emissions trading, information campaigns and policies to increase energy efficiency may 
be insufficient to halt the increasing demand for energy. 
Both Kelly (2010) and Warde (2010) consider high rates of energy inefficiency are due to 
historical economic growth not driving consumption reduction through the development of 
energy efficient technologies. Kelly (2010) attributes this to technology improvements 
having failed to overcome increases in energy demanded from a growing building stock 
and the huge expansion in electrical appliance ownership. 
Warde (2010) considers reliance on energy intensive industries and voluntary activities to 
deliver Government targets is unlikely to be successful. These industries have largely 
been exported to benefit from less stringent energy regulations elsewhere and reliance on 
voluntary actions have, to date, proved to be poorly supported. The CBI (2013) considers 
that has left a UK SME sector that has largely been excluded from the energy policy 
framework. 
In an alternative explanation to those described above, Grubb, Haney and Wilde (2009) 
consider finance to be the key determinant of energy management. They consider costs 
to improve energy efficiency and the lack of skills available, particularly within SMEs, have 
ensured that energy bills remain as a ‘written off incidental cost’ (2009: 15). Sub-division 
of the total non-domestic building sector allows Grubb, Haney and Wilde (2009) to identify 
opportunities largely ignored by SMEs. The research concludes that this sector has 
between 15% and 25% cost savings available from adopting energy efficient actions, a 
figure that is second only to the large energy intensive organisation sector in the scale of 
efficiency improvements. More than two-thirds of these savings are in activities not related 
to production. 
Schleich and Gruber (2008) also consider access to finance a key determinant of energy 
efficient behaviours. They find that within smaller organisations energy is considered an 
unimportant overhead so is largely left unmanaged. Instead firms concentrate investment 
in core business processes which limits their willingness to invest in energy saving. 
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Decision-making within smaller organisations also depends on the power of energy 
decision makers and so can follow patterns of personal preference. Cost effective but 
lower profile energy savings can therefore be easily shelved. 
RWE Npower (2013) considers poor adoption rates of energy efficiency are due to lack of 
finance available to fund energy improvements. The survey finds most UK SMEs focus on 
turning off equipment to reduce energy consumption and educating staff to do so. 
Consequently only small reductions of less than 10% have been achieved. This is 
attributed to the lack of up-front investment. The number of businesses reporting a 
reduction in energy use fell in the 2013 survey although causes of this are not identified. 
Two thirds of survey respondents believe the Government and/or energy companies 
should fund installation of energy efficient equipment.  
Bright (2010) considers current energy performance of non-domestic buildings from the 
perspective of the CRC scheme. With cost effective technologies readily available the 
research concludes that economic factors alone cannot explain this widely recognised 
slow rate of adoption of energy efficient materials and behaviours. Instead Bright (2010) 
suggests that as energy costs represent only c. 1-2% of an organisation’s overheads they 
are not significant enough to command management attention and not large enough to 
change energy behaviours. Delay (2013) agrees that at 1-2% of overheads energy 
savings appear small relative to the overall cost base of a UK business so will frequently 
be overlooked. This supports the hypothesis of Schleich and Gruber (2008) that energy is 
considered an unimportant overhead so it is frequently ignored.  
The cost to comply with CRC is likely to exacerbate the tension in landlord-tenant 
relationships and does little to improve the split of improvement incentives. In fact the 
regulation only gives tenants a duty to co-operate with landlords. Bright (2010) concludes 
that this is likely to have little impact on relationships as most leases give landlords no 
legal right to influence a tenant’s use of energy. 
Bright (2010) also considers the structure of commercial leases contributes to poor 
adoption of energy efficiency activities. Despite the availability of cost effective, energy 
efficient technologies the terms of leases generate split incentives that effectively 
discourage any investment being made to improve energy performance. Hinnells et al. 
(2008) also consider the lack of energy saving activities is due to terms of commercial 
leases, particularly relationships between the landlord and tenant driven by them. The 
researchers find that commercial lease structures do not support energy efficiency in 
building use. At best they largely ignore energy performance and at worst they actively 
hinder the adoption of potential improvements.  
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DeCanio (1993) recognises that profitable energy efficient products and behaviours are 
frequently ignored. Although this was proposed in 1993 it remains a feature of energy 
consumption and management in both domestic and non-domestic settings and is still a 
focus of research today. DeCanio (1993) considers lack of energy investment is due to a 
paucity of information on financial benefits and payback periods to support energy 
investment decisions and concludes that without sufficient information energy projects 
may not appear to support corporate strategies even if they ultimately prove to be cost 
effective. Projects with a known rate of return will be selected in competition for limited 
investment funds even if they offer longer payback period. 
Janda (2011) disagrees with the findings of Brohmann et al. (2009) that energy attitudes 
and behaviours contribute little to the use of energy and those of Schleich and Gruber 
(2008) that lack of finance is the key determinant of poor rates of energy efficiency 
adoption. Instead Janda (2011) concludes a lack of understanding of how people expect 
to use buildings has prevented environmental education programmes being put in place 
to teach users how to save energy. Profitable energy efficient investments can therefore 
frequently be ignored. Janda (2011) finds this feature of energy consumption and 
management in both domestic and non-domestic settings and concludes that existing 
educational and information programmes have not driven reduction in energy 
consumption to date and additional new communication in a similar style is unlikely to 
make a difference.  
Axon et al. (2012) consider that the large number of stakeholders including solicitors, 
investors, developers, agents as well as owners and tenants add complexity to the 
process of energy improvement and limit the adoption of efficient technologies. This 
complexity comes from the different levels of control over change, interest and investment 
within the building. In addition the authors see that an organisation’s structure, size and 
interests will determine how energy efficiency is addressed.  
The UK Green Building Council (2011) hypothesises that lack of good data on energy use 
prevents organisations developing a clear case for investing in energy efficient 
refurbishment and energy reduction strategies. The research finds that commercial 
landlords have significant reservations over the effectiveness of DECs to provide this 
information and that encouragement from reputational drivers such as publicly displayed 
poor energy efficiency ratings and price signals such as the promise of lower building 
running costs is insufficient to reduce energy consumption. 
Fawcett (2010) considers the lack of technical advice regarding improvement 
opportunities is another significant cause of energy inefficiency and a key explanation for 
 
42 
sub-optimal energy investment behaviour. This is found particularly within small firms. de 
Groot, Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999) support this view, suggesting a knowledge gap in 
small companies proves a significant barrier to investment in energy efficient 
technologies. This is tested further in this thesis.  
Clarke et al. (2008) consider the current non-domestic building sector’s poor energy 
performance is due to a lack of energy awareness in building designers, owners and 
occupants and unwillingness of energy users to accept and implement energy efficient 
technology. Johnson Controls (2013) supports this view and considers the lack of in 
house expertise a key cause of energy inefficiency. Their survey finds that only 13% of 
respondents have energy knowledge to manage energy conservation in house.  
In common with other researchers Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh (2007) find 
an individual users’ lack of knowledge and lack of energy awareness prevents energy 
efficiency actions being implemented. This is enhanced by the perception of a lack of 
action by Government and business, prioritisation of financial concerns over 
environmental ones and energy habits. Together these have created the energy attitude-
behaviour gap.  
Revell, Stokes and Chen (2010) challenge this explanation of low rates of energy 
conservation. They find access to information is not a significant cause of poor rates of 
energy efficiency adoption as Fawcett (2010) and de Groot, Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999) 
believe. With only one third of respondents to their survey considering the level of 
information received to be a barrier to change, Revell, Stokes and Chen (2010) conclude 
that information is not a significant barrier to energy efficiency improvements. Despite this 
there is still a lack of progress towards energy conservation, which suggests that relying 
on SME managers, who only manage energy as part of their role, to obtain information 
and make voluntary energy changes may not be an appropriate policy.  
In addition to the explanations described above, Schmidt and Fonseca (2007: 54) believe 
the gap between actual energy usage and ‘responsible consumption’ is due to an 
individual’s need to be recognised as a member of a higher income social group. The 
researchers find that, even where users have knowledge of potential improvements, this 
is more important than energy saving, and recognise that knowledge, attitudes and values 
do not automatically deliver energy saving behaviour. The desire of domestic energy 
consumers to have their social status recognised, for example by their higher energy 
consumption, usually takes precedence, determining energy behaviour. 
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Herring and Roy (2007) consider that energy users’ behaviour has prevented reductions 
in energy consumption thus reinforcing the energy efficiency paradox. The researchers 
find that widely recognised poor uptake rates of energy efficient products in the UK are 
often due to consumers’ social, economic and functional needs not being considered 
during their development. Low rates of energy saving are also partly due to consumers 
not using efficient technologies in an energy saving manner, a factor that Warde (2007) 
considers critical to overcome the UK’s lack of energy efficiency. Long-term increased 
levels of consumption soon dwarf short-term energy conservation savings. This pattern is 
hard to alter as changing behaviour cannot be forced by financial incentives and 
regulation, as it demands changing a person’s lifestyle.  
Unlike researchers citing users’ behaviour as the cause of energy inefficiency Brohmann 
et al. (2009) find that energy users’ environmental attitudes contribute very little to their 
actual use of energy. The researchers find that finances, peer pressure and cultural 
preferences combine to create energy users who act as barriers to their own energy 
efficiency. These barriers are exacerbated where organisations lack resources to prioritise 
energy efficiency. Brohmann et al. (2009) conclude that financial considerations and 
economic incentives are more important in determining energy behaviour than personal 
attitudes and values. This can be used to structure opportunities to change energy 
behaviour.  
In a similar challenge to behavioural causes of energy inefficiency both Weber (1997) and 
Attari et al. (2010) seek alternative explanations. Weber (1997) attributes the poor 
adoption rates of energy efficiency to barriers from political institutions, market barriers, 
barriers within organisations and behavioural barriers. Although these are identified, there 
is no attempt to identify solutions to overcome them. Attari et al. (2010) find that most 
survey respondents underestimate their energy use and therefore the potential savings, 
which limits the likely adoption of energy efficiency behaviours and actions as it skews 
cost, benefit calculations. Other researchers do not raise underestimation of energy 
consumption as a factor influencing energy behaviours.  
The most consistent explanations for the poor rates of adoption of energy efficient 
behaviours and actions found within the literature are the lack of investment available to 
fund improvements and information available on energy saving opportunities. In reality it 
is unlikely that one single cause of energy inefficiency should be identified as each user 
will be influenced by a complex mix of different attitudes, values, resources and property 
ownership as well as the intricacies of the energy market. The opportunities proposed to 
overcome these are explored further below. 
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2.6 Critique of proposed opportunities for the improvement of energy efficiency 
There is a general consensus amongst research reviewed that low rates of the adoption 
of energy efficiency behaviours and technologies need to be overcome to deliver carbon 
emissions targets to mitigate climate change. Despite recognition by both academics and 
energy professionals, less than half of the research reviewed here proposes solutions to 
raise the implementation rates of energy conservation. Increases in the provision of 
information and additional Government interventions are the opportunities for 
improvement most frequently proposed. These are considered in more detail here. 
Only Kelly (2010) and Schmidt and Fonseca (2007) consider social pressure a potential 
opportunity to generate a greater acceptance of energy saving. Kelly (2010) suggests that 
a change of attitude towards energy efficiency would be achieved by making profligate 
use of energy anti-social, so that individuals favour exploiting technology interventions 
rather than avoiding them. Kelly (2010) used the change of attitude towards drinking and 
driving as evidence that such behavioural change is possible. However, the lack of energy 
conservation advocates identified by their research suggests the influence of social 
pressure is limited. This may be a missed opportunity. If individuals can be encouraged to 
take their environmental attitudes to work, pressure on organisations to make energy 
changes may be developed. The potential for social pressure to motivate energy 
improvements is considered further in the research undertaken for this thesis.  
Hinnells et al. (2008) propose harnessing expectations of tenants and landlords to guide 
change. New environmentally efficient buildings are likely to be sought by tenants wanting 
energy friendly premises and by owners wanting higher valued assets that can attract 
higher rental changes. The research predicts poor energy performance is likely to affect a 
rental property’s capital value. Methods of exploiting these expectations are not proposed. 
Bright (2010) considers the CRC Regulation a route for change. Research findings 
suggest a change to lease terms requiring the tenant to contribute to the cost of CRC may 
be the only way to encourage both landlords and tenants to invest in energy efficiency or 
overcome the split incentives that limit the CRC scheme’s potential to succeed in reducing 
energy consumption.  
In proposing the need for future policy intervention, the Carbon Trust (2013c) concludes 
that UK Government support for innovation can fill gaps created where the market is 
failing to deliver strengthened policies to incentivise change. The research suggests that 
strong public sector energy efficient behaviours would set an example for the private 
sector and generate demand for lower cost energy friendly building products. Additional 
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Government intervention in the form of a carbon emissions tax based on a self-assessed 
carbon footprint is expected to generate demand for energy efficient materials. In turn this 
is expected to reduce prices and so further encourage their adoption in both domestic and 
non-domestic buildings. 
In a similar proposal Kelly (2010) suggests that national and local Government 
renovations costing £10 billion per year could be used to drive changes that would 
develop the retrofit market by increasing demand for lower cost energy friendly building 
materials. As the Carbon Trust (2013c) predict, this increased demand for energy efficient 
materials would further reduce prices and encourage greater implementation. McAlllister, 
Quartermaine and McWilliams (2009) support this view and use their position with the 
Investment Property Forum audience to propose additional voluntary investment in 
energy efficiency as the best route forward. The research claims that bringing a non-
domestic building up to market standards for energy efficiency achieves a considerable 
energy consumption reduction of c. 25%. Limited additional investment will increase these 
savings to c. 50%.  
Whilst Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2009) support the importance of Government 
intervention they link this to the need for a greater regulatory approach. The researchers 
question the value of participatory approaches in response to the scale and urgency of 
carbon emissions reduction, favouring regulations that encourage permanent behaviour 
change. Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2009) suggest that using communication to 
encourage demand for additional regulations would generate energy users’ engagement 
with energy reduction whilst facilitating acceptance of regulation. Routes to achieve this 
are not discussed. The use of regulations to motivate energy efficiency and conservation 
is explored further in this thesis. 
DeCanio (1993) concludes the difference between energy efficiency improvements 
adopted and what could be is due to poor information and control. The research 
concludes that if Government policies are restructured significant improvements in 
investment for energy efficiency could be achieved and expects that Government 
attention will overcome organisational inertia. By providing additional information on 
energy technology the Government will encourage private investment to be made, reduce 
the principal-agent problem and eliminate internal barriers within organisations. However, 
hindsight has shown that in the two decades since this research was conducted the 
adoption of energy efficiency has not achieved the usage rate reductions required even 
with the increasing Government intervention experienced. 
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Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh (2007) conclude that both additional regulatory 
actions and communication are required to drive changes to energy behaviour. Current 
policies have failed to deliver energy conservation as personal and social barriers have 
been encountered. New policies to move people out of the “comfort zone of carbon-
intensive living” are required (2007: 456). No further details of policy content, expectations 
of how they will generate different responses or suggestions to close the attitude-
behaviour gap are proposed. 
Although Roodhouse (2007) proposes further Government intervention, a different 
approach is taken. The research considers energy rationing is the only effective politically 
driven method of cutting consumption. Politically, consumption reduction is the least 
favoured opportunity to cut carbon emissions as it demands a change to people’s lifestyle. 
Energy efficiency and low carbon energy are, however, politically acceptable. Taxation 
may be an option if time were not a critical issue but the speed with which carbon 
emissions must be cut leads Roodhouse (2007) to conclude that rationing is the only 
answer.  
Improving users’ energy awareness is proposed by a number of researchers as the key to 
reducing energy consumption. Clarke et al. (2008) consider that engaging energy users 
with the largest consumption within buildings through education and understanding of 
technologies is the most appropriate way to generate energy efficiency improvements. 
Technology focused solutions should be supported by a culture of energy awareness and 
widespread monitoring of the building’s energy use for maximum impact. Without the 
cascade of information and a checking process to monitor progress, change is not likely 
to happen.  
Janda (2011) proposes education as the key opportunity to deliver energy savings. 
Building users should be educated to take responsibility for energy conservation including 
using their buildings in ways that generate responsible consumption. The research 
concludes that increased understanding of how people use and expect to use buildings 
could lead to an education programme that would teach energy users how to save 
energy. 
Brohmann et al. (2009) disagree with the importance of information for energy 
improvement. They consider that existing educational and information programmes have 
not driven reduction in energy consumption to date therefore new communication in a 
similar vein is unlikely to make a difference.  
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Both the UK Green Building Council (2011) and Smid and Neiboer (2008) propose a 
different route to achieve energy efficiency improvements, one that gives responsibility for 
energy conservation to building owners and tenants rather than just tenants as suggested 
by Janda (2011). In an attempt to encourage collaboration both research groups propose 
extending the use of EPCs and DECs to provide information that incentivises building 
owners and users to reduce energy consumption. Smid and Neiboer (2008) recognise the 
value of EPCs for professional landlords in providing knowledge of their assets’ energy 
performance and opportunities to improve asset values. The researchers also see EPCs 
as a tool for energy communication with tenants. Although this view is developed from the 
perspective of housing landlords losing financial support from the Dutch Government, it 
may have value for UK non-domestic building owners. Collaboration between owners and 
tenants as an opportunity for energy improvement is explored further in this thesis. 
The UK Green Building Council (2011) considers DECs the most appropriate way to 
incentivise building owners and users to collaborate to reduce energy consumption. This 
is justified through consideration of the advantages available to commercial landlords. If 
organisations measured and reported energy use there would be a level playing field to 
judge energy performance. Reputational benefits could be gained by organisations 
showing improved energy performance and the value of buildings would increase with 
periods of no occupation reduced through signalling the higher quality of energy efficient 
buildings. Whilst this will contribute to energy efficiency improvement it excludes the 
tenants’ potential to contribute. As other researchers have identified the opposition to 
DECs the validity of this research must be questioned. 
Axon et al. (2012) propose that improvement to the energy efficiency of commercial 
property is only possible through engaging the owners, managers and occupiers to work 
together to create environmental synergies. This is considered the only route to overcome 
factors at the organisational level that prevent the adoption of energy-saving technologies 
and practices.  
Stephenson et al. (2010), however, propose collecting user information rather than 
providing it to generate energy improvements. They propose an Energy Cultures 
Framework to provide supply side opportunities and include the example of energy 
suppliers using the tool to understand customer behaviour and so better tailor tariffs for 
them. This is an opportunity not considered by the other research reviewed here.  
A few of the opportunities described above have been taken up by the Government to 
extend information support for voluntary improvements and to strengthen the regulatory 
environment to incentivise change. However, none of them have delivered the energy 
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efficiency improvements and behavioural changes that are hoped for. This thesis 
therefore takes a different approach. 
 
2.7 Knowledge gaps identified from energy literature 
This review of energy literature has identified a number of research gaps that support the 
scope of this thesis. Some of these have been recognised by the researchers themselves, 
others through the analysis of literature undertaken. The structure of approaches to 
research above is used to organise knowledge gaps to clarify where further research is 
required. These are: technology, behaviour and finance. In addition gaps in building 
ownership research and policy are also discussed. 
Janda (2011; 2013) recognises that energy literature on existing buildings remains 
scarce. Like McAllister Quartermaine and McWilliams (2009), the research finds 
exploration of energy efficiency to date has largely ignored solutions to retrofit existing 
buildings as an opportunity to reduce energy consumption. This knowledge gap can also 
be identified within the work of Kelly (2010). The need to exploit energy saving from 
retrofitting existing buildings is a key driver for this thesis.  
Janda (2009b) also recognises the need to increase awareness of drivers of energy 
consumption and consumption reduction. Of the 13 research initiatives reviewed, only 
three consider the factors controlling or influencing energy consumption and only one 
researches consumption reduction. This thesis aims to help close this knowledge gap in 
energy attitudes and behaviours. 
From the review of the legal aspects of energy management and building ownership, 
Bright (2010) finds that energy research largely excludes attitudes and behaviours of 
building users, a research gap that has also been identified by other researchers including 
Stephenson et al. (2010) and Fleiter, Worrell and Eichammer (2011). Despite recognising 
the importance of understanding energy behaviour researchers have not contributed to 
closing this gap. This thesis attempts to do this. 
Both Axon et al. (2012) and Janda and Killip (2010) recognise a research gap in the 
socio-technological approach to energy efficiency improvement. Both recommend further 
research is undertaken to establish how socio-technical frameworks, that is the 
relationships between landlords and tenants underpin the process by which new 
technologies are deployed in practice. Axon et al. (2012) target further research into multi-
tenanted non-domestic properties and identify a need to understand the division of 
responsibilities around decision making to enact change. Janda (2011, 2014) extends this 
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to recommend the inclusion of owner-occupier commercial premises. This thesis 
contributes to closing these gaps. 
An understanding of energy behaviours above the scale of domestic users emerges as a 
knowledge gap from the research conducted by Stephenson et al. (2010). Greater 
knowledge of energy use and constraints to adopting activities to conserve energy within 
non-domestic buildings will give greater clarity to opportunities for SMEs to benefit from 
energy efficiency. Similarly de Groot, Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999) identify this information 
gap in small companies and consider it represents a significant barrier to investment in 
energy efficiency technologies. This thesis attempts to close this knowledge gap.  
Revell, Stokes and Chen (2010) support the view that SMEs are important in the drive to 
increase energy efficiency. The need for further research into behaviours of small 
commercial organisations to help overcome their environmental inertia is highlighted. 
Further research is recommended to identify ways to overcome SMEs’ resistance to 
energy change and incentivise them to participate in positive energy conservation. This 
thesis attempts to close this gap.  
Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2009) acknowledge the limited value of their research 
and recommend further research is conducted into people’s engagement with climate 
change to identify opportunities that could be used to improve the acceptance of energy 
conservation. Fleiter, Worrell and Eichammer (2011) also recognise this gap in 
understanding energy behaviours, particularly the need to further explore factors that 
influence decision-making. The researchers suggest the need to consider these factors 
that influence the behaviour of commercial organisations. This thesis aims to help close 
this knowledge gap through the analysis of SMEs’ adoption of energy improvement 
opportunities. 
Attari et al. (2010) consider that energy consumers’ behaviour conforms to economic 
theories of rational choice when using energy. This fails to consider differences in 
decision-making between energy users and the variation of barriers faced by them. This 
literature review has identified the need for further investigation into potential drivers of 
energy conservation, which this thesis incorporates. Utilising this knowledge to design 
bespoke energy conservation activities will increase the engagement of individuals, 
groups and organisations. 
McAlllister, Quartermaine and McWilliams (2009) consider research into actions that 
trigger landlords’ energy efficiency investments and non-domestic buildings as energy 
investment opportunities have been neglected. The research highlights the need for 
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further investigation of barriers to energy efficiency generated by the widely recognised 
adversarial relationship between landlord and tenant. Routes to close these investments 
and knowledge gaps using tried and tested technologies would allow landlords to directly 
benefit from energy enhancements. This thesis provides this. 
A knowledge gap has emerged regarding barriers to energy efficiency. Only a few 
researchers for example the Carbon Trust (2013a), Schleich and Gruber (2008) and Smid 
and Neiboer (2008) adequately consider the wide variety of these barriers and the context 
they operate in or propose bespoke policies to overcome them. This thesis aims to deliver 
the additional research required to understand and explore the impact of these barriers 
and identify solutions to overcome them.  
This literature review has also recognised a number of generic research gaps. Whilst the 
researchers agree there is a significant gap between energy improvements that are cost 
effective, technically possible and retrofit feasible, few have put forward practical solutions 
to close this energy paradox. Non-domestic buildings and their energy inefficiency have 
lagged behind residential properties as a target for research and where they are 
considered the focus is on intensive energy users. Despite SMEs offering a valuable pool 
of untapped conservation opportunities researchers have largely excluded them. Drivers 
of energy efficiency and barriers to adopting them are identified by many of the 
researchers although a gap in the understanding of how to address them remains. 
Together these leave a knowledge gap requiring further research to understand potential 














CHAPTER 3: UK ENERGY POLICY LANDSCAPE 
3.1 Introduction 
Despite the adoption of long-term carbon reduction targets, Energy Policy based on 
provision of information and encouragement of voluntary good practice is implemented as 
a short-term Government objective. A timeline of UK Energy Policy is shown in Appendix 
1. Since the first energy demand reduction policies were established in 1974 in response 
to oil price rises, layers of regulations and initiatives have been added leaving an Energy 
Policy landscape that is complex, confusing and cluttered. Harvey (2012) considers this 
has simply added to the cost burdens for organisations operating within it. These 
complexities, coupled with differences in policies between devolved Regional 
Governments, have contributed to the overall failure to cut carbon emissions in line with 
climate change mitigation pathways. Gault and Thompson (2014) calculate 2013 
emissions are below 1990 levels but need to fall a further 73% to meet 2050 targets. 
Although 13% reduction in carbon emissions during the Carbon Budget period of 2007-
2012 has been achieved this was largely due to the recession and the shift to less carbon 
intensive industry. Gault and Thompson (2014) estimate only 0.4% of this was achieved 
through energy conservation measures. 
The large number of initiatives and regulations applying to non-domestic building owners 
and tenants, shown in Table 3.1, has been introduced in a piecemeal fashion creating a 
complex energy policy landscape of incentives and disincentives that operate 
independently. Spencer (2012) considers this has proved unsuccessful in significantly 
reducing energy use or carbon emissions as they have been implemented with a stealth 
strategy in an attempt to avoid conflict with Parliament, media and low carbon sceptics. 
As long as this continues energy efficiency and conservation will remain unconventional 
and unexploited business opportunities. 
This review of Energy Policy will establish the regulations currently applicable to the UK 
SME population and those planned to be introduced in the next year in order to provide a 
legislative context for this research. Energy Regulations applying specifically to utility 
companies are excluded. It is then followed by a review of schemes and initiatives that 
have been established to encourage voluntary adoption of good practice in energy 






























































































































Jun-14 Mandatory ü ü ü ü ü ü ü
Requirement for organisations employing >250 and/or turnover >£42m to conduct energy 
audit by December 2015.SMEs operating as branch of larger organisation will be required 
to comply.Aim is for companies to voluntarily act on information obtained. ESOS does not 
apply to public sector organisations.
Oct-13 Mandatory ü ü ü ü ü ü ü
All UK incorporated companies listed on the main market of the London Stock Exchange, a 
European Economic area market or whose shares are deling on the New York Stock 
Exchange or NASDAQ are required to report on their greenhouse gas emissions as part of 
their annual Directors’ Report.
2011
The Green Deal Jan-13 Voluntary ü ü ü ü ü Awaiting release of Green Deal for non-domestic buildings 
Energy Company Obligation Jan-13 Mandatory ü ü
Funded and administered by energy suppliers. Funding is provided for improvements to 
social housing and hard to heat properties in order to reduce fuel poverty. 
Minimum energy efficiency standards Jul-05 Mandatory ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü
Imposed minimum energy efficiency standard for domestic and non-domestic rental properties from 
April 2018. Provisionally set at energy rating ‘E'.This does not apply to public buildings.
2008
Smart Meters 2015 Mandatory ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü Obligation for energy companies to fit smart meters to 80% of all properties by 2020.
Feed in Tariffs Apr-10 Voluntary ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü Payments for each unit of electricity generated.
Renewable Heat Incentive Nov-11 Voluntary ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü Payments for each unit of heat generated.
2008
EPCs / DECs 2008 Mandatory ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü
DECs are required for public buildings over 1000m2 in area and need to be produced every 
year. EPCs are required for non-domestic buildings over 500m2.
Air-conditioning inspection Jan-11 Mandatory ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü
Units >12kW require inspection and performance reports to be conducted by qualified 
assessors.
2010 Mandatory ü ü ü ü ü
A mandatory carbon emissions reporting and pricing scheme to cover all organisations in 
the UK using more than 6,000MWh per year of fuel.
Building Regulations 2010 Mandatory ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü
Set out minimum standards for building energy efficiency for all new buildings and some 
renovations.
BREEAM 1990 Voluntary ü ü ü ü ü ü ü
BREEAM is an environmental assessment method and rating system for building design, 
construction and operation.
Code for Sustainable Homes 2007 Voluntary ü ü
National standard for the sustainable design and construction of new homes to reduce 
carbon emissions.
1997 Voluntary ü ü ü ü ü Discount against tax can be claimed for investmetn in energy efficient equipment.
2001 Mandatory ü ü ü ü ü
Tax on supply of electricity, gas and coal for use as fuel for heating, lighting and power by 
commercial customers.
2006 Voluntary ü ü ü
Allows eligible energy-intensive businesses to receive up to 90% discount from the Climate 
Change Levy in return for meeting energy efficiency or carbon-saving targets.
2005 Mandatory ü ü ü ü
Limit ('cap') placed  on total emissions from relevant installations. Installations obliged to 
surrender sufficient allowances to cover their emissions and could buy additional 
allowances or sell any surplus. 'Cap' will decline by at least 1.74% a year, so emissions in 
2020 will be at least 21% below their level in 2005 (Carbon Trust: 2013).
Energy Act
Energy Performance of Buildings
Energy Saving Opportunity Scheme




CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme










3.2  Energy Regulations 
3.2.1 Energy Act 2012 
The Energy Act 2012 is the latest in a sequence of energy legislation that has been 
passed annually in the UK for almost 40 years. It is expected by the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (2014b) to make a step change in the accessibility of energy 
efficiency measures to homes and businesses, make energy data publicly available, 
increase generation of low carbon energy and encourage rational economic competition 
within the energy market place.  
The Act relies on traditional economic theory encouraging individuals to voluntarily 
undertake energy improvements in response to improved availability and understanding 
of energy data. However, the poor uptake of the Green Deal must question whether this 
long established approach is valid.  
The Energy Act 2012 has introduced a number of key initiatives that may offer 
opportunities to SMEs. These are briefly discussed below. 
 
3.2.1.1 Green Deal 
The Green Deal, introduced on 1st October 2012, is the ‘opt-in’ framework for energy 
efficiency, which is planned as the core of both long-term and short-term energy policies 
for both domestic and non-domestic energy consumers in England and Wales. Spencer 
(2012) suggests the scheme can be seen as the biggest transformation of the UK’s 
energy system since the 19th Century. However, it could also be seen as simply 
rebranding existing incentives and loans to promote increases in the adoption rates of 
established and proven energy efficiency improvements. 
It aims to incentivise energy consumers to improve energy efficiency of domestic and, in 
the future non-domestic properties, by providing up front funding for approved energy 
efficient products such as loft and solid wall insulation. To ensure those benefitting from 
the improvement repay the loan, the Green Deal charge is attached to the building not the 
consumer. Repayments are made through a charge on the energy bill. This charge 
transfers to the new tenant if there is a change in occupancy or to the new energy bill if 
there is a change in energy supplier. Although this can be in place for up to 25 years the 
Green Deal holds the principle that charges will be less than the energy savings available.  
Statistics to date suggest that the Green Deal is not addressing energy efficiency and 
conservation issues as expected. The Department of Energy and Climate Change 
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(2014b) confirm that despite increasing levels of cash back incentives the loan scheme 
implemented only 1180 of the 210,000 Green Deal Assessments undertaken in the first 
14 months with only 20 Green Deal providers selling plans using Green Deal Finance. 
Greenwise (2014) estimate that if these rates of progress continue it will take 200 years to 
deliver targets to improve the energy efficiency of 14 million homes. Spencer (2012) 
believes this flagship energy efficiency scheme is unlikely to succeed as the Government 
is trying to achieve it by publicising it as little as possible.  
As yet the Green Deal has not been released for non-domestic properties. Modern 
Building Services (2014) consider that compliance with the minimum energy property 
standards introduced by the Energy Act 2011 is unlikely to be achieved without it. These 
standards are discussed below. However, if the residential Green Deal is released for 
non-domestic properties it will be inappropriate as it applies long-term loans for energy 
efficiency improvements that are misaligned for the short-term tenures that increasingly 
apply to non-domestic building leases and rental contracts. The effectiveness of loans as 
a driver of energy efficiency and conservation within SMEs is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
Although the Government are putting their full weight behind this policy it may be for 
political gain as much as for environmental benefit. From June 2014 the cash back 
incentives were increased, offering rebates of up to £7200 in an attempt to rejuvenate the 
programme, incentivise customers and improve rates of uptake. However, Green Deal 
loan rates remain higher than commercially available finance rates and are not to be 
released to SMEs for the foreseeable future.  
 
3.2.1.2 Energy rating standards of rental properties 
The Energy Act 2012 also attempts to promote energy efficiency within non-domestic and 
domestic rental properties by imposing minimum energy efficiency standards from April 
2018. This is provisionally set at an Energy Rating of ‘E’. Without evidence of this 
minimum energy rating it will be unlawful to offer a property for rent. However, no details 
are released of how this is to be monitored or whether it will apply to new tenancies only. 
There are a number of inconsistencies and conflicts that remain unresolved. For example, 
in an ‘E’ rated building where a tenant purchases their energy directly from the utility 
company the owner must upgrade the property before it can be let. If this is financed 




Until 2018 there is nothing planned other than the Green Deal to incentivise non-domestic 
building owners to make voluntary retrofit improvements and there is no visibility of a 
release date for this. Overall this questions whether the 2020 and 2050 targets are likely 
to be achieved.  
 
3.2.2 Energy Act 2008 
The Energy Act 2008 implemented a number of initiatives to incentivise energy 
conservation within non-domestic buildings to deliver national emissions reductions 
targets of 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 with an interim target of 34% reduction by 
2020. These incentives include Feed in Tariffs (FiTs), Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) 
and installation of smart meters, which are examined in more detail below. 
 
3.2.2.1 Feed in Tariffs and Renewable Heat Incentive 
The FiT and RHI schemes offer financial support for low carbon electricity generation and 
renewable heat generation. FiTs guarantee payment for small projects up to 5 megawatts 
and the RHI supports heat generated in any domestic or commercial premises. The 
Government has recently reduced the FiT incentive following unexpected, and therefore 
unaffordable rates of uptake by private consumers and business investors. A legal 
challenge and subsequent negative publicity adds further to concerns over Government 
Energy Policy credibility. 
 
3.2.2.2 Smart Metres 
Under the Energy Act 2008 energy companies were required to install smart meters in all 
domestic and smaller non-domestic buildings by 2013. This was then deferred to 2018. 
Following the established approach of UK Energy Policy, the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (2013b) believe that the provision of additional energy information from 
these metres is expected to deliver a change in energy behaviour and increase 
competitive pressure on energy costs. However, there is no evidence that this will 
happen. A number of issues have emerged, once again promoting negative perceptions 
for large energy companies and Energy Policy. For example, incompatibility of meters 
emerged within the first 12 months due to the lack of a standard meter specification. This 
effectively tied consumers to their energy supply, as meters will not operate on 
competitors’ systems.  
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3.3 Building Regulations 
Until 2010 the energy efficiency requirements of the UK Building Regulations excluded 
existing buildings; rather they influenced incorporation of energy efficient materials and 
systems into new buildings. However, an update in October 2010 to Part L2B introduced 
mandatory energy efficiency into refurbishment of existing buildings of greater than 
1000m2 of usable floor space. The Department of Communities and Local Government 
(2014) expect 25% improvement in energy utilisation from this and predict that this 
change will only cost £5 million if applied to all retrofit targets. However, this still does not 
address the need for energy actions within existing non-domestic buildings that are not 
undergoing refurbishment or the majority of premises occupied by SMEs that fall below 
the Building Regulations threshold. 
Dixon, Britnell and Watson (2014) consider the ability of Building Regulations to deliver 
reductions in non-domestic buildings’ energy consumption is affected by the lack of both a 
robust monitoring system and a standard rating system to measure energy use. 
The 2010 updates to the Building Regulations also introduced additional requirements for 
all new homes built after 2016 and non-domestic buildings built after 2018 to be carbon 
neutral. This follows the application of the Building Regulations so is similarly limited in 
scope and applicability for SMEs. 
 
3.4 Carbon Reduction Commitment  
The Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) Scheme was introduced in 2007 to address 
CO2 emissions not covered by other legislation. It established the requirement for 
organisations consuming large amounts of energy to measure and report consumption 
annually. SMEs within multisite organisations complying with the scheme will participate.  
Operational cost benefits and reputation enhancement from improved energy 
performance were offered as the rationale for CRC. Participants are required to purchase 
allowances to cover emissions for the previous year theoretically encouraging energy 
consumption reduction. However, this effectively allows organisations to choose whether 
to continue to use existing levels of energy by purchasing carbon credits or invest in 
energy efficiency to reduce their expenditure on allowances. An annual league table of 
energy performance is published to encourage competition between participants. Overall 
though, energy consumption reduction remains a voluntary activity. 
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CRC has received criticism from the business community for its excessive bureaucracy 
and inconsistent inclusion of organisations as well as changes to the terms of 
engagement. Initially the money raised from the purchase of allowances to cover 
emissions was to be redistributed to participants as a reward for their reduction in energy 
use. However, in 2010 the plan to return funds was cancelled and effectively CRC 
became a tax on the use of energy. Kelly (2012) considers that this has done nothing to 
encourage businesses to invest in energy efficiency. 
 
3.5 Financial incentives 
A series of tax incentives have been introduced in an attempt to incentivise organisations 
to adopt energy efficiency improvements. These general initiatives can apply to the 
owners and tenants of smaller commercial properties if they fall within applicable taxation 
thresholds. Examples of these financial incentives are described below. 
 The ReEnergise Smart Fund has been established to incentivise SMEs to improve 
energy efficiency through the provision of commercial loans of between £25,000 
and £250,000. Bateman (2012) considers that £5 million set aside to be leant at 
commercial banking rates is unlikely to generate significant energy efficiency and 
conservation improvements for the UK population of 4.99 million SMEs. 
 The Climate Change Levy, a levy on the cost of energy delivered to non-domestic 
buildings, was introduced 2001 to incentivise reduction in energy consumption in 
non-domestic users. The Department of Energy and Climate Change (2014c) 
consider this an industrial, commercial and agricultural energy tax that applies to 
all commercial organisations above the size of a 6-bedroom house. 
 The Enhanced Capital Allowances Scheme is designed to encourage businesses 
to invest in energy efficient equipment as they can deduct its cost from their tax 
liabilities.  
 Through a Climate Change Agreement a large energy intensive user is able to 
negotiate a discount on the Climate Change Levy in exchange for commitment to 
reducing carbon emissions or improving energy efficiency.  
 Commercial building owners are able to claim the Landlord’s Energy Saving 





3.6 Conclusion  
Despite the adoption of long-term carbon reduction targets, Energy Policy is managed as 
a short-term political objective with frequent changes to energy legislation. Increasing 
layers of initiatives has left the current energy policy landscape bureaucratic and complex 
which can be costly for businesses to meet their obligations. Although policy has focused 
on taxes for large carbon emitters and energy intensive industries and financial incentives 
for domestic property, owners and tenants of smaller non-domestic properties have been 
left largely without incentive to conserve energy. This has created an energy policy gap. 
Successive governments have left energy efficiency and consumption reduction for these 
4.99 million SMEs to market influences and relied on additional information to incentivise 
change. However, Kennett (2012) believes that to date energy consumption and carbon 
emissions have not responded positively to this approach. This thesis offers an alternative 
approach to Energy Policy that is based on drivers of energy efficiency and conservation 






CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The methodologies described here were chosen to test the research hypothesis that 
ownership of non-domestic buildings controls the ability and willingness of owners and 
tenants to adopt energy efficiency and conservation opportunities and deliver the 
research aims and objectives described in Chapter 1.  
To simplify the description of research methodologies implemented this chapter is split 
into five sections. Each section represents an element of research undertaken and 
explains research processes and activities chosen to deliver it. These are: firstly, review 
of literature; secondly, design of the ownership segmentation model; thirdly, collection of 
primary data; fourthly, analysis of research participants’ data and finally, creation and 
implementation of the Scenario Planning Model. Each topic also includes its relevance to 
the research, rationale for approaches used and tools chosen, benefits obtained and 
alternatives considered. Potential bias and constraints on the research are also included. 
The flow chart shown in Figure 4.1 summarises the research steps and the order in which 
they were taken. These will be described in more detail below.  
 
4.2 Research targets 
Existing non-domestic buildings within the UK, their owners and tenants were primary 
research targets for this thesis. Building owners are defined as either owner-occupiers, 
owners of an individual building or commercial landlords with multiple properties. Tenants 
are small and medium organisations from all commercial sectors. The only stipulation is 
that tenants should not own the premises they operate from. Those SMEs that both own 
and use their business premises have been classed as owner-occupiers and have been 
included in the data analysis as building owners. The term ‘owner’ is used to differentiate 
between those who own the building and those landlords or managers who may be 
employed to operate it. 
This thesis uses the classification of SMEs set by the European Commission's 
Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry (2005); small and medium commercial 















The European Commission has established this sector on company size and turnover. 
However, this thesis excluded turnover, as it was not considered a significant 
characteristic of the organisations within this research, and used solely the size 
classification as the threshold for participation. Turnover was also excluded to protect 
confidentiality and encourage greater participation rates. Organisations with less than 250 
employees were classified as an SME unless they operate from domestic premises. If 
they did, they were excluded, as they fall under the remit of residential Energy Policy that 
is outside the scope of this thesis. 
Existing non-domestic buildings were targeted by this research as Energy Policy has 
largely ignored this sector as shown in Chapter 3, favouring energy reduction from energy 
intensive organisations, new buildings and residential properties to achieve national 
targets. Whilst energy efficiency of new and altered non-domestic buildings has been 
controlled by Building Regulations, the retrofit of smaller existing buildings has escaped 
Government attention so has remained a voluntary activity. As described in Chapter 2 the 
general agreement amongst energy researchers is that energy optimisation must be 
achieved in all buildings if national targets are to be met. This consensus supports the 
decision to focus on non-domestic buildings and UK SME sector that are affected by the 
energy policy gap. 
 
4.3 Literature Review 
The review of energy literature in Chapter 2 explored existing research into individuals’ 
and groups’ adoption of energy efficient technologies, behaviours and activities. Literature 
from a wide range of sources was examined to identify the extent of energy research 
undertaken by both academics and professionals to date. Articles, books, conference 
papers and reports were used to understand the extent of these behavioural, 
technological and economic analyses and to establish knowledge gaps left within the 
energy research landscape by these approaches. 
Findings from the review of literature, particularly knowledge gaps identified, were used to 
develop the aims and objectives of this thesis. They have evolved since the research was 
originally designed as topics have become better appreciated and concepts validated.  
In addition to the review of energy literature a critique of energy legislation was 
undertaken to provide a regulatory context for this research. The detailed historical 
development of Energy Policy was however, excluded as it has largely ignored SMEs and 
has been widely covered by other researchers.  
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A definition of the policy landscape was challenging. UK energy regulation and policy 
remains fluid with new European Commission Directives and national initiatives regularly 
being introduced. Legal challenges to initiatives added complexity and frustrated 
Government plans. Experiences gained from, and impacts of, these policies were 
considered in creating the alternative policy framework. 
 
4.4 Design of building ownership segmentation 
The research was designed to test the hypothesis that ownership controls the ability and 
willingness of non-domestic building owners and tenants to adopt energy efficiency and 
conservation. This implied participation rates in energy efficiency differed between owners 
and tenants, including varying levels of interest in energy management, willingness to 
invest in energy efficiency and ability to control building changes. A second implication 
was that different building ownership styles incurred different investment costs and 
obtained varying benefits from energy efficiency actions applied. Together these created 
a number of common energy characteristics that were demonstrated by building owners 
and tenants. These were used to identify homogenous groups within the overall non-
domestic building sector.  
This research sub-divided the buildings within this non-domestic sector into a number of 
distinct groups. However, unlike business sector used by Janda (2014) and building type 
used by Peacock et al. (2008) this thesis adopted a new criterion for segmentation; the 
shared characteristics of building ownership combined with the responsibility for the 
purchase of energy consumed.  
Building ownership was selected as the criterion for the segmentation model as it is a 
driver of energy efficiency that has been excluded by other researchers and energy policy 
planners. Little progress to meet energy reduction targets had been achieved by existing 
policy approaches to date, suggesting an alternative approach was required. Ownership 
was hypothesised as holding the key to improving contributions to energy efficiency.  
This new ownership segmentation model divided the UK SME population into 8 distinct 
segments characterised by features of building tenure and the purchase of energy to 
provide a detailed picture of UK building ownership and energy consumption. As each 
segment demonstrated similar characteristics members can be measured and targeted to 
obtain the best energy consumption and carbon emissions reduction return on 
investment. This was explored through scenario planning which is shown in Chapter 8.  
Eight categories of non-domestic building ownership were identified:  
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a) Building owner and tenant – the tenant occupies the building as sole tenant in 
return for rental or lease payments; the tenant purchases energy from the utility 
company 
b) Building owner and user – the owner is the user of the building; the owner 
purchases energy from the utility 
c) Building owner and franchisee – the user occupies the building rent free 
providing a service on behalf of the building owner; the owner purchases energy 
from the utility 
d) Building owner and branch – the building (owned or leased) is a separately 
managed unit within a larger, multisite organisation; head office purchases energy 
from the utility company 
e) Building owner and landlord – the owner appoints a landlord to run the multi 
occupancy building and provide energy for common areas (recouped through 
service charge); the tenant purchases energy from the utility company 
f) Building owner, manager and tenant – the manager runs the building on behalf 
of the owner(s); the building’s manager provides energy for the communal areas 
(recouped through service charge); the tenant purchases energy from the utility 
company 
g) Building owner as the energy provider and user – the tenant occupies the 
building as the sole tenant; the tenant purchases energy from the owner (recouped 
in the rental/lease payment) 
h) Building owner as a commercial investor – the owners have no interest in the 
building other than as an investment; the tenant purchases energy from the utility 
company 
 
Alternative analysis frameworks were considered. This included analysing each 
company individually or treating all SMEs as an homogenous group. These were 
discarded in favour of segmentation. The approach of ownership segmentation was 
selected as it allowed dominant factors influencing the adoption of energy efficiency 
and conservation to be identified and put energy management behaviours in the 
context of building tenure. It was also able to understand the ability of different groups 




Table 4.1: Impact of building ownership on energy consumption reduction  
 
Categories of non-domestic building ownership                                                                   
(energy bill payee shown in brackets) 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































Low cost of energy as a 
business overhead 
        
Split incentive for energy 
investment 
        
Lease terms restrict action 
possible 
        
Energy user does not see 
energy bill 
        
Competition for corporate 
investment funds 
        
Corporate behavioural 
barriers 
        
Corporate financial barriers         
Lack of energy saving 
advocate 
        
Disincentive to reduce 
energy use – energy 
provided to tenant 
        
Disincentive to reduce 
energy use – energy as 
labour replacement 
        
Owner remote from day to 
day activities of building 
        
Access to energy efficiency 
information 
        
 
 
Treating all SMEs as a homogenous group was rejected, as they did not all respond in 
identical ways as would be required by this approach. A system of bespoke policies to 
improve adoption rates of energy efficiency and conservation was considered impractical. 
It was impossible to develop individual policies for each of the UK’s 4.99 million SMEs. 
Grouping SMEs was a practical alternative allowing policies to be tailored to the common 




4.5 Primary Data Collection  
4.5.1  Participants 
To maximise opportunities to deliver research aims and objectives, potential participants 
matching the scope of the project were selected. SMEs within owned or tenanted single 
or multi-site non-domestic business premises were requested to participate along with 
owners of a single non-domestic buildings or larger property portfolios.  
Potential research partners were contacted directly and indirectly. Those identified from 
web searches, network contacts and previous research participant partners were 
contacted directly. Indirect contact with potential participants was made through 
colleagues and associates of direct contacts and social media forums.  
 
4.5.2 Questionnaires 
In order to gather sufficient primary data to ensure the effectiveness of the research, data 
collection was undertaken via a survey of UK SMEs and non-domestic building owners. 
This survey process was chosen to enable a large quantity of information to be gathered 
as efficiently as possible. Issuing surveys via a web-hosted tool was initially chosen to 
enable a large quantity of both quantitative and qualitative data to be collected, collated 
and analysed efficiently.  
As data analysis was undertaken at the level of non-domestic building owner and tenant, 
the questionnaires were designed for this level of implementation. This not only provides 
information for individual owner and tenant analyses but also offers the opportunity to 
scale the information up to the level of an ownership segment and to the segment’s 
population at the UK level.  
Two questionnaires were created, one each for building owners and tenants. These are 
included in Appendix 2. Each survey had one question that is specific to that audience. 
For tenants this requested the ownership structure of their business premises, to confirm 
whether they were owner-occupiers, tenants or franchisees. For those participants 
responding to the building owners’ survey this question asked whether investments will be 
made to the property to improve its energy efficiency or conservation measures when it 
next becomes vacant or the lease is renewed. Although they retained maximum similarity 
it was recognised that each group needed to be asked different questions to capture the 
different energy attitudes and approaches displayed by them. A common questionnaire 
would not have been able to achieve this. More responses from tenants were expected 
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than from building owners, as the numbers operating in the tenant group were 
considerably higher than the number of building owners. 
The choice of research tool was determined by the need to balance demand for 
comprehensive and detailed quantitative and qualitative information against the need to 
use a simple collection tool able to engage participants. A questionnaire using web hosted 
survey software was considered most likely to achieve this.   
Although the web-hosted survey offered advantages such as ease of distribution, 
collection of responses and simplified data analysis through the download of auto-collated 
information, a number of disadvantages were recognised. These included a survey limit of 
10 questions and traditional low response rates. However, with appropriate planning, 
targeting of participants to increase the likelihood of response and thoughtful question 
design these were considered to be manageable. Survey Monkey2 was selected as the 
web host as it was free of charge, technically well supported and likely to have provided 
on-going access. 
The researcher was responsible for tool design, primary data collection and analysis of 
participants’ responses described below. It was therefore recognised that bias could be 
easily incorporated so every effort was made to avoid this by using neutral wording when 
designing the questions and an objective interpretation of responses.  
Upon receipt of the pilot responses to the surveys it was recognised that adjustments to 
the survey format and question content were required. The initial pilot survey was 
conducted using known contacts. A number of concerns were identified including the 
quality of questions and ease of access to the web hosted survey. The low response rate 
also gave cause for concern. It was discovered that not all pilot participants had access to 
the online survey. To overcome this, the survey was converted to a spreadsheet that 
could be used electronically or as a postal survey if the online survey was not accessible 
or an alternate version preferred. The option of interview was also offered.  
The pilot survey responses received also indicated that some questions were misleading 
and therefore generated responses that did not meet research needs. These questions 
were rewritten to correct this.  Pilot surveys are excluded from the analysis of responses 
in Chapter 5.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 Survey Monkey online survey software is available from https://www.surveymonkey.com 
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4.6 Data Analysis 
Analysis of all responses from the research participants was undertaken. No information 
received was excluded. Responses were used to build up both quantitative and qualitative 
pictures of participants’ activities, attitudes and energy cultures, which delivered the first 
two of the research objectives. The collation of these responses provided a pattern of 
energy efficiency within SMEs and the understanding of energy attitudes and behaviours 
gained from this has formed the alternative approach to energy policies proposed. 
Together, these delivered the third and fourth research objective described in Section 4.1.  
The research collected firms’ data within an organisational context. Energy users’ 
intentions, patterns of technology use and organisational impacts cannot be separated 
from the technological and organisational contexts they occur in. Responses were 
therefore evaluated with this context in mind to ensure findings were treated objectively. 
Quantitative data was analysed through a series of spread-sheets, the results of which 
are presented graphically in Chapter 5 and discussed in detail. The information gathered 
has been analysed at the level of individual participant and ownership segment as well as 
being collated into owner and tenant groups. This allowed the results to be scaled up to 
reflect the UK population of 4.99 million SMEs. Qualitative data from participants’ 
responses have been quoted verbatim. 
A commitment was made to all participants to treat their information confidentially and to 
protect their anonymity through the use of reference codes in data analysis. Responses 
are coded with the prefix ‘O’ for responses from owners and ‘T’ for responses from 
tenants. These codes are used throughout the data analysis and presentation of results to 
ensure that any form of bias unintentionally added by the researcher or research process 
is minimised. 
   
4.7 Alternative energy policy proposal 
An alternative approach to energy policy to improve rates of adoption of energy efficiency 
and conservation opportunities by non-domestic building owners and tenants was 
proposed. Qualitative and quantitative information on the drivers of change identified 
through the research was used to design a new approach to Energy Policy. The proposed 
framework was based on the key factors that will motivate non-domestic building owners 
and tenants to adopt energy efficiency and conservation activities and behaviours.  
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This alternative policy approach, termed the Carbon Allowance Scheme, is presented in 
Chapter 7 with its’ potential impact on reducing energy consumption tested using a 
Scenario-Planning Model presented in Chapter 8. This is described in more described in 
more detail below. 
 
4.8 Scenario-Planning Model 
Following the analysis of research participants’ information and proposal of an alternative 
energy policy framework, sensitivity analysis of this alternative approach was undertaken 
using scenario planning. This demonstrated how ownership segmentation might be used 
to focus on, and prioritise efforts to improve adoption rates of energy efficiency and 
conservation within the UK SME population and non-domestic building sector. A 
Scenario-Planning Model incorporating a framework based on ownership segmentation 
established by this research was designed to undertake this.  
The researcher constructed the Excel spread sheet based Scenario-Planning Model to 
explore potential financial savings available from the proposed alternative energy policy 
framework, the Carbon Allowance Scheme. No existing framework was available to 
undertake the tests required consequently a new model was designed. This showed the 
results as both normalised and actual financial outputs in numerical and graphical form. 
These normalised outputs represent data as a change versus the base value rather than 
showing actual values and have been used to compare energy consumption reduction 
scenarios. This is discussed further in Chapter 8. 
A series of ten scenarios, each applying a different combination of savings rates and 
grant funding, were used to establish the potential financial and energy savings from the 
implementation of the Carbon Allowance Scheme. These are described in detail in 
Section 8.4. Annual energy usage and cost figures estimated from the annual fuel 
consumption figures provided research participants and fuel costs calculated by the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (2013c) were input into the model for each 
ownership segment. These are described in more detail in Section 8.3.2 and 8.3.3. The 
segment’s consumption figure was generated from the data provided by the research 
participants scaled up to reflect the segment population at the UK level. A standardised 
energy cost based on the prices of fuels established Department of Energy and Climate 
(2013c) for non-domestic users was used. These figures were input into the model to 
establish how the alternative policy framework might impact UK SMEs’ energy 
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The methodologies implemented were chosen because they were most likely to deliver 
the aims and objectives of this research. In addition they were designed to fill policy and 
knowledge gaps left by previous researchers, Energy Policy and Government Planners 
which were identified within the review of literature and evaluation of regulations. 
Together these allowed the objective creation and management of data, the details of 




CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESPONSES 
5.1 Introduction 
To structure the analysis, the participants’ responses are discussed by total participant 
population and by owner and tenant sub-groups. The input from the research participants 
is also allocated to the ownership segments defined in Chapter 4. Where findings are 
scaled up to reflect the UK population, the baseline figure of 4.99 million SMEs calculated 
by the Federation of Small Businesses (2014) is adopted. To provide the context for the 
data collected companies responding to the survey are initially described. An analysis of 
the segmentation of non-domestic buildings is then undertaken in Section 5.4 and 
followed in Section 5.5 by the analyses of participants’ responses to the surveys. 
A summary of the key findings of the research is shown in Table 5.1. References in the 
final column indicate where the analysis can be found in this chapter. The detailed 
analysis of the participant’s responses below follows the order used in the table. 
 
5.2 Survey participants  
Twenty-eight survey responses were received from participants. All were included in the 
analysis. Of the responses received 7 (25%) from building owners and 21 (75%) from 
tenants. All responses from tenants come from within the UK SME population. As far as 
possible owners leasing or renting to SMEs were sought as research participants. 
However, not all building owners can be confirmed as owners of properties occupied by 
SMEs. The size of premises owned cannot be directly correlated to the number of 
employees housed within the building, which is the measure of an SME organisation used 
within this thesis. 
Figure 5.1 shows the business sectors from which the participants in this research have 
been drawn. They were established from participants’ survey responses. The majority of 
research participants (63%) are from the service sector with leisure and manufacturing 
having fewer representatives at 23%, and 14% respectively.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of key research findings  
Energy factor Key findings Section 
reference 
Participants 28 survey respondents: 7 building owners (25%); 21 tenants (75%) 
3 largest ownership segments: 
1) Segment ‘a’  - building owner and tenant; tenant buys energy from utility 
2) Segment ‘d’ - building owner and branch; head office buys energy on behalf of site 
3) Segment ‘i’ - Building owner and franchisee; franchisee buys energy from utility 
5.2 
Responsibility for energy 
management/improvement 
39% of tenants and 25% of owners are responsible for energy improvements 
18% of properties have no one responsible for energy improvements 
5.5.2.1 
Required responsibility for energy 
improvement 
Sharing of responsibility is the preferred scenario overall 
No tenants want their building owners to take full responsibility 
5.5.2.2 
Relationship between owner and 
tenant with regard to energy 
consumption  
50% of participants have relationships with owner/tenant that prevent improvements to energy efficiency and 
conservation: 36% have “preventative” relationships; 14% choose no involvement1. 
100% owner occupiers and building owners choose no involvement  
5.5.3.1 
Expectations of future 
relationships with regard to 
energy consumption 
71% expect tenants to increasingly demand energy efficient properties 
50% of tenants consider it unlikely owners will upgrade existing buildings 
50% of owners are unlikely to upgrade their properties when they next become vacant 
5.5.3.2 
Incentives to adopt energy 
efficiency and conservation 
31% of respondents receive no incentives to improve energy performance 
 
5.5.4.1 
Disincentives to adopt energy 
efficiency and conservation 
88% of respondents have encountered disincentives to the adoption of energy efficient opportunities 
79% experienced split incentives preventing improvement 
5.5.4.2 
Motivation of future energy 
improvement 
3 key motivating factors for owners and tenants:  
Owners:                               
1) Regulations  
2) Easier grant access  
3) Customer pressure 
 
Tenants:  
1) Regulations  
2) Easier grant access  




The sample of companies surveyed is representative of the structure of the UK SME 
population; it identifies a similar distribution of businesses as that established by BMG 
Research (2013) in the 2012 Small Business Survey for the Department of Innovation and 
Skills. This identified 67% of SMEs is in the services sector (including manufacturing, 
retail, information and transport), 12% in manufacturing, 15% in leisure and 1% in 
agriculture. Although services, leisure and manufacturing are represented, no research 





Figure 5.1 shows the business sectors from which the participants in this research have 
been drawn. They were established from participants’ survey responses. The majority of 
research participants (63%) are from the service sector with leisure and manufacturing 
having fewer representatives at 23%, and 14% respectively.  
The sample of companies surveyed is representative of the structure of the UK SME 
population; it identifies a similar distribution of businesses as that established by BMG 
Research (2013) in the 2012 Small Business Survey for the Department of Innovation and 
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Figure 5.1: Research participants’ business sectors  
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It is recognised that there are fewer organisations participating in this research than 
initially expected. The implications of this are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
In addition survey responses indicate that 15% of building owners own a single non-
domestic building with 85% of owners having portfolios of between 5 and 50 buildings. 
The survey responses indicate participating owners and tenants own or operate from both 
single and multi-occupancy sites. A significant majority (85%) occupy their business 
premises as individual occupants (Figure 5.2). Of those sharing premises, 4% are co-




5.3 Purchase of energy  
In order to verify the segmentation of building ownership and to understand patterns of 
energy purchases within non-domestic buildings, the participants are asked to confirm 
how energy is paid for in both the tenants’ premises and, if appropriate, communal areas. 
Tenants are asked this directly, whilst owners are asked how their tenants obtain their 
energy.  
As Figure 5.3 shows, the majority of participants (78%) confirmed that they or their 





Figure 5.2: Owners' and tenants' occupancy profile  
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company. The remaining 22% obtained energy via their building owner as part of their 





Tenants controlling their energy purchases represent a significant disincentive for the 
building’s owner to invest in efforts to reduce energy consumption as only the tenant will 
benefit financially and it is unlikely that the rental charges will be increased to reflect 
recoup the investment. Where energy is a fixed charge the tenant has little incentive to 
adopt energy efficiency and conservation measures, as only the owner will financially 
benefit. This finding confirms the presence of split incentives identified within Chapter 2. 
As shown in Figure 5.4 all participants occupying space in multi-tenanted buildings 























5.4 Segmentation of participants in the surveys 
The eight categories of ownership used to model the segmentation of non-domestic 
buildings at the outset of this research have been reviewed against participants’ 
responses to questions regarding the tenure of their properties and their sources of 
energy supply. This tests the accuracy of this segmentation prior to its use in the analysis 
of other responses to ensure robust and accurate data interpretation. Research findings 
are shown in Table 5.2.  
Three findings emerge from this review of segmentation: firstly 7 of the 8 categories are 
confirmed to exist; secondly, an additional ownership segment emerges; thirdly, sources 
of energy used to define the building ownership segments need to be adjusted for 
Segment ‘h’. This new segment is given the reference ‘i’.  
For tenants in ownership Segment ‘c’ where a non-domestic building user occupies their 
premises free of charge as a franchisee, it was initially assumed their energy is also 
provided free of charge by their clients as part of their service contract. However, the 
surveys have revealed that whilst this tenure structure exists for some franchisees a 












Figure 5.4: Purchase of energy - communal areas 
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Table 5.2: Segmentation of non-domestic building ownership segments 
Segment 
reference 
Segment details                                   
(and purchase of energy) 
Revised segment details                    
(and purchase of energy) 
a 
Building owner and tenant                                                                     
(tenant from utility) 
Building owner and tenant                                                                     
(tenant from utility) 
b 
Building owner and user                                       
(owner from utility) 
Building owner and user                                       
(owner from utility) 
c 
Building owner and franchisee                                   
(owner from utility) 
Building owner and franchisee                                   
(owner from utility) 
d 
Building owner and branch                                 
(head office from utility) 
Building owner and branch                                 
(head office from utility) 
e 
Building owner and landlord                               
(tenant from utility) 
Building owner and landlord                               
(tenant from utility) 
f 
Building owner, manager and tenant                                      
(tenant from utility) 
Building owner, manager and tenant                                      
(tenant from utility) 
g 
Building owner as the energy provider 
and user (tenant from owner) 
Building owner as the energy provider 
and user (tenant from owner) 
h 
Building owner as a commercial investor                   
(tenant from utility) 
Building owner as a commercial investor                   
(tenant from owner) 
i  
Building owner and franchisee                                   
(tenant from utility) 
 
 
In this new segment the franchisee occupies the building free of charge but purchases 
energy direct from a utility company. This research adds knowledge to the understanding 
of the structure of non-domestic building ownership across the UK SME sector, including 
patterns of tenure and occupancy of non-domestic buildings and relationships between 
owners and tenants.  
This additional segment has been identified within the leisure sector where a number of 
respondents operate sports centres, swimming complexes and golf courses for local 
authority clients. It covers 12% of the non-domestic building owners and tenants 
participating in this research. This segment has not been identified with private owners.  
From the information provided by the research participants it appears that no owners or 
tenants can be placed within Segment ‘e’ in which the owner appoints a landlord to 
operate the building on their behalf. It cannot be conclusively established from this 
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research whether the segment does not exist, whether it has not been populated as 
companies within this segment have not been recruited or whether it overlaps with 
Segment ’f’ in which a managing agent operates the building on behalf of the owner. It is 
recommended that further research be undertaken to determine this.  
The participants’ survey responses indicate that the ownership segmentation model 
requires adjustment to correct the purchase of energy in Segment ‘h’. The research finds 
tenants obtain energy for their premises from the owner with the cost included within the 
service charge (Figure 5.5) rather than purchasing it directly from the utility as originally 
proposed.  
The survey responses from members of Segment ‘a’ indicate that there is no single 
pattern of energy purchase within the segment. However a clear majority (80%) of tenants 
purchase energy directly from their utility company. This matches the segmentation 
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As shown in Figure 5.6, 50% of research participants fall within Segment ‘a’ whereby non-
domestic building users occupy their premises as tenants and purchase energy directly 
from a utility supplier. The second highest population (19%) falls within with Segment ‘d’. 
This represents branches of multi-site organisations with their head offices controlling 
energy purchasing. The new category of franchisees purchasing energy directly from a 
utility supplier, Segment ‘i’, emerges as the third largest segment (12%).  
 
5.5 Analysis of survey responses 
This section contains the analysis of responses to the surveys received. To create an 
analysis framework it has been subdivided into themes: tenure; responsibility for energy 
efficiency and conservation; perceptions of relationships between owners and tenants 
within energy management; current incentives and disincentives for energy improvements 
and factors to motivate future improvements. Interrelationships between these topics are 





















Figure 5.6: Survey participants by ownership segment 
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5.5.1 Non-domestic building tenure  
A question to establish the ownership structure of the respondents’ business premises is 
asked of both tenants and owners. Six scenarios are offered. These categories are:  
1. Owner occupier  
2. Leased from a public authority 
3. Leased from a private owner 
4. Rented from a public authority 
5. Rented from a private owner 
6. Free of charge – building provided as part of a contract  
 
Overall the research finds that leasehold or rental tenants occupy 72% of non-domestic 
properties. Responses shown in Figure 5.7 indicate the majority of SMEs (57%) occupy 
premises leased or rented from private owners, with premises leased or rented from 
public authorities comprising only 15% of tenancies. 14% of respondents are owner-
occupiers with a further 14% occupying their business premises free of charge as part of 
their service contract. This latter category is all within the leisure sector. 
 
 
Leased - private 
owner 
43% 













Figure 5.7: Ownership structure of survey participants' business premises  
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5.5.2 Responsibility for energy management, efficiency and conservation 
5.5.2.1 Current patterns of responsibility 
To gauge how energy management, efficiency and conservation activities are managed 
within non-domestic buildings, SME tenants and building owners were asked to identify 
who is responsible for energy management, efficiency and conservation within their 
business premises or buildings owned. A number of standard scenarios are proposed 
with the category of “other” available should none of the standard answers apply. 
Additional comments are also encouraged. These standard options are:  
1. Tenant 
2. Owner 
3. Split between owner and tenant  
4. Parent company 
5. Managing agent 























As shown in Figure 5.8 in 82% of participants indicate an individual or group is allocated 
responsibility for energy management, efficiency and conservation. 60% have someone 
responsible within the building. However, it emerges that no one is responsible for energy 
management, efficiency and conservation in 18% of buildings surveyed; 60% of these 
responses are from tenants and 40% from building owners. 
A significant difference in responsibility for energy management, efficiency and 
conservation emerges from tenants and owners. These are shown in Figure 5.9. 24% of 
participating tenants consider that no one is responsible for energy management, 
efficiency and conservation for their business premises although owners do not agree. 
71% of owners consider themselves responsible. None consider their tenants responsible 
although 14% of owners think tenants are responsible through their parent company and 
15% perceive joint responsibility.  
However, 52% of tenants see themselves responsible and 10% see owners responsible 
for energy management, efficiency and conservation activities. 15% of owners and 10% 
of tenants consider responsibility is split between themselves and their tenants. Even 
though these responses do not come from the owners and tenants of the same buildings 
they indicate a potential gap in the ownership of energy improvement that causes energy 

























Figure 5.9: Responsibility for energy managment, efficiency and 





When these figures are scaled up to reflect the UK SME population, around 900,000 
SMEs appear to be operating from premises where no one is responsible for energy 
efficiency improvements. If the estimated £2000 p.a. saving from simple energy 
improvements calculated by the Eon (2011) is applied, it appears the SME population is 
failing to obtain financial savings of almost £10 billion a year and emissions savings of 
over 1000 mtCO2.  
Responses analysed here highlight the difference of opinion that exists between owners 
and tenants as to how energy consumption is versus should be managed within non-
domestic buildings. Owners report themselves responsible for energy improvements in 
the majority of their buildings and that each building has someone responsible for energy 
efficiency. However, tenants disagree. Over three quarters consider owners of their 
business premises have no involvement with energy improvements.  
When survey responses are considered by ownership segment (Figure 5.10) a consensus 
on responsibility emerges in all but Segments ‘a’ and ‘d’. SMEs purchasing energy from 
their building owner within Segment ‘c’ agree that no one is responsible for energy 
management, efficiency and conservation which highlights the owner-tenant split 
identified within previous research by DeCanio (1993), Fawcett (2010) and Schleich and 
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Figure 5.10: Responsibility for energy management, efficiency and 










Only Segment ‘a’ shows responsibility for energy efficiency and conservation split 
between owners and tenants. However, the majority of responses indicate tenants are 
considered responsible for energy management. 
 
5.5.2.2 Preferred allocation of responsibility 
The surveys establish how participants believe responsibility for energy management and 
improvements should be allocated to exploit the benefits available. This information is 
included within the alternative approach to energy policy framework to maximise 
engagement in energy and carbon savings.  
The participants are asked to place the owner and tenant on a scale between 0% and 
100% according to their expectation of the responsibility they should take for 
implementing energy management and adoption of energy efficiency and conservation 
interventions. Responsibility is rated against three items: 
1. Responsibility for funding energy improvements 
2. Responsibility for carrying out improvements 































Ownership of responsibility 







As shown in Figure 5.11 the majority of owners want to retain responsibility for funding 
and installing energy efficiency and conservation opportunities (66%). Only 17% would 
allow their tenants to install improvements or share responsibility to do so. This figure is 
slightly lesser than the number of owners currently taking responsibility for energy 
efficiency and conservation (71%) shown in Figure 5.9. This implies that to improve rates 
of the adoption of energy efficient technologies owners have to be targeted. This is 
considered further in Chapter 8. 
Over three quarters of tenants want to share responsibility for energy consumption 
improvement with their buildings’ owner. This is a large increase over the 10% of tenants 
who indicate that they currently share responsibility with their building owners.  
Analysis of responsibility is also undertaken by ownership segment. Segment positions on 
the rating scale are shown in Figure 5.12. Responses indicate members of six of the nine 
ownership segments agree on responsibility for energy efficiency and conservation 
activities within their buildings (Figure 5.13). Participants in Segment ‘d’ show a split, 
indicating that they would like responsibility allocated equally between owners, tenants or 
shared between the two. More than 80% of tenants in ownership Segment ‘a’ and 100% 
in Segment ‘i’ want to share responsibility with their building owners. Only participants in 
Segments ‘f’ and ‘g’ want owners to take sole responsibility for energy improvement. 

























































The research participants are also asked for additional comments. In response T5, a 
member of Segment ‘a’ operating in the IT services sector commented,  
“Someone needs to take responsibility as at present there are no 
encouragements for tenants to be more energy efficient.” 
 
5.5.3 Energy relationships between owners and tenants  
In order to understand the type of relationships participants have with their owner or 
tenant regarding energy the surveys request both quantitative and qualitative responses 
to the question on owner-tenant relationships. In addition participants are asked to 
confirm their expectations of relationships in the future. 
 
5.5.3.1 Current relationships  
 Research participants are asked to categorise their relationship with the owner or 
tenant of their business premises by selecting the most appropriate description 
from a series of standard relationship scenarios:  
 Collaborative: Tenant and building owner work together to reduce energy 
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Figure 5.13: Preferred ownership of energy management, efficiency 







 Cooperative: Building owner encourages tenants to make changes to reduce 
energy expenditure; no financial support provided 
 Supportive: Building owner implements energy conservation measures without 
tenants' involvement 
 Preventative: Building owner prevents tenants making changes to reduce energy 
expenditure 
 No involvement chosen: Owner or tenant chooses to have no involvement in 
improving energy efficiency improvement 
 
These categories were designed by the researcher to reflect the relationships likely to be 
experienced by non-domestic owners and tenants. The titles used were taken from the 
descriptions of relationships used within the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. 
As shown in Figure 5.14, “preventative relationships” emerge as the most common style 
of relationship between tenants and owners with 36% of participants confirming that their 
owner or tenant prevents improvements to the building’s energy efficiency being 
undertaken. A further 14% of participants consider that owners choose not to get involved 
in energy efficiency and conservation improvements. Therefore 50% of participants have 











chosen  14% 
Supportive 4% 
Figure 5.14: Perception of current relationships between tenant and 
owner with regard to energy efficiency and conservation 
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When the category of “preventative relationships” is combined with the scenario of “no 
involvement” approximately half of all respondents have a relationship with their owner or 
tenant that actively prevents either or both parties from benefitting financially from energy 
consumption reduction opportunities. 
If this is scaled up to reflect the UK population, approximately 1.8 million SMEs occupy 
commercial premises in which there is little likelihood of energy efficiency and 
conservation improvement under the current relationship. Approximately a further 700,000 
SMEs occupy premises in which the owners choose to have no involvement in improving 
the energy performance of the building. Together around 2.5 million companies are 
unlikely to be able to generate the financial and carbon emissions savings available. 
On the positive side, 27% of participants indicate that they collaborate with their building’s 
owner or tenant to adopt opportunities to improve energy efficiency. A further 19% cite a 
cooperative relationship with their owner or tenant. This implies that in almost 50% of the 
non-domestic properties considered here there is a relationship between owners and 
tenant that allows them to benefit from energy efficiency and conservation opportunities. 
However, despite this positive relationship survey responses indicate that tenants have 
undertaken an average of only 0.9 improvement interventions in the last 2 years and 

















Collaborative Cooperative Supportive Preventative No
involvement
chosen
Figure 5.15: Relationships between tenant and owner with regard to 





When owners’ and tenants’ responses are considered separately the views of each group 
appear markedly different (Figure 5.15). It emerges that tenants consider their owners 
more preventative and less supportive than the vice versa. 38% of tenants consider that 
their relationship with their building’s owner prevents them from making changes to 
reduce energy expenditure. However, only 29% of owners claim a similar relationship with 
their tenants. This implies that an alternative policy needs to engage owners to adopt 
energy efficiency and conservation opportunities. The alternative approach to Energy 
Policy proposed in Chapter 7 is designed to achieve this. 
It is encouraging that only 5% of tenants believe that their building owners chose to have 
no involvement in energy efficiency and conservation activities. However, 29% of owners 
feel this is true of their tenants. This is indicative of the split of incentives identified by 
researchers including Fawcett (2010) and Bright (2010) and discussed in Chapter 2 exists 




When relationships between owners and tenants are reviewed by ownership segment 
a number highlights emerge (Figure 5.16). These include: 
 All owner-occupiers participating in this research choose to have no involvement 
in energy efficiency and conservation. Consequently they do not benefit from the 
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Figure 5.16: Perception of relationship between tenant and owner 










reflect the UK SME population, around 343,000 owner-occupiers feel unwilling or 
unable to improve their energy efficiency. 
 All participants within Segments ‘c’ and ‘f’ consider their relationship with their 
building’s owner or tenant prevents energy efficiency and conservation 
improvements. In Segment ‘c’ this may be due to the fact that the owner controls 
the purchase of energy. In Segment ‘f’ the relationship between owner, managing 
agent and tenant may be too confused to deliver energy improvement.100% of 
participants in Segment ‘h’ confirm that they, as building owners, choose to have 
no involvement in energy efficiency and conservation. This may be due to the fact 
that they are commercial investors and therefore remote from the occupants of the 
building and cost of energy.   
 Overall only a few participants consider they have a ‘supportive’ relationship with 
their tenant or owner. These respondents are all from owners within Segment ‘a’, 
implying tenants within other segments do not receive support from the owners of 
their business premises to improve energy efficiency. 
 
Research participants are asked to give additional information regarding their relationship 
with their owner or tenant. This contributes to understanding owner-tenant relationships 
and is used to frame an alternative Energy Policy that will increase the likelihood of SMEs 
adopting energy efficiency and conservation improvements in Chapter 7. These 
comments are considered here.  
Respondent O2, a building owner with a portfolio of more than 10 single occupancy 
properties in Segment ‘b’, indicates they choose to have no involvement in energy 
efficiency and conservation. In addition O3, a building owner in Segment ‘g’ with 10 multi-
tenanted properties, indicates that in the majority of properties,  
“Energy costs aren’t a significant factor.” 
With this view there appears to be little or no incentive for owners to invest in energy 
improvements that will reduce energy consumption and energy costs. 
Many tenants describe a similar description of energy inefficient relationships. For 
example, participant T16, in Segment ‘i, in the leisure sector describes the relationship 
with their building owner as “cooperative” although this is qualified,  
“But only where the landlord permits and there are potential fiscal advantages 
for the landlord. Our landlord attempts at all times to avoid replacement of 
equipment that is his responsibility.” 
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T14, from the ecology services sector in Segment ‘a’, describes the relationship with their 
building’s owner as ‘functional’ where, 
 “The only involvement they have is when something goes wrong”.  
Participant T21, a management consultancy division of a larger multi-site organisation in 
Segment ‘d’, confirms,  
“Our building owner has no interest in helping us to reduce energy costs. They 
have refused to replace oil-fired boilers. Our energy use has to be reported as 
part of CRC so it costs us twice as much to be energy inefficient!”  
T22, a management services company in Segment ‘d’, indicates,  
“Our building owners have nothing to do with energy efficiency. We had to 
insist on PIRs and an air source heat pump when they refurbished the building 
before we moved in. But there’s something wrong with the settings so we’re 
using more electricity than expected. Our bills are 50% higher than in our old 
premises which were a barn twice the size with single glazing and no 
insulation.”  
The tensions in relationships highlighted here reflect those identified by Janda (2009b), de 
Groot Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999), and Schleich and Gruber (2008). They appear to 
prevent the adoption of energy efficiency improvements that would financially benefit both 
parties. Overall, it emerges that half of research participants identify a relationship with 
the owner of their business premises or tenant that actively or passively discourages the 
adoption of energy efficiency and conservation. These findings are used to develop the 
alternative energy policy framework proposed.  
 
5.5.3.2 Future relationships  
The research participants are also asked to identify how they expected relationships 
between non-domestic building owners and tenants to evolve over the next ten years.  
Although 20% disagree, 71% of the tenants responding to this question indicate that they 
expect tenants to increasingly demand more energy efficient properties in the future. 
However, less than 10% of participants considered this likely to be driven by current 
energy policies such as the introduction of mandatory EPCs in 2018. Participant T1, a 
tenant in Segment ‘a’, working in the renewable energy sector, summarized this,  
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“Tenants will increasingly expect more energy efficient properties going 
forward.”  
O3 in Segment ‘a’ expects, 
“As energy costs rise and energy saving equipment becomes more common 
and cost effective more measures will be adopted” 
Participant T12, an organisation in Segment ‘a’ supplying facilities management services, 
expects energy efficient business premises to become increasingly attractive in the future, 
“We recognise that it would benefit current and prospective landlords to 
support energy efficient buildings as they will be more attractive to prospective 
tenants and will attract like-minded tenants that will support such measures. 
They are likely to be willing to pay a premium on occupancy charges if they 
realise reduced running costs and will also benefit from any kudos in 
occupying such a building.” 
The owners’ perspective of upgrading their properties is considered further in Section 
5.5.3.3.  
Despite the expectation of an increasing demand for energy efficient non-domestic 
buildings, 50% of tenants are doubtful it will happen and consider it unlikely that owners 
will upgrade existing buildings. This is largely due to owners being risk adverse and 
unwilling to invest if the return on their investment does not meet their business strategy.  
Research participant T6, in the facilities services sector in Segment ‘a’ writes,  
“With respect to older premises I do not think the situation will change. It is a 
well-known fact that landlords assess the age of their stock and weigh up the 
cost of upgrading versus payback against time.” 
 
5.5.3.3  Vacant building upgrades 
An additional question is posed to the non-domestic building owners to establish whether 
they will implement energy improvement upgrades when their building is next vacant. Half 
of respondents indicated this was unlikely whilst the other half did not know.  
The view emerging from the owners is that they will not automatically benefit from energy 
improvements so will not undertake building upgrades. However, this may prevent them 
from benefitting from the expected rise in demand for energy efficient properties 
highlighted by the tenants participating in this research.  
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Participant O2, a property owner in South Yorkshire in Segment ‘f’, confirmed that 
upgrading is unlikely when their property is next vacant, 
“Unless it is clear that either it’s a barrier to or will help with letting”. 
 
5.5.4 Incentives and disincentives to adopt energy efficiency and conservation 
In order to establish which factors affect owners’ and tenants’ ability and willingness to 
adopt energy efficiency and conservation opportunities, research participants are asked to 
confirm which inducements and barriers have been encountered when attempting to 
implement energy improvements over the previous 2 years. Owners and tenants 
participating in this research are asked to select the factors they have experienced from a 





As shown in Figure 5.17, despite some incentives being identified, over two thirds of 
participants indicate they only been faced with barriers when attempting to improve 
energy efficiency and conservation. These responses are examined in more detail below 














5.5.4.1  Incentives encountered when adopting energy improvements 
The incentives encountered by research participants are shown in Figure 5.18. Two key 
encouragements emerge from participants’ responses: cost savings and legislative 
compliance. Almost one quarter of research participants confirm they have not been able 
to take advantage of these incentives. However, despite these opportunities being 
available almost one third of respondents confirm that they have received no incentives to 
improve energy performance.  
The surveys requested further details of participants’ experiences of incentives for the 
adoption of energy efficiency and conservation opportunities. Examples of their responses 
are included below.  
T18, a leisure service operator in Segment ‘a’, confirms that they have been encouraged 
to reduce energy consumption, as it was included as an obligation within their contract,  
“As part of the service contract [the owners] expect the utilities onsite to be 


















Figure 5.18: Incentives for energy improvement encountered by research 
participants   
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Participant O2, an owner with a portfolio of small properties in Segment ‘f’, specifies,  
“Cost saving and re-letting are the main incentive”. 
However, participant T15 in Segment ‘i’ is less positive and indicates,  
“Only incentive is legal requirement to electrically test the aircon units in each 
office”. 
Similarly T2, a facilities management company in Segment ‘d’, confirmed, 
“Feed in Tariffs have helped with the deployment of renewables but other than that 
there are no effective incentives”. 
T21, a management services consultancy in Segment ‘d’ highlights the significance of 
legislation,   
“Our company owner will only pay for improvements that will ensure the company remains 
legally compliant” 
 
5.5.4.2  Disincentives encountered when adopting energy improvements 
The disincentives for adoption of energy efficiency and conservation opportunities offered 
by the research participants are shown in Figure 5.19. Although a wide variety of barriers 
have been encountered, a number of key themes can be seen: 
1. Financial constraints e.g. the capital costs of energy efficiency are prohibitive 
2. Knowledge constraints e.g. owners and tenants lack understanding of potential 
improvements 
3. Ownership constraints e.g. the lease prevents energy improvements being 
made 
4. Regulatory constraints e.g. planning permission has not been achieved for the 
improvements proposed 
 
These key themes are used to provide a framework for the analysis of disincentives 









Figure 5.19: Disincentives for the adoption of energy efficiency and conservation 
 
From the analysis of participants’ responses, Ownership and Financial Constraints 
emerge as the key barriers to energy efficiency and conservation encountered by 43% 
and 36% of research participants respectively. The split of these is shown in Figure 5.20. 
Constraints from a lack of understanding of improvement actions available and 
regulations appear to be encountered less frequently than ownership and financial 
constraints. This supports the responses to questions on energy improvement motivators 
discussed in Section 5.4.7 that indicate access to additional information is of less 
significance than is assumed by current energy policy. 
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If the incidence of the two most widely experienced barriers to energy efficiency is 
increased pro rata to reflect the UK SME population, it emerges that 2.9 million 
companies may encounter barriers to energy efficiency related to the ownership of their 
business premises and 1.9 million SMEs experience financial disincentives. This prevents 
them from benefitting from £3.8 billion of cost savings each year and the country by more 
than 750,000 tCO2 emissions savings. 
These two largest disincentives encountered by research participants are discussed in 





5.5.4.2.1 Disincentives for energy efficiency and conservation based on ownership  
When impacts of ownership disincentives are analysed in more detail (Figure 5.21) the 
effect of lease clauses and ownership structures of business premises emerge as the 
most frequently encountered barriers to adopting energy efficiency and conservation 
improvements. They have been experienced by 82% of participants. One quarter of 
participants cite the tenure of their business premises as one of the two key disincentives 
to energy improvement. The effect of the second key barrier, the content and structure of 



















Qualitative responses given by participants provide further details of disincentives for the 
adoption of energy efficiency and conservation related to building ownership. For 
example, participant T7, a tenant sharing their business premises in Segment ‘b’, 
indicates, 
“As tenants we are unable to change the fabric of the building and we are very 
much dependent upon the other tenant company and the landlord”. 
Similarly T8, a tenant in Segment ‘a’ in a multi-occupancy building highlights this reliance 
on co-located organisations as well as the building owner to improve energy performance,  
“As one of 2 tenant companies, investment will be dependent upon landlord and 
other tenant’s buy in” 
T3, an independent retail company in Segment “a” explained, 
“We are [on the] ground floor with flats above, the Local Authority is the owner and 
rent them out. If we want to put solar panels up we would have to go through 
tenants and the Local Authority before we could carry out [the work]”. 
Participant T17, a company in Segment “i”, running a leisure centre on behalf of a local 
authority, are constrained by contractual issues, 
“All areas of the building have to comply with Sport England recommendations. As 



















Figure 5.21: Ownership constraints to the adoption of energy 
efficiency and conservation 
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T19, a leisure centre operator in Segment “a”, confirms they have encountered 
disincentives of, 
“Red tape and contractual politics” 
This participant also illustrates the impact of contractual issues, 
“There are 2 tenants, one responsible for operations, the other maintenance. The 
operator has responsibility for utility costs but little or no authority to change 
structure or equipment without the consent of the maintenance partner. This can 
be very problematic when the operators would like to change something that may 
end up costing its maintenance partner long term”. 
T16, an SME within the service industry in Segment “i”, supports the view that contracts 
can be a disincentive for energy improvements and confirms that energy improvements 
are laborious to implement, 
“Improvements can only be undertaken with all party agreement and a Notice of 
Change to the Contract”.  
As this is a legal change it appears unlikely that many changes will be pursued. 
Research participants also describe more general disincentives for improving energy 
efficiency within their buildings. For example, respondent T6 in Segment “a”, in the 
facilities services sector, describes a general disincentive, 
“There is probably a great deal of tenants that would like to have a more 
energy saving building unfortunately their hands are tied. Most tenants would 
like the freedom to choose the best energy available or have metered energy 
but again they get no help to do so.” 
O6, an owner-occupier in Segment “b”, confirms, 
“I am selling the business so will not invest in improving the office. That is for the 
new owner to address”. 
 
5.5.4.2.2 Disincentives for energy efficiency and conservation based on financial 
investment and return 
As shown in Figure 5.19, participants of this survey also consider financial constraints a 
significant barrier to making energy improvements. This is broken down further in Figure 
5.22 to provide more details. 
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Over 70% of respondents consider the split of financial incentives arising from building 
ownership negatively impacts the ability and willingness of both owners and tenants to 
adopt energy efficiency and conservation opportunities. The research indicates the 
serious impact of split incentives previously with 39% of tenants and 33% of owners 




For example, participant O1 a property owner in the East Midlands in Segment ‘h’ 
summarised this widely held opinion as:  
“Investment money is limited so [the building] will be tidied up. But we don’t benefit 
long-term so we won’t invest in energy efficiency for tenants”. 
Responses also indicate more than a fifth of participants feel their company’s financial 
rules e.g. payback periods or rates of return on investment act as barriers to the 
improvement of energy efficiency. 6% of the participants see the scale of the capital cost 
required to invest in energy improvements prevents them doing so.  
If these figures are increased to represent the UK SME population, approximately 1 
million small businesses would be unwilling to invest in energy efficiency, or unable to, as 
it conflicted with their financial rules.  
Participants also provide illustrations of these financial barriers encountered. For 
example, T11, a grounds maintenance contractor in Segment ‘c’, indicated, 
Tenant 
unwilling to 















capital cost  
6% 
Figure 5.22: Financial constraints to the adoption of energy 
efficiency and conservation  
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“There has been no investment in any building with regard to reducing energy 
consumption. This is mainly due to lack of funding”. 
T22, a management consultancy in Segment ‘d’, confirmed,  
“The cost of energy improvements does not meet the company's financial rules - 
e.g. payback periods’.  
T6, a facilities services company in Segment ‘a’ indicated,  
“We have not been offered any incentives to improve energy efficiency or 
conservation or costs measures. It is very frustrating when the company I run is 
operating in facilities services and I can see obvious areas of improvement” 
O2, an owner in Segment ‘h’ with a portfolio of small buildings in the Yorkshire, indicates,  
“The main barrier is capital cost”. 
In a similar manner, T17, a leisure centre operator in Segment ‘i’, indicated,  
“Sourcing capital funding for energy projects is a challenge”. 
When disincentives to energy efficiency and conservation are considered by ownership 
segment distinct patterns of barriers emerge and the impact of ownership of the business 
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As shown in Figure 5.23, research participants within Segment ‘a’ appear to be 
significantly affected by the impact of the ownership structures of their premises. This may 
be due to the split of incentives between owners and tenants limiting the ability and 
willingness to invest in energy efficiency and conservation. Segments ‘c’ and ‘i’ also 
demonstrate this. However, unlike members of Segment ‘a’ companies in both of these 
segments are franchisees and indicated by participants’ responses, are likely to have 
limited ability to make energy improvements.  
Financial constraints appear most significant in Segment ‘b’ where the owner of the 
building occupies it, Segment ‘f’ where the owner and tenant are separated by the 
presence of a managing agent and Segment ‘h’ where the owners are commercial 
investors. For owner-occupiers the investment required for energy improvements may 
have to compete with other investment opportunities. 
However, for participants in the other segments there appears to be a common theme of 
separation between the building user and its owner that may be influencing investment in 
energy efficiency and conservation. For example, T22, a management consultancy in 
Segment ‘d’, described their experience:   
“The lease has only 12 months to go so we've given up trying to get the owners to 
improve the building fabric. We have made 5 requests for energy efficiency 
improvements to our building over the last 3 years but nothing was ever 
forthcoming. In fact only one response was received to the 5 requests made. The 
building’s owner refuses to invest in the property.” 
Lack of knowledge of opportunities regarding energy efficiency and conservation appear 
only significant to the owner occupiers in Segment ‘b’, and to a lesser extent to tenants in 
Segment ‘a’ and the branches of multisite organisations in Segment ‘d’. However, in all 
cases these are of lesser importance than other disincentives encountered and of lesser 
importance than assumed within current Energy Policy.  
 
5.5.5 Impact of lease agreements on adoption of energy efficiency improvements  
The literature review in Chapter 2 suggested that tenancy agreements may have a 
significant influence on the ability and willingness of owners and tenants to adopt energy 
efficiency and conservation measures. This thesis tests this view and concludes that 
leases remain a significant disincentive to improving energy efficiency. As shown in 
Figure 5.21, 25% of research participants own or occupy business premises with leases 
that restrict their ability to make energy improvements.   
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57% of the tenants surveyed indicate that they are restricted from making changes that 
will improve energy efficiency whilst owners indicate that they restrict 61% of tenants from 
doing the same. Owners and tenants participating in this research may not own and 
occupy the same buildings yet, as show in Figure 5.24, their responses offer similar 
patterns of restriction suggesting that the use of lease clauses to control changes to the 




If these figures are scaled up to reflect the UK SME population over 2.8 million companies 
are restricted from improving energy efficiency by their tenancy contracts. 
The participants’ qualitative responses also illustrate how leases affect the ability of 
building owners and tenants to improve their energy efficiency. These range from simple 
restrictions caused by the remaining length of the lease to more complex scenarios. For 
example T3, a retail outlet in Segment ‘a’, confirmed, 
“The length of the lease can restrict the amount of investment”. 
However, T5 an IT facilities organisation in Segment ‘a’ provides an example of the 
impact of a specific lease clause, 
“Clauses are prohibitive and encourage waste…especially under dilapidations e.g. 













Figure 5.24: The impact of lease clauses on owners' and tenants' 









though it is in fine condition and replace with cheap items such as cheapest 
lighting and carpets which are not energy efficient”. 
T11, a grounds maintenance contractor in Segment ‘c’, confirmed investment in energy 
improvements, 
“Would very much depend on return of investment as we do not own the buildings 
and only 6 years of the contract left”. 
T14, an ecology services provider in Segment ‘a’, confirms, 
“The lease clauses prevent us as the tenant from making alterations to the exterior 
of the building or any part of the interior of the property. The owner is not restricted 
from making changes but does not get involved in energy improvements” 
When considered by ownership segment (Figure 5.25) a similar picture of restrictive lease 
clauses emerges in all except Segments ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘g’. The only segments in which 
participants have no restrictions on energy improvements are Segments ‘b’ and ‘g’. This is 




In segment ‘a’, 75% of the tenants are bound by lease clauses that constrain their ability 
and willingness to reduce energy consumption. If this is scaled up to reflect the UK SME 
population, up to 1.85 million companies are restricted from adopting technologies that 
will improve energy efficiency and energy conservation. If the saving of £2000 per year 
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Figure 5.25: Lease clauses restricting owners' and tenants' ability to 








to benefit from the £3.7 billion in energy savings that are readily available and the country 
is missing an opportunity to reduce carbon emissions by 450 mtCO2 in one year alone.  
 
5.5.6 Factors that will motivate future improvements 
Having established that 88% of non-domestic building owners and tenants have 
encountered some form of disincentive when attempting to reduce energy consumption, 
this research now seeks to establish what would motivate research participants to adopt 
energy efficiency and conservation opportunities.  
This review of potential motivators of energy change is undertaken to test the validity of 
expected drivers of energy efficiency entrenched within current energy policy and 
research and identifies the factors most likely to be successful drivers of change. Findings 
from this analysis will be incorporated in the proposal for an alternative policy approach in 
Chapter 7.  
The surveys ask participants to rate a series of potential driving factors according to how 
strongly they would be motivated by them to invest in energy efficiency and conservation 
measures. The motivational effect of these factors is collected using a simple scale 
between 1 and 10, where 1 is “unlikely to be motivated” and 10 “will be motivated”. A 
score of 7 or more indicates a significant driver of change. Research participants are also 
encouraged to provide additional information. The factors presented are listed below and 
are followed by an explanation of why these items are included:  
1. Changes to regulations and legislation  
2. Increase in cost of energy  
3. Easier access to grants 
4. Easier access to low cost loans 
5. Easier access to information on energy efficiency opportunities 
6. Social pressure 
7. Customer pressure 
8. The appointment of an energy champion 
9. Voluntary adoption of good practice  
10. Recognition as a leader of sustainability 





These motivational factors offered to research participants represent key features and 
gaps within current Energy Policy, findings of previous energy research and accepted 
drivers of sustainable behaviour.  Regulatory change is included as energy regulation is a 
current policy gap for SMEs. As described in Chapter 3, Energy Policy focuses on large 
carbon emitters and domestic energy consumers with SMEs falling into the policy gap 
between the two.  
Low cost loans, the provision of information on energy efficiency and energy price 
manipulation are key features of current Energy Policy. Grants for energy efficient 
interventions are a former improvement incentive offered by government organisations 
such as the Carbon Trust. Funding of grants has now been cancelled in favour of low cost 
loans. Voluntary good practice is the expected outcome of current policies.  
Other potential motivators are also taken from energy research findings reviewed in 
Chapter 2. RWE Npower (2013) included the appointment of an energy champion as a 
potential motivator for SMEs’ energy behaviours. The opportunity to be seen as a leader 
of sustainability is a motivator proposed by the CBI (2013). Bright (2010) and Hinnells et 
al. (2008) recommended changes to lease clauses to improve the adoption of energy 
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Figure 5.26: Factors that motivate non-domestic building owners and users 




The average ratings of the motivational factors given by respondents are shown in Figure 
5.26. Legislative and regulatory change with an average score of 8.2 out of 10 is the most 
significant factor that will drive improvement in the adoption rate of energy efficiency and 
conservation opportunities for owners and tenants of smaller non-domestic properties. 
This is followed by easier grant access with a rating of 7.2 out of 10 and energy price 
increases with a score of 6.9. The implications of this for future policies are explored 
further following the comparison of responses received from building owners and tenants.  
Both owners and tenants consider regulatory and legislative pressure to be the strongest 
factor to motivate them to adopt energy efficiency and conservation measures to improve 
the energy performance of their buildings (Figure 5.27). Tenants, however, have allocated 
this greater priority than owners, scoring it almost one point higher. Regulation is rated as 
8 or more by 62% of tenants whereas only 50% of owners have given the same rating. 
This implies that non-domestic building owners are slightly more remote from regulatory 
activities, possibly as they consider their tenants to be responsible for compliance. This 
supports the view from research participants in Section 5.5.3.1 that owners consider 
energy costs an insignificant factor for tenants. Despite this, owners believe regulatory 
change is likely to motivate them to improve energy efficiency, with an average rating of 





The importance given to regulatory change indicates that investment in energy legislation 
for UK SMEs is likely to achieve a greater contribution to energy consumption reduction 
and consequently to carbon emissions reduction than current Energy Policies based on 
encouraging voluntary good practice.  
Both owners and tenants consider easier access to grant funding for energy 
improvements the second most important factor to motivate change. Again, tenants have 
scored this higher than the owners. This indicates provision of additional grant funding will 
encourage SMEs to adopt energy efficiency and conservation measures.  
Energy price increases appear more important for tenants than owners with a rating 
difference of one point, i.e. a difference of 10%; tenants rate energy price increases as 
7.1 out of 10 whilst building owners rated it only 6.1. The maximum score from a tenant is 
10 whilst from an owner it is only 8. This may be due to the fact that most tenants are 
responsible for their own energy purchases as shown in Section 5.3. As the majority of 
participating owners (88%) do not provide energy for tenants there is less incentive for 
energy price rises to drive them to instigate energy improvements.  
Customer pressure emerges as the third most important driver of energy efficiency for 




































































Figure 5.27: Comparison of average ratings of motivational factors from 





early indicator of increasing demand for energy efficient business premises identified by 
participants in Section 5.5.3.2. This motivational factor may be achieved as an outcome of 
regulatory change and energy price increase as tenants will seek to lease energy efficient 
buildings to comply with regulations and reduce energy consumption.  
Easier access to information has proved to be of considerably lower importance to owners 
than to tenants specifically and to commercial organisations in general than is expected 
by current energy policy approaches. Tenants will be considerably more motivated to 
improve energy efficiency and conservation as they have scored easier access to 
information as 6.4 out of 10 than owners who rated this as 4.3.  Neither these scores, nor 
its’ 5th and 6th position suggest that large investment of public funds in the provision of 
information will achieve the energy efficiency and conservation improvements required to 
meet Government targets. This finding challenges the current policy approach applied.  
For both groups the adoption of good practice is been rated significantly less motivating. 
Both groups have scored it at least 2 points lower than regulations, the most significant 
driver of change. This indicates that regulatory change or grants will achieve a better rate 
of return than encouraging good practice. 
There is a difference in more than 4 points in the scores for changes to lease clauses as 
factors that will drive energy efficiency and conservation activities. Tenants score this as 7 
out of 10 whilst owners consider this significantly less important, rating it as only 2.3. This 
supports the findings in Section 5.5.5 whereby owners do not consider that lease clauses 
prevent improvements to the energy efficiency of their buildings.  
Both groups consider the appointment of an energy champion, recognition as a leader of 
sustainability and social pressure as unlikely to motivate them to improve energy 
efficiency and conservation. In each case tenants rate them significantly higher implying 
that they may consider their customer-facing image as more important than the tenant-
facing image by the building owners. This supports the view in Section 5.5.3.1 that non-
domestic building owners only get involved in energy when something goes wrong.  
Neither group rates easier access to low cost loans as a significant driver of change. This 
suggests that Government provision of funding for loans could represent lower value for 
money than if the funding is used to provide grants. Indeed, this finding appears to 
contradict the approach taken by UK Energy Policy. Grants have been removed in favour 
of low cost loans provided under the Green Deal scheme.  
When analysed at the ownership segment level (Figure 5.28) the 3 highest rated 
motivational factors described above, i.e. regulatory change, easier grant access and 
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energy price increases emerge as motivators for members of all segments to adopt 
energy efficiency opportunities.  
With the exception of Segment ‘h,’ regulatory change is considered a significant motivator 
with participants rating this greater than 7 out of 10. For commercial property investors in 
Segment ‘h’, regulatory compliance is less significant as it is considered the tenant’s 
responsibility. Owner–occupiers in Segment ‘b’ and franchisees directly purchasing 
energy from utility companies in Segment ‘i’ have rated the motivational factor of 
regulations with an average score of more than 9 out of 10. For owner-occupiers this may 
be because they are directly responsible for legislative compliance and franchisees for 
contractual compliance.  
Easier access to grants will drive change in all segments. Although for branches of a 
multi-site organisation (Segment ‘d’) and commercial property investors (Segment ‘h’) it is 
considered of lower motivational importance than by members of other segments. This 






Energy price change appears to motivate participants in all segments with the exception 
of Segment ‘h’. This may be because energy costs for participants in Segment ‘h’ are 
remote from daily overheads, as energy overheads are paid within the service charge will 
not be affected by price changes.  
Customer pressure has emerged as a significant factor that will motivate building owners 
and tenants to improve energy efficiency in Segments ‘c’, ‘d’, ‘f’ and ‘h’. Participants in 
Segment ‘f’, where the owners employ managing agents to operate their buildings have 
rated this as their most significant motivator, and Segment “h” has allocated customer 
pressure their highest ratings of 9 and 8 out of 10 respectively.  
Overall this analysis demonstrates that if Energy Policy focuses on regulations, easier 
grant access and energy price manipulation it will make a significant impact on improving 
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Figure 5.28: Comparison of importance of factors that motivate the 
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adoption rates of energy efficiency and conservation within non-domestic buildings. 
According to the participants’ scores these three factors will motivate 92% of the building 
owners and tenants to adopt energy efficiency and conservation measures. If this is 
scaled up to the UK SME population more than 4.5 million SMEs would be driven to 
improve rates of energy efficiency and reduce consumption and carbon emissions. In 
comparison, current policy based on information encouraging good practice will motivate 
less than 50% of research participants or 2.3 million UK SMEs. These results have 
delivered the second of the four objectives for this research. 
The perception of the importance of these motivating factors offered by non-domestic 
building owners and tenants offers significant insight into how alternative approaches 
could be applied to energy policy to improve rates of energy efficiency and conservation 
within SMEs. This contributes to the delivery of the final of the four objectives of this 
research, an alternative energy policy framework. Utilising this knowledge will deliver 
greater rates of SME engagement, financial return and carbon emission reduction than is 
currently experienced. This research suggests that encouraging voluntary good practice 
and providing funding for easier access to information will motivate neither SME tenants 
nor their business premises owners to adopt energy efficiency and conservation 
measures. Regulatory change and the provision of grants will generate a greater energy 
reduction return on investment for owners and tenants in all non-domestic building 
ownership segments. The potential levels of energy savings and CO2 emissions able to 
be achieved are explored through scenario planning in Chapter 8. 
 
5.6 Data analysis conclusion 
This research finds that an energy-efficiency gap exists caused by non-domestic building 
ownership within the UK SME sector. Analysis of the research participants’ survey 
responses provides sufficient evidence to confirm that the research hypothesis is correct; 
ownership of non-domestic buildings does have a significant impact on the ability and 
willingness of owners and tenants to adopt energy efficiency and conservation 
opportunities. This not only has direct control through ownership structures, lease clauses 
and relationships, but also provides a financial constraint as well. 36% of survey 
responses indicate that tenants and owners have a relationship that prevents the adoption 
of energy efficiency measures. In addition 5% of tenants confirm their building owners 
choose not to get involved in energy efficiency; 29% of owners confirmed this is their 
choice as well. 33% of non-domestic building owners and 39% of tenants highlight the 
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influence of split incentives and confirm they are unwilling to invest to improve energy 
performance as the other party would benefit from them doing so.  
In addition potential factors that will motivate both tenants and building owners to adopt 
energy efficiency and conservation are also investigated. Research findings highlight 
regulation, the provision of energy efficiency grants and energy price increase as key 
drivers of change. Analysis shows that current policy approaches of access to information 
and voluntary good practice are not the most effective way to engage owners and 
tenants. Regulations and grants are a more cost efficient route to improving adoption 
rates of energy efficient technologies. This adds significant knowledge to energy research 
and delivers the first three of the four objectives set for this research shown in Section 





CHAPTER 6: DATA COLLECTION CONCERNS 
6.1 Introduction 
A key feature of data analysis collection for this research was the difficulty in engaging 
non-domestic building owners and users. Whilst this has limited the quantity of primary 
data available, it is recognised this lack of engagement has contributed to the research in 
a number of other ways and has added knowledge to the issue of what motivates SMEs 
to adopt energy efficiency and conservation measures. This is included in the 
development of an alternative approach to Energy Policy proposed in Chapter 7.  
As described in Chapter 4, surveys are sent to more than 100 non-domestic building 
owners and users directly and more than 5000 potential research participants via social 
media and networking groups over a two year period. The target audiences contacted are 
shown in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1: Surveys issued to support data collection










Various 09/04/13 50 20%  
15/11/13 40 23%  











24/10/13 3000+ 0  
Networking 
groups 
RETA 31/05/13 100+ 1% Issued via Coventry City 
Council  
3P 01/11/13 30 0  










2 Degrees 28/03/12 500 0.4% Environmental Forum 






The highest percentage response rate was from professional contacts. However, as 
surveys are sent to almost 100 SMEs and building owners the total number of surveys 
returned was small. Use of social media to access a wide pool of potential research 
partners proved unproductive. 2 Degrees (a forum for energy professionals), Enterprise 
Rockers (an organisation of micro businesses with less than 9 employees) and LinkedIn 
(a professional networking online forum) resulted in a response rate of less than 0.5%. 
Contributions to the research project were requested from members of fifteen LinkedIn 
groups, including local business forums such as West Midlands Business Network and 
Stratford Business Forum and more specialised groups such as Energy Efficiency 
Building Network and Commercial Landlord and Tenant Professionals focused on non-
domestic building ownership and use.  
Two research groups agreed to provide access to their members: the Sustainable 
Business Group at Coventry University and the Warwick Manufacturing Group. Both 
issued surveys via newsletters. This failed to elicit any responses.  
Research partners were sought from the members of networking groups Renewable 
Energy Technology Alliance (RETA) and 3P. Response rates were 1% and zero 
respectively.  
Members’ contact details were requested from nine Chambers of Commerce within the 
Midlands region. Only one responded to this request. Due to the confidentiality of data 
held, Birmingham Chamber of Commerce members could only receive a request for 
research participation via a quarterly newsletter. The links to the online surveys received 
no responses. 
More than 95% of the survey responses received were obtained from professional 
contacts recruited through personal requests for research support. Less than 5% of 
responses were obtained from speculative requests for help from professional networking 
groups and social media forums. The direct requests for research participation made to 
professional contacts and at the RETA networking meetings proved to be the most 
successful recruitment approach. This is likely to be because the purpose and content of 
the research were personally explained and participation agreed in advance.  
 
6.2 Data concerns 
The difficulty of engaging research partners raised a number of concerns over the 
quantity and quality of data collected. These include the source of research participants, 
the low response rate producing low levels of primary data, inability to access publicly 
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held non-domestic building data and lack of connectivity between survey responses. Each 
of these concerns is discussed in more detail below.  
 
6.2.1 Source of research participants 
The choice of research participants for any research project will influence the data 
collected. Due to the subject under consideration only those having a particular interest in 
the subject of energy efficiency and conservation may have answered the surveys. This 
could have added a bias into the information obtained.  
This potential for influencing the data collected could have been exacerbated by engaging 
research partners through social media forums. As they are established as groups of 
individuals with common interests or backgrounds, clusters could have developed within 
certain business sectors. Participants have been engaged from a number of sources. 
Responses received are not clustered within ownership segments established. 
Where a number of responses have been received from a specific business sector such 
as leisure services, the ownership segment distribution of respondents could be distorted. 
The analysis of the responses contained in Chapter 5 demonstrates that there is no 
significant clustering of research partners and that an appropriate spread of both 
respondents and their ownership segments have been achieved.  
Although survey responses have been received from non-domestic building owners and 
tenants, the number of responses received from tenants outweighs those from owners in 
a ratio of 3:1. This ratio is considered to accurately represent the tenure profile of the UK 
non-domestic building sector established by Dixon (2009) where many buildings have 
multiple occupants and many owners own a number of buildings. Over 70% of building 
owners participating in this research have identified that their commercial building 
portfolios contain more than one building.  
 
6.2.2 Low survey response rates 
The low survey response rate experienced within this research programme has provided 
a limited quantity of primary data. Although the number of surveys obtained does not 
provide a significant sample in pure statistical terms it is sufficient to provide a realistic 
view of energy efficiency and conservation activities and behaviours currently being 
experienced by UK SMEs and the owners of their premises.  
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Extensive energy efficiency information has been made available in increasing quantities 
to businesses over the last decade in attempt to encourage them to adopt voluntary 
energy efficiency and consumption reduction activities. However, this has failed to engage 
them. This research has experienced a similar lack of engagement, which may be 
symptomatic of SMEs’ low levels of engagement in energy efficiency and conservation. A 
number of hypotheses are suggested for this lack of participation and are examined in 
detail below. Additional information is presented to support the hypothesis where 
appropriate. It is recommended that these be considered in future research projects to 
improve participation rates 
 Hypothesis 1: There is a general lack of engagement in energy management by 
non-domestic building owners and tenants so they are less likely to participate in 
energy research. Accounting and strategic business practices create a culture of 
short-termism, which may reduce the attractiveness of energy efficiency and 
conservation actions. Kennett (2012) believes that business owners must divert 
resources from more tangible savings, which requires them to take a leap of faith 
to implement energy investment. Wynde and Lane (2010) suggest energy savings 
being less tangible than material saving opportunities causes this lack of 
engagement. 
 Hypothesis 2: Businesses are immersed in a risk adverse culture and have not 
wanted to be made aware of their energy risk by responding to this research. 
Sullivan and Sullivan (2009) consider investment of resources including time and 
money in energy efficiency and conservation opportunities is a risk for many 
commercial property owners and tenants as the potential energy saving available 
cannot be proven absolutely. Avoidance of energy efficiency opportunities may 
reinforce the company’s culture of energy inertia, whereby they become better off 
by doing nothing.  
 Hypothesis 3: Building owners do not expect their tenants to consider the 
operational energy costs and emissions implications of their energy consumption 
and therefore have no interest in energy research. In a review of advertisements 
offering vacant Government owned commercial property for lease conducted to 
support this research only 15% contained the Energy Performance Certificate for 
the premises advertised. This is indicative of owners’ and agents’ lack of 
consideration of operational energy costs expected by the potential user in the 
rental decision-making process. Additionally, if owners do not provide Energy 
Performance Certificates to potential tenants they too are unlikely to drive energy 
cost opportunities forward during the tenancy period. de Jong (2013) considers 
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this failure to highlight future running costs could also prevent owners from 
exploiting opportunities for rental price differentiation. If tenants are willing to move 
into a new business premises without consideration of future energy consumption 
they are unlikely to consider energy as a key overhead worthy of financial 
investment or energy research worthy of participation. 
The unwillingness of non-domestic building owners and users to voluntarily engage in 
energy research supports the proposal that an alternative approach to energy policy 
requires mandatory action is required to unlock the culture of energy inertia. This is 
explored further in Chapter 7. 
 
6.2.3 Lack of survey connectivity between building owners and tenants 
The commitment to anonymity and confidentiality does not facilitate the collection of data 
from owners and tenants of the same buildings. Only one owner of the building occupied 
by a tenant participating in this research is known to have also completed a survey. The 
responses from a building owner and their tenant can therefore not be linked and 
compared. It is suggested that this be incorporated within future research into 
opportunities to improve the energy efficiency and conservation of non-domestic 
buildings.  
 
6.2.4 Inability to access nationally held benchmark data 
This research planned to use data on the UK stock of non-domestic buildings and their 
tenure from the Valuation Office Agency as the baseline for examples of the impact of 
ownership constraints on the UK SME population. Although tenure details are collected 
for each property they are not made available online. Requests for it are subject to special 
consideration. As it was estimated to take more than 3.5 working days to collate the 
tenure data into a usable format the Valuation Office Agency declined to provide it.  
In the absence of this centrally held data on non-domestic building tenure a pro rata 
calculation has been substituted in order to calculate figures for ownership segments at 
the UK level. This allows the details of tenure established from the surveys completed by 
research participants to be related to the national non-domestic building stock. This 
survey-based data has provided the benchmark for the scenario planning conducted in 




6.3 Conclusion  
Despite the difficulties experienced in obtaining information, sufficient research 
participants have been engaged to accurately provide a robust view of the energy 
efficiency and conservation environment currently experienced by the owners and tenants 
of smaller non-domestic properties. And the energy efficiency gap caused by ownership 
structures. The research has also avoided the clustering of participants within certain 
ownership segments as may have occurred with the number of professional contacts and 
previous research partners engaged.  
Despite the number of tenants’ responses outweighing owners’ responses the split 
reflects the UK non-domestic building sector’s tenure profile estimated by the Federation 
of Small Businesses (2014) and the sample of companies surveyed is representative of 
the UK structure SMEs established by BMG Research (2013). Therefore using this data 
to describe the impact of ownership on energy efficiency at ownership segment and UK 
SME population levels, as the baseline for the creation of an alternative approach to 
energy policy described in Chapter 7 and for scenario planning undertaking in Chapter 8 
is considered appropriate.  
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CHAPTER 7: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO ENERGY POLICY 
7.1 Introduction 
This research identifies a considerable gap between the initiatives implemented by 
current UK Energy Policy in an attempt to encourage good practice ted into clusters of 
barriers with associated characteristics and the factors that will actually motivate building 
owners and tenants to adopt energy efficiency and conservation opportunities. This can 
be seen as an energy policy gap. Consequently this research proposes that an alternative 
approach to Energy Policy is required. 
As shown in Chapter 3, UK Energy Policy relies on energy users displaying rational 
economic behaviour whereby decisions are made and actions taken based on best 
financial return or optimum self interest. Policy Planners widely believe that, in line with 
economic theory, commercial energy users are sensitive to energy price changes and will 
act rationally in response to increases in the cost of energy. This rational response is 
expected to take the form of investments in energy efficiency technologies and 
behaviours that will reduce consumption and minimise energy costs.  
However, despite the recognition that energy efficiency and conservation can save money 
and reduce carbon emissions the research participants identify that little has been done to 
improve their energy efficiency or energy conservation. The analysis of the data collected 
suggests that ownership of non-domestic buildings prevents or discourages owners and 
tenants them from investing in energy efficiency and conservation improvements. 
The research identifies that energy regulation is the key motivator of change so is 
consequently the most likely method of closing the energy-efficiency gap caused by non-
domestic building ownership. This knowledge is used to construct an alternative energy 
policy framework that delivers the fourth of the four research objectives: to understand the 
opportunity for an alternative framework for energy policy in order to improve rates of 
energy efficiency and conservation within UK SMEs. Through this it also contributes to the 
aim of this thesis: to encourage SMEs to contribute further to national carbon reduction 
policies. This proposed alternative energy policy framework is the Carbon Allowance 
Scheme that is based on the change motivators highlighted by participants within this 
research rather than the expectation of rational economic behaviours and voluntary action 
that have come to dominate successive Governments’ Energy Policies over the last 40 
years.  
In this chapter the proposed alternative policy framework of bespoke Carbon Allowances 
is presented. It is then used as the basis of scenario planning that uses the ownership 
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segmentation established by this research to identify and prioritise energy efficiency and 
conservation actions that might be achieved. 
 
7.2 The Carbon Allowance Scheme 
The proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme is a system of bespoke allowances or non-
tradable energy quotas that operate as energy efficiency drivers tailored for each non-
domestic energy user. These are proposed to apply to all individuals and organisations 
responsible for the consumption of energy in non-domestic buildings. The scheme is 
based on three principles; firstly, users of non-domestic buildings consume too much 
energy; secondly, non-domestic building tenure frequently prevents owners and tenants 
from adopting energy efficiency and conservation opportunities and thirdly, organisations 
should manage energy efficiency improvements within the constraints of their own 
businesses and for their own benefit if there is to be sustainable consumption reduction.  
The scheme proposed combines two of the top three drivers of consumption reduction 
identified by the research participants: legislations/regulations and energy price controls. 
The incorporation of the third of the 3 key motivators, improved access to energy 
efficiency grants, could also be introduced as part of this alternative policy approach and 
is described later in the chapter.  
Within the proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme each commercial energy consumer 
would be allocated an annual energy quota, the Carbon Allowance. The energy provider 
would calculate this. It would comprise the total kWh of fuel (electricity and gas) available 
to the organisation for the year and would be calculated from an estimate of the total 
energy required within the premises covered by the fuel bill minus a realistic consumption 
reduction target. Transport fuel would be excluded. The proposed annual energy quota 
would be in operation for a 12-month period, the Carbon Allowance Cycle, which is 
described in the following section.  
Consumption reduction would be driven through capping the quantity of energy available 
on a standard price tariff to each user. To incentivise the non-domestic building owners 
and tenants to make energy conservation improvements, a usage penalty would be 
incurred if they exceed their energy quota. This penalty would be paid as a fuel cost 
premium and would be applied from the following Carbon Allowance Cycle. Each fuel 
company would collect these penalty payments and pay them into an independently 
administered central account to fund additional energy improvements through the 
 
121 
provision of energy efficiency grants to non-domestic consumers. This usage penalty and 
the central improvement fund are discussed separately.  
The scheme, which could reduce the complexity and confusion of current Energy Policy, 
is designed to ensure that all those consuming energy are responsible for reducing their 
consumption. In return they could benefit directly from the energy savings available. All 
non-domestic building owners and tenants are responsible for their energy use directly or 
indirectly and therefore all contribute to CO2 emissions. This accountability could deliver a 
key concept of the ‘polluter pays principle’ and the elements of fairness considered 
significant by the Environmental Audit Committee (2011). These principles of 
accountability and responsibility could be further enhanced, as the Carbon Allowance 
would not be a tradable commodity. The quota would remain with the bill payee as the 
polluter.  
This framework of Carbon Allowances is designed to close the energy efficiency gap 
caused by the impact of building ownership on the owners’ and tenants’ ability and 
willingness to adopt energy efficiency opportunities identified by this research by 
implementing mandatory energy reduction policies. Unlike the current relationships 
discussed in Section 5.5.3 in which owners do not consider energy costs as significant, 
this proposed alternative energy policy could actively drive energy consumption reduction 
by both owners and tenants, which in turn could contribute to carbon emissions 
reductions. This is discussed further in Section 7.3. 
 
7.2.1 The Carbon Allowance Cycle 
The proposed process to apply and administer the Carbon Allowance Scheme is 
designed to be a series of sequential annual activities.  Each sequence is cyclical and 
would lead into the following year’s Carbon Allowance to maintain continuity of energy 
efficiency and conservation improvements. This is termed the Carbon Allowance Cycle. 
Figure 7.1 describes the cycle that forms the framework for the proposed Carbon 
Allowance Process and its connectivity in more detail. This is then explored in more detail 
below. 
 
7.2.2 The Carbon Allowance Calculation 
To ensure all members of the energy supply chain are fully engaged energy companies 




Figure 7.1: The Carbon Allowance Cycle 
 
 
Allowance. Their costs would be covered by the part of the grant fund set aside to cover 
administration costs described in Section 7.2.3. Each energy quota, a consumer’s 
bespoke allowance, would be calculated by taking the Year 0 fuel consumption as the 
baseline usage and applying a task to reduce fuel consumption. The resulting figure 
would represent the fuel available to the owner or tenant at the standard pricing structure, 
i.e. the Carbon Allowance.  
 
Example:  Baseline usage = 900,000 kWh 
 Carbon Allowance task  = 5% 
 Energy quota = 855,000 kWh 
 
The Carbon Trust (2009) propose a series of potential energy efficient interventions that 
will reduce an organisation’s energy consumption with little or no up front financial 
investment. By adopting some or all of these energy conservation opportunities, shown in 
Table 7.1, an organisation could achieve the proposed 5% Carbon Allowance task.   
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Table 7.1: Potential energy efficient interventions (Carbon Trust: 2009) 











Heating 46%  Programmable thermostats 
 Optimise on/off times 
 Reduce room temperature 
 Thermostatic radiators 
 Energy-efficient boiler 
 Roof/wall insulation, double 
glazing  
 Heat recovery  
Up to 70% 
 
Lights 23%  Timers to switch off when 
building not in use 
 Presence detectors 
 Energy efficient bulbs/ fixtures 
equipment  




11%  Building management systems  
 Natural ventilation 
 Chill beams  
Up to 30% 
Catering 8%  Energy efficient equipment  
 Water boilers ILO kettles  
Up to 30% 
Hot water 4%  Programmable thermostats 
 Low water/water saving taps  
Up to 40% 
Office equipment 3%  Energy efficient equipment  
 Timers to switch off what not in 
use 
 Communication 
Up to 75% 
Other 4%  Energy efficient equipment  Up to 30% 
 
 
The Carbon Allowance task suggested to be applied initially is a standard percentage 
reduction. This would remain fair to all commercial energy users and would protect their 
competitiveness. The proposed target reduction is based on the figures within the carbon 
reduction pathway established by Department of Energy and Climate Change (2010). 
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Once their Carbon Allowance has been calculated each non-domestic customer would be 
able to declare ‘Concessions’ to reduce the task applied. This Concession would be 
based on actions over the previous year that have reduced their use of carbon intensive 
fuel such as installation of solar water heating or wall insulation. A list of materials and 
technologies that generate concessions would be published along with the rate to be 
applied.  This would ensure that these benefits are standardised for all fuel users.  
 
Example:  Baseline usage = 900,000 kWh 
 Carbon Allowance task  = 5% 
 Energy quota = 855,000 kWh 
 Concession 1: wall insulation = + 450 kWh 
 Concession 2: solar water heating = + 300 kWh 
 Carbon Allowance = 855,750 kWh  
 
The researcher’s experience of organisations suggests that a formal recognition of good 
practice motivates further adoption of improvement, for example the Business in the 
Community Awards or CRC league tables. Offering Concessions could provide this 
motivation and recognition. It could also encourage existing tenants to urge building 
owners to upgrade their property’s energy efficiency and encourage a tenant seeking new 
premises to favour those buildings that offer efficiencies to provide Carbon Allowance 
Concessions. This incorporates the research findings that 71% of tenants expect that in 
future they will increasingly demand energy efficient properties. As the Carbon Allowance 
Scheme could drive this increasing demand, owners are likely to respond by providing 
properties that facilitate compliance. These properties could attract a premium on 
occupancy charges in return for reduced running costs thus helping to overcome the 
influence of split incentives in preventing energy improvements. 
During each Carbon Allowance Cycle structural changes made within an organisation, 
can be declared at any time, for example reduced output or workforce. As the proposed 
Carbon Allowance Scheme would be enacted by legislation these changes would 
represent a legal declaration as is undertaken to comply with the current CRC and EU 
ETS Schemes. These will be incorporated into the following Carbon Allowance Cycle and 
the organisation’s Carbon Allowance adjusted accordingly. 
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7.2.3 Implementation of the Carbon Allowance Scheme 
The proposed process to handle the Carbon Allowance Scheme is shown in Figure 7.2. 
Each activity is given an owner to clarify the sequence of events and interrelationships 
that could maximise their effectiveness. This will not be described in detail here although 
a few of the key features of the scheme are highlighted. 
This proposed alternative policy approach would be implemented through energy 
legislation. The Carbon Allowance Scheme therefore would incorporate one of the key 
motivators of change for both owners and tenants discussed in Chapter 5: Regulation. 
This Regulation is proposed to be the Commercial Energy Saving Obligation and, as with 
other energy policies, it would be implemented by the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change. It would place the obligation to administer the Carbon Allowance Scheme with 
energy suppliers and the obligation to reduce energy consumption with the commercial 
energy bill recipients. This could be the building owner or tenant or both according to the 
tenure and energy supply structure of the building. 
Carbon Allowances would not be prescriptive and only the energy cost penalty would be 
fixed should the energy user not meet their energy quota. Each company would therefore 
retain the ability to meet their obligation as would best fit their business. This flexibility has 
been incorporated as it could encourage greater engagement from SMEs to reduce 
energy consumption than current Energy Policy and incentives have achieved.   
The proposed scheme would be administered through the existing billing system thus 
minimising the need for a new energy organisation or new complex implementation 
systems. Familiarity with the billing process could also reduce the fear of the unknown 
and perception of the Carbon Allowance as an administrative burden. If a company has 
two or more energy suppliers an energy quota would be applied against each bill 
received. The researcher’s experience suggests that this would apply to a minimum 
number of companies. The Department of Energy and Climate Change (2013a) identify a 
trend towards single provider fuel contracts for consumers within non-domestic buildings. 
Use of the billing system could also support the transfer of an organisation’s Carbon 
Allowance should they choose to move energy supplier. This would adopt a precedent set 













It is proposed that a penalty called the ‘Carbon Allowance Premium’ should be incurred if 
a non-domestic owner or tenant does not meet their Carbon Allowance within a Carbon 
Allowance Cycle This would be applied during the following cycle as a percentage 
increase to the kWh fuel cost. To prevent claims of profiteering by the energy companies 
the value of their customers’ cost premiums could be re-invested to improve energy 
efficiency by SMEs. It is proposed to establish a Commercial Energy Saving Obligation 
Fund to contribute to energy efficiency and conservation initiatives, including the provision 
of grants to SMEs for energy efficiency improvements. 5% of the Carbon Allowance 
Premiums will be reserved to fund the Carbon Allowance Scheme’s operating costs, for 
example energy companies’ and Department of Energy and Climate Change operating 
costs and marketing and publicity. . 
The proposed Commercial Energy Saving Obligation Fund, held and administered by the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change, would be independently administered to 
ensure impartiality. Money raised could be used to fund energy efficiency grants with 
surplus funds supporting energy audits and organisational energy culture change, for 
example through training. The fund could prioritise help for SMEs. In addition to providing 
commercial energy users with help to save energy, the fund could also exploit a market 
driven opportunity. If an organisation sees its penalty payments being used to help 
competitors it may be predisposed to save energy to meet the Carbon Allowance. The re-
distribution of Carbon Allowance Premiums would allow the proposed alternative energy 
framework to deliver easier access to grants which is the second of the key factors 
identified by this research as motivating non-domestic building owners and tenants to 
adopt energy efficiency and conservation opportunities. 
 
7.2.4 Role of energy companies  
The Commercial Energy Saving Obligation would also obligate the energy companies to 
help their commercial customers save energy. This could offer opportunities to 
demonstrate to potential customers their commitment to helping organisations meet their 
Carbon Allowance. The success rate of customers’ meeting their Carbon Allowances 
would also be calculated. It is proposed that from Carbon Allowance Cycle 2 performance 




7.2.5 Communications and reporting 
Unlike current Energy Policy approaches that give energy companies responsibility for 
publicity campaigns, the Carbon Allowance Scheme could adopt a simple, yet effective 
alternative centrally driven communications strategy. This would follow the approach used 
by successful campaigns such as “get set for digital” and “Fire Kills”. Phillips and Scott 
(2012) consider these successful as they feature a single message from trusted sources 
and are Government backed. This is proposed to help overcome one of the potential 
barriers to the Carbon Allowance Scheme; the lack of trust in energy suppliers. 
It is proposed that the Department of Energy and Climate Change publishes energy 
company performance league tables showing non-domestic consumers’ achievement of 
energy quotas and the number of users moving energy supplier. This would encourage 
energy companies to work with commercial consumers to deliver Carbon Allowances to 
improve performance in league tables.  
 
7.3 Rationale for the Carbon Allowance Scheme 
The proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme offers a new approach to energy efficiency and 
conservation as it converts policies that reduce emissions into policies that reduce energy 
consumption so that a financial value can be placed against compliance. This is the factor 
that resonates most closely with business managers and building owners. An analysis of 
the proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme’s applicability is included in Chapter 8. 
Carbon Allowances could have a number of advantages over the current complex and 
confusing energy policy components. These can be summarised as ten key benefits:  
1. One size fits all: as the proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme would be 
administered through energy bills it could target owners and tenants of non-
domestic buildings; single site and multi-site organisations; multi-tenanted 
buildings and owner-occupiers. 
2. Overcomes ownership constraints: the scheme would not be constrained by 
influences of building ownership e.g. split incentives. In fact it could actively work 
towards closing the Landlord-Tenant Divide through tenants seeking energy 
efficient buildings to avoid energy cost premiums. To retain competitiveness 
owners would have to upgrade rental properties. In a scheme that would apply to 
all equally, the rental market could be influenced by the search for energy efficient 
properties that could reduce the cost of compliance. More frequent business 
relocation identified by de Jong (2013) and Delay (2013) within the trend for short-
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term tenancy agreements could encourage greater demand for energy efficient 
properties.  
3. Overcomes payback conflicts:  the Carbon Allowance Scheme could close the 
gap between a commercial organisation’s requirement for short-term payback of 
financial investments and the medium to long-term payback periods frequently 
realised by energy investments. If they receive a grant, companies could improve 
energy performance without having to comply with internal investment strategies 
or utilise their working capital. 
4. Active intervention: the scheme could actively engage all non-domestic 
consumers in energy conservation. The proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme 
incorporates the factors which have been shown by this research to motivate 
owners and tenants to reduce energy consumption; regulations, grants and energy 
price manipulation. 
5. Delivers business priorities: the Carbon Allowance Scheme is based around the 
key business priority of increasing profits so can resonate more closely with 
commercial organisations than existing policy, which relies on rational economic 
responses to energy price increases. The Carbon Allowance Scheme links a 
simple system of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’. Increased business profitability as the result 
of energy conservation is offered as a ‘carrot’ whilst the consequent charge if 
energy consumption is not reduced is the ‘stick’.  
6. Energy efficiency driver: the Carbon Allowance Scheme could drive energy 
improvement to the highest levels of efficiency by imposing on going reductions 
through energy quotas. This introduces the concept of continuous energy 
continuous improvement. 
7. Limits the rebound effect: the on-going requirement to deliver annual energy 
consumption reductions, to achieve Carbon Allowances and avoid premium 
payments, may limit the rebound effect of energy saving. Within the rebound effect 
companies use the money saved from reducing energy use to fund additional 
energy intensive equipment that results in a subsequent increased use of energy.  
8. Simple application: the Carbon Allowance Scheme can overcome the complexity 
and confusion of current Energy Policy and would be less bureaucratic than the 
current CRC and EU ETS programmes as it does not include a requirement for 
declarations or tradable allowances.  
9. Polluter pays: As Carbon Allowances are not tradable the proposed scheme 
does not offer organisations the ability to purchase the right to pollute. Instead it is 
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based on the equitable polluter pays principle, the cornerstone of sustainability 
and international environmental legislation. 
10. Provides adaptability: the scheme could be upgraded in the future. It could be 
extended to include domestic properties and/or public sector buildings. The 
proposed scheme could also be used to create accurate benchmarks of energy 
use per square metre of floor space, establish commercial sector standards or 
implement scalable discounts to prioritise the adoption of certain technologies.  
 
For non-domestic building tenants the scheme could offer a driver of energy efficiency 
and conservation that financially rewards SMEs for reducing energy consumption. It could 
also provide an opportunity to increase demand for energy efficient buildings that would 
reduce the cost of compliance and reduce the split of incentives widely experienced. The 
Carbon Allowance Scheme would offer those tenants who pay for energy through rental 
payments or service charges (Segments ‘c’, ‘g’ and ‘h’) an incentive to improve their 
relationship with the building’s owner to increase transparency in the energy management 
process. SMEs that receive energy free of charge (Segment ‘c’) as part of their service 
contract would not directly benefit financially from the proposed energy policy although 
they could benefit from improvements made by the building’s owners.  
Overall the proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme could work to reduce or eliminate the 
disincentives for energy efficiency and conservation experienced by the research 
participants and drive shared responsibility for energy improvement required by tenants. 
Leases would have to become more flexible to accommodate the needs of owners and 
tenants to reduce energy consumption, for example through improvements to lease 
clauses preventing minor change to the structure of buildings to install energy efficient 
interventions. Investment would be required by both owners and tenants to deliver 
obligations. Grant funding could be made available to overcome the financial constraints 
reported by 38% of respondents including the unwillingness of owners (9%) and tenants 
(13%) to invest in energy efficiency.  
Within multi-tenanted buildings the owners would have to work with all tenants to ensure 
that the energy cost premiums applied under the Carbon Allowance Scheme are avoided 
for common areas. This could help develop supportive energy relationships currently 
identified as missing by this research.  
As the proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme operates within an annual cycle it could 
encourage year-on-year energy consumption reductions. Improvements in energy 
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efficient technologies currently outstrip the needs of the scheme so building owners and 
tenants will be able to meet obligations under the Regulation. Grants could be provided 
on an on-going basis to fund these improvements as shown in Chapter 8.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
In spite of rising energy prices and a growing awareness of the financial benefits of 
reducing energy consumption this research shows that little benefit of this is obtained by 
SMEs. The majority of non-domestic building owners and tenants receive few incentives 
to improve energy efficiency and conservation. This research shows that the tenure of 
non-domestic buildings creates an environment that prevents adoption of energy 
efficiency and control.  
To date Energy Policy has been unable to deliver energy or carbon savings in sufficient 
quantity to meet Government targets or hopes of an energy efficient property sector. A 
new approach is now needed if the energy efficiency-gap caused by non-domestic 
building ownership is to be closed and climate change mitigation targets are to be 
achieved.  
At the SME level participation rates in energy efficiency, activities and behaviours are 
largely unrelated to the mitigation of climate change. However, by achieving energy usage 
reduction in response to a financial disincentive scheme, emission reductions could be 
achieved.  
The proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme could create a balance between providing 
flexibility and ensuring the standards are sufficiently strict to deliver energy reduction 
requirements. It could exploit the key motivators of energy efficiency and conservation 
identified by participants in this research and delivers the fourth research objective; an 
alternative policy approach in order to improve rates of energy efficiency and conservation 
within SMEs. This simple scheme of Carbon Allowances would operate within the current 
pattern of non-domestic building ownership and as it would operate at the level of the 
energy consumption within a business it could focus on the most tangible aspects of 
energy use for the business; the cost of energy consumption.  
Carbon Allowances could combine both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ drivers of energy efficiency within 
a simple and fair scheme of energy quotas and financial disincentives that have been 
designed to change energy behaviours and drive the responsibility for energy 
consumption reduction into all non-domestic users. By converting policies that reduce 
emissions into policies that reduce energy consumption a financial value could be placed 
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CHAPTER 8: SCENARIO PLANNING  
8.1  Introduction 
The key aim of this thesis is to identify how SMEs can be encouraged to take full advantage 
of the financial benefits available from energy efficiency and in turn contribute further to 
national carbon reduction targets. The Carbon Allowance Scheme proposed in the previous 
chapter has the potential to deliver this but is un-tested. In this chapter sensitivity analysis 
through scenario planning is used to estimate the alternative energy framework’s potential to 
deliver energy savings.  
 
8.2  Scenario-Planning Model 
Relationships between Carbon Allowances and energy savings are tested through 
spreadsheet modelling using the Scenario-Planning Model created by the researcher. 
Existing commercial software and scenario planning tools were sought to conduct this 
modelling but nothing suitable was available. A new tool was consequently developed 
utilising Microsoft Excel. This is sufficiently flexible software to operate the model and has 
the added advantage that should other users wish to follow this modelling approach they are 
able to do so easily, at little or no cost. This tool is chosen as it applies information provided 
by research participants to predict the outcome of the Carbon Allowance Scheme on SMEs’ 
energy consumption. An example of the Scenario-Planning Model, which incorporates the 
framework of ownership segmentation established by this research, is shown in Appendix 3.  
There are two assumptions within this scenario planning; firstly, there is a limited fund for 
investment in energy efficiency and conservation and secondly the allocation of this fund 
must be prioritised to maximise the rate of energy saving impact. The model incorporates 
fixed values for energy cost, energy consumption and segment population, which are 
discussed in Section 8.3, whilst modelling changes to values of grant funding and grant 
allocation. This highlights the impact of each scenario and allows comparison between 
scenarios and across segments, which together prioritise the introduction of the Carbon 
Allowance Scheme.  
The Scenario-Planning Model is able to show the results as both normalised and actual 
financial outputs. Normalised graphs that represent the data as a change versus the base 
value rather than showing actual values. These are used for the comparison of energy 
consumption reduction scenarios in Section 8.4. This removes the effect of segment 
population size to allow direct comparison of segment results. A full set of normalised 
Scenario-Planning Models is included in Appendix 4. Financial modelling assists in 
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prioritising ownership segments for a pilot study or staged rollout. This is explored further in 
Section 8.5. 
As it models the influence of the Carbon Allowance Scheme the Scenario-Planning Model 
utilises energy consumption figures from Year 0 to provide the energy baseline. In this first 
year no owners or tenants pay an energy premium although some companies will begin to 
adopt energy efficiency opportunities. This group of SMEs is shown in the model as ‘ns’ i.e. 
the number saving energy in order to save money and potentially avoid incurring a penalty in 
subsequent years.   
In Year 1 the model assumes that 75% of the owners and tenants of non-domestic buildings 
do not meet their energy quotas and will therefore incur energy cost premiums. This 
assumption is based on the traditionally slow rates of response to new legislative obligations 
experienced in the UK. The group of SMEs incurring premiums is shown in the model as 
‘np’, that is the number of companies paying the energy cost premium, which is discussed 
further in Section 8.3.4. It is assumed that an increasing number of companies will adopt 
energy saving opportunities to avoid paying the premium; therefore ‘np’ is set at a standard 
declining rate within the model. These premiums are used to provide the Grant Fund. 
Grants are issued from Year 2 onwards and achieve energy savings. The number of 
companies able to obtain a grant, termed ‘ng’ within the model, is dependent upon the 
capital available within the Grant Fund and the percentage of the fund to be allocated. Each 
grant is standardised as either £10,000 or £20,000 and the fund allocation set as either 50% 
or 95% according to the Scenario applied. SMEs within ‘ng’ are assumed to be unable or 
unwilling to make savings without a grant to fund it. Between Years 3 and 10 grants continue 
to be issued in line with funds available. Limiting the allocation of the Grant Fund to 95% or 
50% allows for the provision of 5% of the fund to cover administration costs of the Carbon 
Allowance Scheme. For scenarios in which 50% of the Grant Fund is allocated the remaining 
45% will be redistributed to other ownership segments or to other energy efficiency 
schemes. 
It is recognised that the model may have a number of limitations based on the small sample 
of research participants. For example, it uses figures that have been increased pro rata from 
the primary research data, as actual population data is not available. However, as discussed 
in Chapter 6 the responses are sufficiently representative of the UK SME population to be 





8.3 Inputs for the Scenario-Planning Model 
8.3.1 Ownership segmentation population 
The Scenario-Planning Model utilises the ownership segmentation framework established by 
this research. Segment populations input into the model are increased pro rata from data 
obtained from research participants to reflect the UK SME population of 4.99 million. The 
population, energy consumption and energy cost inputs are shown in Figure 8.1. 
 
Table 8.1: Scenario-Planning Model inputs 




‘a’ Building owner and tenant                                                                     
(tenant from utility) 
2,450,000 0.745 GWh £80,000 
‘b’ Building owner and user                                       
(owner from utility) 
343,000 1.12 GWh £108,000 
‘c’ Building owner and franchisee                                   
(owner from utility) 
196,000 1.19 GWh £110,000 
‘d’ Building owner and branch                                 
(head office from utility) 
882,000 2.4 GWh £190,000 
‘f’ Building owner, manager and 
tenant                                      
(tenant from utility) 
196,000 0.98 GWh £65,000 
‘g’ Building owner as the energy 
provider and user              
(tenant from owner) 
196,000 0.14 GWh £13,000 
‘h’ Building owner as a 
commercial investor                                  
(tenant from owner) 
196,000 0.18 GWh £16,000 
‘i’ Building owner and franchisee                                   
(tenant from utility) 
539,000 2.04 GWh £112,000 
 
 
8.3.2 Energy costs 
The energy cost input to the model is 4.475 pence per kWh, which represents the weighted 
average of gas at 3.173 pence per kWh and electricity at 10.933 pence per kWh consumed 
by members of each segment. This approximates to 5:1 in the use of one unit of gas to one 
unit of electricity. This figure is calculated from the average fuel prices paid by the UK’s 4.99 
million SMEs during the first 3 quarters of 2013 published the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (2013c). They are used within the model to calculate the cost of energy 




8.3.3 Energy consumption figures    
Energy consumption inputs to the model are obtained from research participants, which 
when normalised will apply to any range of figures. The inputs of average energy 
consumption per SME within the segment and are shown in Figure 8.1. These are combined 
with the standardised energy cost figures described above to provide the average annual 
energy cost per SME.  
 
8.3.4 Grant funding 
Participants in this research identify that easier access to grants will provide a significant 
stimulus for energy improvement. In order to ensure that this opportunity is maximised, the 
premium payments incurred under the proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme are used to 
create the Grant Fund.  
The Carbon Allowance Scheme applies an energy quota to all non-domestic building owners 
and tenants, which represents a task against the previous year’s energy consumption. For 
this scenario planning an initial 5% reduction requirement is applied. This is considered a 
realistic target for the model as potential energy saving with minimal investment has been 
calculated for small offices as 38% and retail warehouses as 52% (Anon: 2013). This also 
exceeds the 3% reduction required to meet 2020 and 2050 carbon reduction targets 
identified by the Committee on Climate Change (2012). In turn, if non-domestic consumers 
exceed their quota a 5% premium will be applied to their energy costs in the following 
Carbon Allowance Cycle. In reality, however, by complying an SME will save 10% of energy 
costs with this approach i.e. they will achieve an actual saving of 5% plus they will avoid 
paying the 5% premium cost payment.  
Scenario planning undertaken here considers how reinvesting these premium payments in 
the form of energy efficiency grants may drive further energy consumption reduction. The 
optimum allocation of grant funding is proposed.  
 
8.4 Energy consumption reduction scenarios  
Ten scenarios are input into the Scenario-Planning Model, each of which tests potential 
impacts of energy efficiency grants. Each scenario applies a different combination of savings 
rates and grant funding to establish potential savings available within the ownership 




Table 8.2: Scenarios used within the Scenario Planning Model 
 Value of Grant Grant Fund 
Allocation 
‘ng’                 
Saving 
‘ns’                  
Saving 
Scenario 1 £10,000 50% 5% 5% 
Scenario 2 £20,000 50% 5% 5% 
Scenario 3 £10,000 95% 5% 5% 
Scenario 4 £20,000 95% 5% 5% 
Scenario 5 £10,000 95% 8% 8% 
Scenario 6 £10,000 95% 8% 5% 
Scenario 7 £20,000 50% 8% 5% 
Scenario 8 £20,000 95% 8% 5% 
Scenario 9 £20,000 50% 20% 5% 
Scenario 10 £20,000 95% 20% 5% 
 
The rationale for each scenario is illustrated with the model’s output for Segment ‘a’, the 
largest ownership segment in which tenants lease their business premises and purchase 
energy. A full set of normalised graphs, showing the outputs of the Scenario Planning Model, 
are shown in Appendix 4. 
 





































Scenarios 1 to 4, apply the combinations of grant value and percentage allocation shown in 
Table 8.2. The results are shown in Figure 8.1. Scenario 3 generates the maximum Grant 
Fund over the 10-year programme and delays peak grant funding until Year 4 giving time for 
engagement to grow. Scenario 4 is unable to maintain grant funding over the 10-year 
scenario-planning horizon. 
As the Scenario-Planning Model indicates that these scenarios offer similar energy saving 
potential even though the inputs change, Scenario 5 is added to consider whether an 8% 
saving by ‘ns’ and ‘ng’ is able to deliver additional savings in return for £10,000 grant with 
95% Grant Fund allocation (Figure 8.2). Whilst this scenario will generate an increase in 
financial saving it is considered unlikely that the ‘ns’ group would achieve an 8% reduction 
without grant funding. It is not proposed for adoption.  
 
 
Figure 8.2: Scenario 5  
 
Scenario 6 (Figure 8.3) is then added to reduce the expectations on ‘ns’ and limit savings to 
5% (the minimum required to avoid premium payments under the Carbon Allowance 
Scheme) whilst retaining the higher rate of savings for ‘ng’. This shows some loss of energy 
saving with the 3% reduction in target but is considered a more realistic scenario. Scenario 6 
offers an incentive over Scenario 3 as it adopts an energy saving target greater than the 
penalty incurred. Overall this will deliver 13% savings for SMEs obtaining a grant (8% saving 
and 5% avoidance of premium energy costs in the following year).  However, it does not 














Figure 8.3: Scenario 6  
 
Scenarios 7 and 8 are then added to test whether an increase to the higher rate grant of 
£20,000 will increase the savings available with either 50% or 95% allocation of the Grant 
Fund. The output of the model shows no additional benefit in normalised levels of energy 
saving from funding increased grants (Figures 8.4 and 8.5). However, actual savings will be 
increased within Scenario 8 although there is only a short-term availability of grants.  
 
 
Figure 8.4: Scenario 7  
 
 




























To consider the opportunity to further increase savings Scenarios 9 (50% allocation) and 10 
(95% allocation) are created to test the impact of a £20,000 grant generating 20% savings 
from improving energy efficiency and conservation within the ‘ng’ group of SMEs (Figures 
8.6 and 8.7). The higher rate grant is applied, as this level of saving is unlikely to be 
achieved without significant levels of investment. 
 
 
Figure 8.6: Scenario 9  
 
As shown in Chapter 5 research participants indicate that they are unlikely to fund this 
investment from their own capital or using a low rate loan. Neither Scenario 9 nor 10 adds 
significant energy saving benefit above Scenarios 3 or 6, which are the most cost effective 
as they allocate £10,000 grants. The early peak of grant funding in Scenario 9 will not 
support the long-term aims of the Carbon Allowance Scheme. Scenario 10 results indicate 
only short-term availability of grants.  
 
 






















8.5 Findings from scenario planning  
The normalised graphs generated by the Scenario-Planning Model suggest the application 
of each scenario results in a similar energy saving profile for each segment. The response of 
owners and tenants to each scenario can therefore be used to establish the combination of 
grant value and percentage Grant Fund allocation that could achieve the greatest energy 
saving impact. A summary of these potential responses, the prioritised scenario and the 
rationale is shown in Table 8.3. The likely responses of owners and tenants to the proposed 
Carbon Allowance Scheme used in Table 8.3 are taken from the survey responses received, 
the segmentation model and the researcher’s experience of organisational behaviour. These 
have been categorised using product adoption life cycle terminology proposed by Beal, 
Rogers and Bohlen (1957) that describes the adoption of a new product or service according 
to demographic and psychological characteristics of defined adopter groups. 
The number of grant applications from Early Adopters within Segments ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘i’ is likely 
to be high as their energy costs are a high proportion of overheads so there is a greater 
incentive to save energy. This suggests the optimum scenario to be applied will be either 3 
or 6 where the largest Grant Fund is available at the lowest cost to the scheme. To maximise 
the savings generated Scenario 6 should be adopted as it incorporates a higher target. For 
example the small population of 343,000 owner-occupiers with high average energy 
expenditure of £108,002 within Segment ‘b’ will generate an opportunity to save £1.8 billion 
over 10 year scenario-planning horizon. As members of Segment ‘b’ own and occupy their 
buildings there will be fewer ownership barriers to the adoption of energy efficiency.  
Members of Segments ‘c’ and ‘I’ are identified within this research as Local Authority non-
domestic building owners. They are likely to have knowledge and resource to adopt energy 
efficiency opportunities and are expected to avoid risks from regulatory change.  
Despite the slower growth of the Grant Fund with maximum funds available 3 years later 
than Scenario 1, Scenario 6 (£10,000 grants with 95% of the fund distributed in return for 8% 
savings) offers grants over the 10-year scenario-planning horizon and the greatest energy 
saving impact.  
The high population of 2.45 million tenants and owners categorised as Late 
Majority/Laggards within Segment ‘a’ have a medium average energy expenditure of 
£80,182, a lower proportion of overheads than Segment ‘b’. This will generate an opportunity 
to save in excess of £100 million over 10-year scenario-planning horizon.
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Table 8.3: Scenario planning findings  
Segment  Description 
Likely response to the Carbon Allowance Scheme                                                           









Building owner and 
tenant                                                                     
(tenant from utility) 
 
Late Majority/Laggards 
 SMEs traditionally slow to respond to regulatory change  
 Split incentives of building ownership limit compliance 






 Slow initial uptake of grants allows lower proportion of fund to be     
allocated; remainder of fund can be redistributed  
 Medium energy expenditure; likely lower proportion of overheads 
 Strategy exploits cooperative and collaborative relationships and 





Building owner and 
user                                       
(owner from utility) 
 
Early Adopters/Early Majority 
 Owner occupiers likely to adopt grant funding 
opportunities to reduce financial risk  






 Research finds owners occupiers choose to have no involvement in 
their building’s energy performance  
 High energy expenditure; likely to be higher proportion of overheads 
 Segment has fewer ownership barriers to energy efficiency 





Building owner and 
franchisee                                   
(owner from utility) 
 
Innovators/Early Adopters 
 Local Authority owners likely to have resource/knowledge 
of energy management to engage early in scheme 
 Local Authorities owners likely to avoid additional cost and 






 Research finds energy relationships discourage adoption of energy 
efficiency and conservation opportunities 
 Tenants do not receive energy bill; owner controls purchase of energy 
 High energy expenditure; likely to be higher proportion of overheads 





Building owner and 
branch                                 
(head office from 
utility) 
 
Early Majority  
 Multi-site organisations likely to have greater resource and 
knowledge for energy saving  
 Multi-site organisations tend to have structure for 







 Opportunity to demand greater energy saving (20%) in return for grant 
through energy experience 
 High energy expenditure; likely to be higher proportion of overheads 
 Surplus can be redistributed 







manager and tenant                                      




 Owners likely to leave compliance to tenants 
 Leases likely to prevent tenants improving energy 
efficiency 
 Managers unlikely to have responsibility for energy  








 Ownership structure will exacerbate impact of split incentives and 
delay compliance; research finds energy relationships prevent change 
 Slow initial uptake of grants allows lower proportion of fund to be 
allocated; remainder of fund can be redistributed  
 Medium energy expenditure; likely to be a lower proportion of 
overheads 





Building owner as the 
energy provider and 
user (tenant from 
owner) 
Laggards 
 Owners and tenants likely to be slow to comply; no 
incentive to do so 






 Ownership structure will exacerbate impact of split incentives and 
delay compliance 
 Research finds owners choose to have no involvement in their 
building’s energy performance 





Building owner as a 
commercial investor                                  
(tenant from utility) 
 
Laggards 
 Owners likely to leave compliance to tenants 







 Low energy expenditure likely to be small proportion of overheads 
 Large grants most likely to engage investment owners 
 Long term availability of grant funding to incentivise investors  






Building owner and 
franchisee                                   
(tenant from utility) 
Early Adopters/ Early Majority 
 Local Authority owners likely to have resource/knowledge 
of energy management to engage early in scheme 
 Local Authorities owning buildings are likely to avoid 








 High energy expenditure; likely to be higher proportion of overheads 
 Tenants providing service on behalf of building owner 
 Large uptake of grants likely be occur early in the life of the scheme 
 Strategy exploits cooperative and collaborative relationships and 
overcomes split of incentives identified by research 
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However, there is likely to be a slow initial compliance with the Carbon Allowance 
Scheme as the premium payment will initially be a risk as it is a low proportion of business 
overheads. Scenario 6 provides long-term grant availability with the opportunity to 
redistribute the surplus Grant Fund to Early Adopters in other ownership segments to 
deliver increased savings in the early years of the scheme. This will also publicise the 
financial opportunities available through compliance and encourages the cooperative and 
collaborative relationships identified by the research in Segment ‘a’. Targeting both 
owners and tenants will help overcome the split incentives experienced by research 
participants.  
The 882,000 branches of multi-site organisations within Segment ‘d’ have the highest 
energy expenditure and are likely to comprise the Early Majority as they have greater 
experience of regulatory compliance and knowledge of energy efficiency through central 
functions. These organisations are likely to be able to deliver 20% savings if allocated 
higher rate grants. Scenario 7 will provide the opportunity to save in excess of £2.5 billion 
over the 10-year scenario-planning horizon at the lowest cost to the Carbon Allowance 
Scheme. This scenario is adopted in preference to Scenario 10, which delivers higher 
financial savings but is unable to maintain grant funding across the scenario-planning 
horizon. The structure of these organisations suggests head offices should be targeted 
with higher rates of saving.  
Members of Segments ‘f’, ‘g’ and ‘h’ with low energy expenditure and split incentives for 
energy improvement arising from their ownership styles are likely to show the slowest 
uptake of energy efficiency opportunities. Commercial investors owning non-domestic 
buildings within Segment ‘h’ are most likely to respond to higher rate grants over the 
longest period. Scenario 7 will offer this at lowest cost to the scheme.  
Owners within Segment ‘f’ are remote from the energy performance of their buildings as 
they employ building managers with no responsibility for energy. The research finds these 
owners choose to have no involvement with their building’s energy performance. This 
ownership structure will exacerbate the split incentives and relationship barriers to energy 
efficiency identified by research participants. Uptake of the Carbon Allowance Scheme is 
therefore likely to be slow. As this segment has a small population, Scenario 1 will provide 
sufficient grant funding to drive change at lowest cost to the scheme.  
Within Segment ‘g’ the building’s owner provides tenants’ energy, which creates little 
incentive for tenants to become energy efficient. The research finds owners choose to 
have no involvement in their building’s energy performance. Low average expenditure on 
energy further exacerbates this. The owners are therefore targeted through Scenario 1, 
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which will provide a high level of grant funding early in the programme to drive change at 
the lowest cost to the scheme. The surplus funding can be redistributed to Early Adopters.  
Overall Scenario 6 (£10,000 grants, 95% allocation, 8% target for ‘ng’) offers the best 
opportunity within most segments to encourage SMEs to adopt energy saving 
opportunities, which in turn contributes to national carbon reduction targets. The 8% 
target for ‘ng’ will improve adoption rates of energy efficiency and conservation 
opportunities over the 5% target included in Scenario 3. The capital available in the Grant 
Fund is able to support grants over the 10-year scenario-planning horizon.  
Scenario 1, which offers the same size of grant with the lower rate of allocation, is 
proposed for smaller segments ‘f’ and ‘g’ in which owners and tenants are likely to be 
slow to comply with the Carbon Allowance Scheme. However, if Scenario 6 is substituted 
to standardise the regulatory approach there will be little cost implication for the scheme. 
As Segments ‘d’ and ‘h’ are unlikely to respond well to lower rate grants Scenario 7 
should be retained if maximum energy saving impacts are required. However, adopting 
Scenario 6 for these segments may be more politically acceptable.  
 
8.6 Implementation of the proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme 
The findings from this scenario planning can be used to identify which ownership segment 
should be used to either pilot the Carbon Allowance Scheme or prioritise a staged roll out. 
The prioritisation is based on actual financial benefit to the segment and ease of SME 
engagement. A set of Scenario-Planning Model outputs showing actual financial savings 
are included in Appendix 5. 
Segments ‘a’, ‘d’ and ‘i’ offer the greatest potential for financial savings from the adoption 
of energy efficiency and conservation activities due to the size of their population and high 
levels of energy expenditure. In addition Segment ‘a’ provides an opportunity to address 
the issue of split incentives that was identified as a problem by over 50% of research 
participants within this ownership segment. Owners and tenants within Segment ‘a’ rated 
the importance of grants, as a motivator for energy improvement, 8.4 out of 10. Prioritising 
this segment should therefore generate significant energy savings. However, the scale of 
the ownership segment suggests that it could be unmanageable for a pilot study or initial 
programme rollout.   
Although Segment ‘d’ is more than 60% smaller in population than Segment ‘a’ it’s 
members have an average annual energy cost that is more than double. This results in a 
3% greater opportunity for energy saving. This high level of saving opportunity coupled 
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with the smaller number of companies to be addressed suggest that Segment ‘d’ could be 
prioritised for the phased roll out of the Carbon Allowance Scheme. However, these 
SMEs are part of a larger multi-site organisation and may be a politically unattractive 
group of companies for which to prioritise grant funding.  
Although members of Segment ‘i’ are offered a significant saving opportunity they may be 
difficult to identify as they occupy their non-domestic building free of charge whilst 
providing a service on behalf of the building’s owner. As many of these non-domestic 
building owners are Local Authorities this could be a politically unacceptable group to 
benefit from grant funding. This, coupled with the lower level of saving than either 
Segment ‘a’ or ‘d’ suggests that prioritisation of this group is not be appropriate.  
When considered from the perspective of ease of access to the SMEs within the segment 
and initial political response to the Carbon Allowance Scheme an alternative prioritisation 
may be considered more appropriate. The estimated 343,000 owner-occupiers within 
Segment ‘b’ will be an easier group to engage in a pilot study or phased roll out of the 
scheme. The disadvantage of this is that it will only generate around 20% of the financial 
saving available form Segment ‘a’ and ‘d’.  
Overall it is recommended that members of Segment ‘b’ should be prioritised to pilot the 
implementation of the Carbon Allowance Scheme, followed by Segments ‘a’ and ‘d’ to 
generate the large financial saving for SMEs and energy consumption and carbon 
emissions reductions available. The group of owner-occupiers within Segment ‘b’ would 
also be a politically acceptable target to support when introducing the proposed Carbon 
Allowance Scheme legislation. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
The Scenario Planning Model is designed to identify how the saving rate applied can be 
balance d against the level of grant provided to achieve the greatest rate of financial 
saving for SMEs from energy efficiency and conservation activities. As all scenarios 
generate a similar normalised level of energy saving the likely response of the owners 
and tenants is taken into account in identifying the scenario likely to adopt the optimum 
energy saving impact. For Segments ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘i’ this is Scenario 6, which maximises 
the benefits of lower targets attractive to SMEs and an increased rate of saving coupled 
with the availability of grant funding over the 10 year scenario-planning horizon. The 
ownership structure of Segments ‘d’ and ‘h’ are likely to show more engagement if larger 
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grants of £20,000 are offered. In return these will achieve higher levels of energy saving. 
Scenario 7 is therefore most appropriate for these segments. 
If the introduction of the Carbon Allowance Scheme is prioritised by ownership segment, 
the Scenario-Planning Model suggests that members of Segment ‘a’ and ‘d’ should be 
prioritised if financial savings available from energy efficiency are the priority. Benefits 
from the larger saving available from Segment ‘d’ may be outweighed by the politically 
unattractive approach of giving grants to sites within larger multi-site organisation. 
Segment ‘a’ should be therefore be prioritised. However, Segment ‘b’ should be selected 
as a pilot scheme. This segment will be more easily engaged as it offers a smaller, 
discrete group of owner-occupiers with high costs of energy and lower ownership barriers 
to energy efficiency and conservation. Support for owner-occupiers would also be a 





















CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Today the central role energy plays in the emission of carbon is widely accepted by the 
UK Government, politicians and energy intensive businesses with energy concerns high 
on political agendas. Despite this smaller businesses continue to work within historically 
developed economic infrastructure that have built up around the availability of low cost 
energy and do not consider energy concerns a threat. Consequently, without a new 
approach to energy efficiency and consumption reduction, Janda (2008) and Kelly (2010) 
consider it unlikely that national carbon reduction targets will be met. This thesis offers 
this new perspective on energy research and proposes an alternative approach to Energy 
Policy.  
As shown in Chapter 2, energy research has largely mirrored Energy Policy and 
consequently focuses on residential properties, carbon emissions from large energy 
intensive commercial organisations and the energy efficient technologies available. This 
research has adopted an alternative scope and perspective. It examines the owners and 
occupiers of existing smaller non-domestic buildings who together contribute 20% of the 
UK’s annual carbon emissions. Greenwise (2012) considers that this sector is one of the 
least successful in terms of energy efficient improvements. However, as indicated by Kelly 
(2010) buildings in existence today are likely to contribute 70% of the building stock in 
2050, the deadline for the UK’s 80% carbon emissions reductions target. Without 
improvements in their energy performance SMEs will continue to forego savings of £10 
billion per year and will not contribute further to carbon emissions reduction targets. As 
indicated in Chapter 3 this SME sector is largely excluded from Energy Policy.  
To date the majority of building energy research has taken a technological approach, 
establishing the building type as the driver of energy performance. However, this thesis 
considers that owners and users of buildings have greater influence on energy efficiency 
and conservation than building type and hypothesises that the tenancy structures of non-
domestic buildings control the ability and willingness of owners and tenants to adopt 
energy efficiency and conservation opportunities. The key aim of this thesis is to identify 
how SMEs can be encouraged to maximise the financial benefits offered by widely 
available, financially beneficial and retrofit feasible energy efficient technologies and 
behaviours. 
The aim and objectives of this thesis have been delivered through a new framework for 
energy research, the segmentation the non-domestic building sector into cohesive groups 
based on the ownership of the building and provision of energy. A segmentation model 
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containing 8 categories of ownership is created and tested. The research confirms the 
existence of 7 of the original 8 segments. No research participants fitted into Segment ‘e’ 
whereby the owner employs a landlord to manage the building and the tenant purchases 
their own energy. It is not known whether the segment remains unpopulated as it does not 
exist, companies within this segment have not been recruited or it overlaps with Segment 
‘f’ in which a managing agent operates the building on behalf of the owner. Further 
research to conclude this is recommended. 
An additional segment of non-domestic building ownership is identified, Segment ‘i’. This 
is a group of SMEs occupying their business premises free of charge as franchisees and 
purchasing their own energy. The building owners are the organisations for which they 
are providing their franchisee service. Research participants indicate that the owners 
within this segment are Local Authorities.  
A survey of non-domestic building owners and users is undertaken to collect primary data 
with which to test the hypothesis established and understand the extent to which building 
ownership influences the ability and willingness of both non-domestic building owners and 
tenants to adopt energy efficiency and conservation opportunities (Objective 1).  
Although this research engages only a small number of research participants it has 
provided new understanding of the rationale for, and barriers to, the adoption of energy 
efficiency opportunities. The energy-efficiency gap caused by the ownership structures of 
non-domestic building has been highlighted and has significantly added knowledge to 
academic and business research and understanding of energy behaviours. This thesis 
also presents an opportunity to overcome current poor rates of energy efficiency and 
conservation caused by this gap by proposing an alternative approach energy policy 
framework based on the actual factors that will motivate SMEs. Research participants 
have identified these in their survey responses. 
The findings of the surveys indicate that features of non-domestic property ownership 
raise a significant barrier to the adoption of energy efficiency and conservation. 50% of 
respondents indicate that their relationship with their owner or tenant blocks change. 36% 
describe their relationship as ‘preventative’ whilst 14% say their owners choose to have 
no involvement in energy management or efficiency. Tenant T14 sums this up as, “the 
only involvement [the owners] have is when something goes wrong”. Overall 43% of 
research participants indicate that they have experienced restrictions on improving energy 
efficiency based on their tenancy structure.  
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In addition to these ownership barriers research participants indicate that they have also 
encountered financial barriers to improving energy efficiency and conservation linked to 
building ownership. For example, 88% of respondents have encountered disincentives 
such as lease clauses preventing change and 79% experienced a split of financial 
incentives resulting from the properties’ ownership. 
When the barriers to energy efficiency and conservation identified by this research are 
increased pro rata to reflect the UK population of 4.99 million SMEs it emerges that 
almost 2.5 million businesses are unable to benefit from the financial savings available 
from energy improvements due to barriers related to the tenure of non-domestic 
properties and 700,000 SMEs occupy premises where the owners choose to have no 
involvement in energy improvement. If this is considered alongside the easily accessible 
savings of £2000 per year from simple energy usage improvements established by Eon 
(2011), together they are foregoing savings of more that £10 billion per year.  
Even though 50% of the research participants indicate that they co-operate or collaborate 
with their owners or tenants to improve energy performance there is evidence that little is 
actually being delivered. Tenants indicate that they have benefitted from an average of 
0.9 and owners 1.8 interventions to reduce energy consumption in the past 2 years. This 
lack of focus on energy efficiency will have significant implications in future as 71% of 
participants expect that non-domestic building tenants will increasingly demand energy 
efficiency properties.  
Tenants perceive that owners represent a greater barrier to adopting energy efficiency 
opportunities than vice versa. They want to share responsibility for energy efficiency and 
conservation rather than leave responsibility with their building owner. Owners, however, 
overwhelmingly want to retain control for energy efficiency. This supports the view of both 
owners and tenants. 50% of tenants consider it unlikely that owners will upgrade the 
energy performance of existing buildings and 50% of owners confirm that they are unlikely 
to make performance improvements when their building next becomes vacant.  
Non-domestic owners participating in this research consider that energy costs are not a 
significant factor for their tenants. They therefore have little or no incentive to invest in 
consumption reduction improvements. This exacerbates the split incentives relating from 
building tenure experienced by 79% of research participants.   
Despite this negative picture of energy efficiency within existing non-domestic buildings 
the research identifies that there are drivers of change that will motivate owners and 
tenants to improve their energy performance (Objective 2). Both owners and tenants will 
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respond to regulatory change and easier access to grants. Regulatory change is given an 
average motivational rating of 8.2 out of 10 and grant access a score of 7.2. 92% of 
participants see regulatory change as the most significant driver of energy efficiency and 
conservation.  
Non-domestic building owners also consider customer pressure a motivator for change. 
Although this will drive change it is considered of lesser importance with a rating of 6.3 out 
of 10. For tenants energy price control emerges as the 3rd most significant factor for 
driving energy improvements with a score of 7.1.  
Understanding research participants’ actual motivators of change adds significant new 
knowledge to energy research and is used to develop an alternative framework for energy 
policy that will increase the adoption rate of energy efficiency and conservation 
opportunities (Objective 4). 
To date Energy Policy has been constructed on the premise that organisations will treat 
energy efficiency and conservation as a rational economic business decision. However, 
this research has proved that this is not the case.  
This research challenges the traditional approach to current Energy Policy, identifying that 
current policy drivers are less effective in delivering change than expected. For example, 
Energy Policy is based on the provision of information, voluntary good practice and low 
cost loans which research participants have rated as 6.0, 6.2 and 5.0 out of 10 putting 
them in 5th, 4th and 7th places in the table of factors that will motivate change. This gives 
them lower motivational value than regulations, grants and price manipulation.   
Energy Policy has been delivered in piecemeal fashion, which has delivered a policy 
framework that Janda (2009a) and Kelly (2010) consider complex, confusing and remote 
from day to day business activities. This complexity is recognised by the Environmental 
Audit Committee (2011) as having reduced the effectiveness of policies in raising 
awareness and delivering change.  
This research indicates that this approach is flawed and that businesses will only become 
engaged in energy improvement if there is sufficient incentive to do so. As energy 
comprises only 1-2% of overheads, Bright (2010) and Delay (2013) consider it insufficient 
to drive change. To achieve the re-prioritisation of energy efficiency and conservation the 
benefits of change must outweigh the cost of intervention. The research findings indicate 
that this alternative approach should be a simplified Energy Policy framework based on 
regulatory pressure and grant funding for improvement. This would be more likely to 
deliver energy savings for SMEs, which in turn could contribute greater carbon savings for 
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the UK. This alternative approach therefore delivers the key aim of this research; to 
identify how SMEs can be encouraged to maximise the financial benefits offered by 
energy efficiency and energy conservation. 
This proposed alternative approach is the Carbon Allowance Scheme, a mandatory 
system of non-tradable energy quotas that would be applied to each non-domestic energy 
consumer through the existing utility billing system. Consumption reduction could be 
driven by capping the amount of energy available to the user at the standard energy price 
with all energy consumed above this quota incurring a price penalty. In turn these penalty 
payments could be used to provide grant funding for SMEs’ energy efficient interventions.  
As it is would be introduced by legislation, with grants provided through the redistribution 
of premium payments, it incorporates the 2 key motivators of energy change: regulations 
and access to improvement grants. The use of pricing premiums introduces the 3rd 
motivator for tenants; price manipulation. 
The proposed alternative energy policy framework is based on three principles: firstly, 
owners and users of non-domestic buildings use too much energy; secondly, non-
domestic building tenure frequently presents barriers to owners and tenants when 
considering the adoption of energy efficiency and conservation opportunities; and thirdly, 
organisations should manage energy efficiency improvements within the constraints of 
their businesses and for their own benefit.  The proposed Carbon Allowance Scheme 
could ensure that all those consuming energy are responsible for reducing their 
consumption and consequently their carbon emissions. In return they could benefit 
directly from financial savings available. This follows the key concept of the polluter pays 
principle and the principles of fairness that the Environmental Audit Committee (2011) 
consider fundamental for energy change. 
The scheme could also work to reduce ownership barriers to the adoption of energy 
efficiency identified by research participants. The need to avoid proposed premium 
energy costs could drive non-domestic building users to seek energy efficient properties 
to reduce the cost of compliance and owners to improve their buildings’ energy 
performance to meet this customer pressure and demand. The scheme proposes to 
allocate annual energy quotas therefore energy improvements would need to be applied 
as a continual improvement process. Technical improvements delivering energy 
consumption opportunities continue to outstrip the needs of the Carbon Allowance 
Scheme so non-domestic building owners and tenants would be able to meet their 
obligations under the proposed regulation. 
 
152 
As the proposed scheme is based around the key business priority of making profits it 
would resonate closely with commercial organisations. It would link a simple system of 
‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’. Increased business, profitability as the result of energy conservation, 
would be offered as a ‘carrot’ that could be implemented within existing business systems 
whilst the consequent premium energy payment if consumption is not reduced would be 
the ‘stick’.  
It is recognised that it would have been beneficial to test SMEs’ views of the alternative 
energy policy framework proposed. However, to protect confidentiality and anonymity of 
research participants as described in Chapter 4 it has not been possible to re-contact 
participants for further input. It is proposed to obtain SMEs’ input through further research.  
Scenario planning is undertaken to assess the potential outcome of this Carbon 
Allowance Scheme. A series of scenarios testing various combinations of inputs (grants) 
and outputs (financial energy savings) are modelled to establish the optimum benefit for 
UK SMEs using ownership segmentation implemented within this research. In turn this 
modelling identifies a potential prioritisation for a staged introduction of the proposed 
regulation using the non-domestic ownership segmentation.  
Several alternative prioritisation routes for different opportunities are identified. These 
depend on the chosen programme objective; maximum energy savings over the life of the 
programme; an early peak in grant funding or ease of political and business acceptance 
of the Carbon Allowance Scheme. The scenarios that deliver each of these objectives will 
overcome the limitations of existing energy policy.  
Scenario planning suggests Segments ‘a’ and ‘d’ will offer the greatest rate of energy 
impact over the 10-year scenario-planning horizon. This will generate financial benefits for 
the maximum number of SMEs and greatest reduction in carbon emissions for the country 
in the medium to long-term. However, if efficiency, ease of SME engagement and political 
acceptance of the Carbon Allowance Scheme is the main objective of a phased 
introduction, prioritising members of Segment ‘b’ is most the appropriate strategy. Owner-
occupiers are a smaller, discrete group of non-domestic building users for whom energy 
costs represent a significant proportion of business overheads. As they both own and use 
their business premises there will be also fewer ownership barriers to energy efficiency. 
This thesis adds knowledge to academic research, business strategy and Energy Policy 
making and closes knowledge and research gaps identified in the review of literature in 
Chapter 2. The recognition of the significance and scope of barriers to energy efficiency 
and conservation improvement emanating from the ownership structures of non-domestic 
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buildings proves the hypothesis of this research and assists in closing the ‘Energy-
Efficiency Paradox’ identified by DeCanio (1993) and the energy-efficiency gap caused by 
non-domestic building tenure identified by this research.  
The impact of non-domestic building ownership is shown not only to discourage but more 
frequently to prevent SMEs from benefitting from the financial savings that are easily 
accessible from widely available, financially viable and retrofit feasible energy efficient 
technologies and behaviours (Objective 1). The impact of this on Energy Policy is 
established (Objective 3) and an alternative approach to Energy Policy to overcome this is 
proposed (Objective 4). Policy direction is changed from encouraging voluntary good 
behaviour through the expectation of economically rational responses to price stimuli to a 
framework based on delivering energy consumption reduction driven by the avoidance of 
risk (Objective 2).  
This single policy for all non-domestic energy consumers, which delivers the research aim 
of this thesis, is based on the key factors that SMEs and building owners have identified 
as their drivers of change. It will reduce the current complexity and bureaucracy so that 
UK SMEs can obtain financial benefits from energy efficiency whilst increasing their 
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Figure A1: UK Energy Policy Timeline  
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1996 – Emissions rose sharply 
as economy came out of 
recession   
1992 – 1997 market led 
energy policies                        
(ends when Labour win 
General Election) 
 
2000 – Energy efficiency policy 
decentralised to regions 
2001 – Carbon Trust 
established – aim to 
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2000 – energy policies 
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2012 – Energy efficiency 
policy disconnected from 
discussions about need 
for new electricity 
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2006 – Energy 
Policy becomes a 
major political 
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2005 – Commercial and 
Services sector emerge as 
policy gaps 
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Statement since 1993 – CO2 reduction, 
securing, affordability and competitive 
markets 
2010 CRC introduces regulation, 
requiring purchase of carbon 
credits. Plan is to recycle 
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companies. Regulations applies 
to 5000 sites with energy 
consumption >6000kWh. Covers 










2008 – Energy 
efficiency and 
supply becomes 













2011  – Renewable Heat 
Incentive financial 
incentives paid for heat 
generated from renewable 
sources 
2013 – The 
Green Deal 
launched to 






2014 – Mandatory 
minimum standards 
(Energy rating ‘E’) 



























Figure A3.1 Example of Scenario Planning Model 
KEY 
np The number of companies paying the premium rate for energy as a penalty for not 
meeting energy quota 
ng The number of companies able to receive a grant for energy efficiency improvements 
ns  The number of companies saving energy in order to save money and potentially 
avoid incurring a penalty in subsequent years 
Total Energy saved in £/a Estimated total financial value of energy that could be saved by 
companies within the segment  
Grant Fund at start of cycle Funding available for grants at the beginning of each Carbon 
Allowance Cycle 
Normalised inputs to the model represent data as a change versus the base value and are 
used to explore potential energy consumption reduction rather than absolute values of 
savings
PROPORTION OF GRANT FRUND DISTRIBUTED 0.5
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPANIES IN SEGMENT 2450000
PREMIUM RATE (ENERGY PENALTY) 5%
AVERAGE COST OF ENERGY PER YEAR (£) 80000




Grant fund at 




Grant fund at 
end of Carbon 
Allowance 
Cycle
0 0 0 0 612500 0
1 0 1837500 0 612500 3675000000
2 3675000000 1225000 245,557     -1470557 3059713125
3 3059713125 735000 147,334     -882334.4 2263184438
4 2263184438 490000 98,223      -588223 1620477469
5 1620477469 245000 49,111       -294111.5 1054681359
6 1054681359 196000 39,289      -235289.2 722894779.7
7 722894779.7 147000 29,467      -176466.9 508112964.8
8 508112964.8 98000 19,645      -117644.6 351833532.4
9 351833532.4 49000 9,822        -58822.3 224805291.2
10 224805291.2 24500 4,911        -29411.15 136846908.1
The exact number of companies within the segment is not known.  As explained in Chapter 6 the lack of engagement in 





















Grant fund at 
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Figure A4.1: Scenario planning models: Segment ‘a’ 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Scenario 7 Scenario 8





















































































Figure A4.2: Scenario planning models: Segment ‘b’ 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Scenario 7 Scenario 8









































































































































































Figure A4.3: Scenario planning models: Segment ‘c’ 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Scenario 7 Scenario 8




















































































Figure A4.4: Scenario planning models: Segment ‘d’ 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Scenario 7 Scenario 8




















































































Figure A4.5: Scenario planning models: Segment ‘f’ 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Scenario 7 Scenario 8




















































































Figure A4.6: Scenario planning models: Segment ‘g’ 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
95%
Allocation
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Scenario 7 Scenario 8





















































































Figure A4.7: Scenario planning models: Segment ‘h’ 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Scenario 5 Scenario 6
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Figure A4.8: Scenario planning models: Segment ‘i’ 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Scenario 5 Scenario 6
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Figure A5.1: Financial Savings resulting from the Carbon Allowance Scheme 
 
